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THREATS AND CHALLENGES 

TO 

MARITIME SECURITY 2020 


PREPARED BY: 

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE 

& 

U.S. COAST GUARD INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION 

CENTER 


1 MARCH 1999 




1 / 0 3 

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LC Control Number 



II lllllllll mini iim ii 
99 491701 

















THREATS AND CHALLENGES TO 
MARITIME SECURITY 2020 



FOREWORD 


1 March 1999 

This document is a broad overview of the forces, events, and activities that may shape the maritime security 
environment of the next two decades. It is primarily intended as an information tool for use by policy 
makers, strategic planners, integrated systems analysts, and force structure planners. It has been produced 
largely in support of the goals, objectives and responsibilities of the Department of Transportation and the 
United States Coast Guard. However, we believe it may also be of value to the Department of Defense, 
Department of the Navy, and other government organizations having responsibilities or interest in maritime 
affairs or transnational issues. 

The study has been co-produced by the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center and the Office of 
Naval Intelligence. It draws upon extensive research and the expertise of the academic, scientific, and 
intelligence communities. It has been reviewed by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central 
Intelligence Agency. 

Please address any questions or comments regarding this study to the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination 
Center. 

Phone: Commercial (301) 669-4565; DSN prefix 659 
Fax (UNCLAS): (301) 669-4566 

MSG PLA: COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC 

Mailing Address: Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center 

National Maritime Intelligence Center 
4251 Suitland Road 
Washington, DC 20395-5720 


THIS REPORT CONTAINS COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION OF THE 
TEXT AND IMAGES CONTAINED HEREIN ARE PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE 
COPYRIGHT OWNERS. 












INTRODUCTION 


There are few constants in today’s ever-changing world, but one of them certainly is 
man's reliance upon the sea. From the ancient Greeks and Romans to today, civilized 
man has depended upon the sea for food, transport, and the fundamental communication 
of peoples and commerce. The same will hold true 20 years from now; in fact, the 
increasingly interconnected world of 2020 may be more reliant on the sea than ever for 
food, transportation, energy, and even minerals. Maritime security, therefore, will be 
critical to the basic functioning of the global economy of 2020. To prepare for the near 
future, we must assess, to the best of our ability, the security environment we will face 
in the next two decades. 

First, what is “maritime security?” It can be considered in the classical military sense as 
protection of the homeland and the nation's commerce from conventional seaborne 
military attack. That definition could be broadened to include security from any hostile 
force on the seas, be it military, pirate, or terrorist. Maritime security can also be thought 
of as the safety of life and property at sea, whether the threat be natural or manmade. It 
can also be viewed from the law enforcement perspective - drug trafficking at sea is a 
threat to the nation’s security, as is the maritime trafficking in human beings. It could 
even be a reference to the protection of the natural marine environment. Finally, maritime 
security can be broadly defined in a national security context to include the protection 
of all of the nation’s interests on the seas. 

Today’s maritime, and other security threats are not like yesterday’s or tomorrow’s. 
Over time, some threats will remain, others emerge, and yet others will disappear, 
overcome by technology and geopolitical changes, or rendered obsolete by other forces. 
By 2020. for example, access to ocean surveillance information from space-based sensors 
may be so advanced as to render unnecessary some of the traditional methods of 
reconnaissance. On the other hand, many of the maritime security challenges of 2020 
will still have to be addressed at sea, and will require an appropriate response force 
capability to confront such challenges effectively and efficiently. This, of course, 
translates to having the resources, assets, technology, and supporting infrastructure 
required to meet the threats and challenges of today - and tomorrow - in the littoral 
regions, across the sea lines of communication, and in the deepwater environment. 

Threats and Challenges to Maritime Security 2020 presents some of the forces, events, 
and activities foreseen in the next 20 years that will have broadly defined maritime 
security implications. The focus is not on the capabilities and threats posed by foreign 
navies, but on 1) the overarching forces and events that will shape the maritime security 
environment in 2020, and 2) the actual activities occurring in that environment and their 
relation to maritime security. The reader may view the majority of subjects treated in 
this paper as unconventional or asymmetric, and so they are. At first glance, some of 
the subjects may even appear irrelevant to maritime security, as considered in the classical 


i 





INTRODUCTION 


sense. However, the world of 1999 is becoming more interconnected and complicated 
by the day. Traditional concepts of national security are being reevaluated and expanded. 
Defining what is and what is not in the national interest in the post-Cold War world is an 
ongoing debate. The world is changing, and issues presented in this paper may very 
well be the critical issues of maritime security in 2020. 

The information in the following pages has been jointly produced by the U.S. Coast 
Guard Intelligence Coordination Center and the Office of Naval Intelligence. In its 
preparation we have drawn upon the expertise of the academic, scientific, and intelligence 
communities to assist us in predicting-to the best of our ability—the maritime security 
environment for the first two decades of the new millennium. This publication may be 
used for a variety of strategic planning purposes, including force structure and the 
development of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C ISR) requirements. We believe it will play a critical 
role in articulating the future threats and challenges which require a response from U.S. 
forces. 



Ernest R. Riutta 

Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard 
Assistant Commandant for Operations 
and Senior Intelligence Officer 



Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy 
Director of Naval Intelligence 
and Commander, Office of 
Naval Intelligence 


11 











TABLE OF CONTENTS 


FOREWORD 

INTRODUCTION. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 


CHAPTER I. A CHANGING OCEAN ENVIRONMENT 


A. CLIMATE CHANGE. 1-1 

B. IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE. 1-1 

1. Global Warming.1-1 

2. Ocean Temperature.1-2 

3. Sea Level Rises.1-3 

4. Storm Trends.1-4 

5. Ice Formation.1-5 

C. UNCERTAINTIES STILL EXIST. 1-5 


CHAPTER II. CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY .11-1 

A. FORCES AFFECTING MARITIME SECURITY .11-1 

1. Economy.11-1 

2. Migration.11-3 

3. Non-state Actors.11-18 

a. Civil Actors.11-19 

b. Non-civil Actors.11-20 

4. Technology.11-28 

a. Platforms.11-30 

b. Naval Weapons Systems.11-30 

c. Navigation.11-31 

d. Technological Impact on Asymmetric Warfare.11-31 

e. Ocean Monitoring.11-32 

5. Information Operations.11-39 

6. Law of the Sea.11-41 


iii 































TABLE OF CONTENTS 


B. DESTABILIZING EVENTS .. 11-44 

1. Political-Military Engagements.11-44 

2. Natural Disasters. 11-48 

3. Other Emergencies. 11-49 

CHAPTER III. THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 

A. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES. IM-1 

1. Natural Resource Exploitation. 111-1 

a. Living Marine Resources.111-1 

b. Exploitation of Non-living Marine Resources.II1-7 

c. Maritime Safety and Security Requirements. 111-14 

2. Legal Maritime Trade and Activities. 111-19 

a. Container Shipping. 111-19 

b. Bulk and Bulk-break Cargo. 111-20 

c. Tankers. 111-21 

d. Nuclear Waste. 111-21 

e. Port Infrastructure.111-22 

f. Cruise Ships and Ferries. 111-24 

g. Underwater Cables. 111-26 

3. Illegal Maritime Trade and Activities. 111-27 

a. Drugs/Narcotics. 111-27 

b. Arms Proliferation. 111-33 

c. Unlawful Migrant Entry Methods. 111-38 

B. POLLUTION AND DEGRADTION OF 

NATURAL RESOURCES .111-43 

1. Coastal Population Growth.111-43 

2. Nonpoint-source Pollution.111-44 

3. Marine Accidents.111-45 

4. Ocean Dumping.111-46 

5. Noise Pollution.111-46 

6. Invasive Species.MI-46 

a. Marine Environment.111-47 

b. Terrestrial Environment.111-48 


iv 



































TABLE OF CONTENTS 


APPENDIX A. FUTURE TRENDS IN COMMERCIAL SPACE-BASED 
REMOTE SENSING. A-1 

APPENDIX B. PROJECTED SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE/ELECTRONIC 
WARFARE INFORMATION WARFARE THREAT TO U.S. COAST 
GUARD 2010. B-1 

APPENDIX C. UNCERTAINTIES IN MODELING 

CLIMATE CHANGE. C-1 

APPENDIX D. BIBLIOGRAPHY.. D-1 


v 






























EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 


Maritime security will be of vital importance to the world of 2020, and particularly to 
maritime nations such as the United States. The oceans are, and will remain, a key 
source of food, energy, transportation, trade, and communications. It will be a continual 
challenge to ensure the oceans remain a safe and stable source of these needs. 

The overall changes affecting the world of the future are aptly described as globalization. 
According to A National Security Strategy for a New Century , recently published by the 
White House: 

“Globalization - the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural and political 
integration - means that more and more we, as a nation, are affected by events beyond our 
borders. Outlaw states and ethnic conflicts threaten regional stability and economic progress 
in many important areas of the world. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, drug 
trafficking and organized crime are global concerns that transcend national borders.” 1 

Certainly, many of the concepts and threats described here have a maritime component. 

A good deal of uncertainty is involved in predicting the world 20 years into the future. 
Several issues or events may have a great effect on maritime security in 2020, but the 
direction or even the occurrences cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy. 
Regional conflicts, natural disasters, asymmetric warfare carried out by hostile states or 
non-civil, non-state actors, and unforeseen technological developments are all examples 
of wildcards that may affect maritime security in 2020. Even with these uncertainties, 
however, certain trends shaping the maritime security environment of 2020 can be 
predicted. 

Significant Changes Affecting the Maritime Environment 

There will be several striking trends affecting security in the maritime environment of 
2020. Most of these trends are part of larger global changes that will have effects beyond 
the maritime sphere. Some of the most salient changes that will affect the maritime 
environment include the following: 

Legal maritime trade, driven by global economic growth and flourishing international 
trade, will triple by 2020. 

• The most explosive growth will be in the container shipping industry. The trend will 
be toward larger ships carrying more containers. The volume of cargo and size of 
ships will require U.S. ports to expand their infrastructure and deepen their channels 
to remain competitive. Smaller but faster container ships, travelling at speeds 


1 The White House. A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1998), 1. 








EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 


of up to 40 knots, may ply the coastal trade routes between U.S. ports. The movement 
of these relatively large vessels at such high speeds could create safety concerns in 
the coastal shipping lanes. 

• Tanker traffic in U.S. waters will increase substantially by 2020 as U.S. oil imports 
rise. The increasing energy demand in the United States and decreasing domestic 
petroleum production will drive oil imports from 46 percent of U.S. petroleum 
consumption in 1996 to 66 percent in 2020. 

• The number and size of cruise ships will increase significantly through 2020. The 
number of cruise ships will likely double, and some of the newest cruise ships will 
be twice the size of cruise ships built in past decades. The Caribbean will remain the 
busiest region for these ships, but more routes to remote areas such as Antarctica 
will open. 

• High-speed ferries will be a burgeoning transportation business in 2020. Ferry speeds 
will increase as ferry companies try to compete with other forms of transportation, 
such as commuter airlines. Ferry speeds may reach 80 or even 100 knots, posing 
significant safety challenges in busy coastal zones. 

Non-state actors will challenge the sovereignty of the state and have a greater effect on 
international affairs by 2020. While the state will still play the predominant role in the 
international political system, non-state actors such as the media, non-governmental 
organizations, and multinational corporations will play roles of unprecedented importance 
in national and international security. Environmental activist groups, in particular, will 
have great influence in the maritime sphere. 

Organized crime will increase in influence and scope through 2020 as organized crime 
groups become increasingly entrenched in the international economy and as demand for 
and profits from the illicit transportation of people, drugs, and contraband multiply. 
These crime groups will take advantage of growing global maritime trade to move their 
products more efficiently using commercial means. 

Adversaries of the United States will be more likely to engage in asymmetric warfare 
such as terrorism, sabotage, information operations, and chemical or biological attacks. 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons will also remain a concern. Challenges from 
future conventional maritime weaponry could include aircraft, antiship cruise missiles, 
patrol combatants and larger naval surface combatants, submarines, mines, special 
operations forces, small craft, coastal artillery, ballistic missiles, and even weapons 
available to ground combat units operating along the shoreline. Military operations in 
times of tension short of war during sanctions enforcement, non-combatant evacuations 


Vlll 





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 


or shipping escort operations, for example, could take place very near the routine operating 
areas of potentially hostile forces. The majority of future maritime threats, however, 
will originate from individual states and stateless organizations with naval capabilities 
ranging from a limited ability to operate within their own territorial waters to the almost 
nonexistent. Therefore, the world’s littorals will be the most stressing environment for 
U.S. maritime forces through 2020. 

The capabilities of space-based ocean monitoring systems will greatly increase through 
2020. The resolution and availability of imagery from commercial electro-optical and 
synthetic aperture radar satellites will improve dramatically. There will be numerous 
applications for this technology, such as navigation, surveillance, search and rescue, 
and monitoring of oil spills. Surveillance and targeting technology will become more 
complex and capable, with space surveillance systems expected to assume a more 
important role in reconnaissance and target cueing. This technology, however, will also 
be available to potential adversaries, such as organized crime, terrorists, and hostile 
states. 

Exploitation of non-living marine resources likely will increase by 2020. The world 
increasingly will probe and exploit the oceans for energy and minerals to fuel its 
expanding economy. Furthermore, exploration, drilling, and mining operations will 
move farther offshore as new technology advances the ability to operate in deeper waters. 
More facilities and operations in deeper waters will create more maritime safety and 
security challenges. 

Issues of Continuing Concern 

Several of today’s concerns regarding the maritime environment will continue as pressing 
issues in 2020. Specifically: 

Worldwide demand for fish will increase through 2020, stressing already fully fished 
and overexploited stocks, reinforcing the need for sound fisheries management practices, 
and creating potential conflict among states competing for scarce fisheries resources. 
This will be a major concern for the United States, which has the world’s largest exclusive 
economic zone, containing an estimated 20 percent of the world's fishery resources. 

Drug trafficking will plague the United States through 2020, driven by continued high 
demand for illicit drugs. Traffickers in the future will rely increasingly on commercial 
transportation systems to move their products. They also will use successful non¬ 
commercial means, remaining flexible in altering methods in response to law enforcement 
tactics. 


ix 





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 


International migration, fueled by tremendous population increases in developing 
countries and uneven global economic growth, will be one of the most important factors 
affecting maritime security through 2020. World population will increase by two billion 
people by 2020, with most of this growth in developing countries. Migrating to the 
United States will remain an attractive choice for many, and people trying to illegally 
immigrate to the United States by boat will continue as a maritime security challenge. 

Degradation of the marine environment will remain a substantial concern in 2020. The 
marine environments near most developed states will be healthier in 2020 than today, 
because of these states’ commitment to stricter standards in shipping and environmental 
protection. However, developing states will not have the same commitment and ability, 
and the marine environments around these states will likely deteriorate. 


x 





CHAPTER I 

A CHANGING OCEAN ENVIRONMENT 


A. CLIMATE CHANGE 

During the past century, man has introduced greenhouse gases into the atmosphere that 
may cause extreme global consequences. The carbon dioxide (CO,) level today is 
estimated to be 30 percent above pre-industrial age levels. Paralleling this rise in CO,, 
the mean global surface air temperature is believed to have risen between 0.3 and 0.6°C 

since 1900. Scientists are not certain whether this temperature 
increase is caused by the increase in CO„ or is simply due to natural 
variation in the global climate. Nevertheless, the balance of evidence 
suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global 
climate. 1 

International efforts to limit greenhouse gases may have some 
impact on future release rates. However, CO, has a long residual 
lifetime (about 100 years), and even if emissions of CO, were 
reduced today it would still take centuries for its concentration in 
the atmosphere to decrease significantly. Attempts to limit CO, 
emissions that result from the burning of traditional fossil fuels 
may have an effect on maritime operations similar to the effect of 
bans on Freon and other halocarbons, especially if new fuels and 
propulsion plants are mandated through legislation. 

B. IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 

Maritime operations have always been susceptible to the effects of weather. The 
implications of a warming trend, then, must be examined in order to prepare for future 
operations. Among the impacts that a warming trend could have on global climate and 
weather patterns, which in turn could affect maritime operations, are changes to ocean 
currents, frequency and strength of oceanic storms, winds, frequency of fog, sea-ice 
distribution and thickness, and sea level rise. 2 

1. Global Warming 

Global climate models predict that global temperatures will continue to rise. The “best 
estimate” values, as modeled by organizations contributing to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), project an increase of about 2°C by 2100 in global 


Our planet has the wrong name. 
Our ancestors named it Earth, af¬ 
ter the land they found around 
them.... If the ancients had 
known what the earth is really 
like they undoubtedly would have 
named it Ocean after the tremen¬ 
dous areas of water that cover 
70.8 percent of its surface. 

- Leonard Engel 
“The Sea” 


1 John Houghton and others, eds.. Climate Change 1995. The Science of Climate Change, Summary for Policy Makers . 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10. 

2 Alan Robock, “Global Warming: State of the Science,” Testimony before the House Committee on Science, Subcommittee 
on Energy and Environment, Oct 1997, 2. 


1-1 









A CHANGING OCEAN ENVIRONMENT 


mean surface air temperatures relative to 1990. Refining certain parameters in the model 
give a range of a 1 to 3.5 C increase, depending on the sensitivity of the climate to 
atmospheric aerosol composition and concentrations. By 2020, the IS92 model 
(considered “best estimate”) global mean temperature is expected to increase by about 
0.4°C. 3 

2. Ocean Temperature 

Due to the large heat capacity of water, the oceans can absorb a good deal of any 
atmospheric warming. However, much uncertainty exists relating to the impact of warmer 
air on complex global and hemispheric oceanic circulation. An important mechanism 
for distributing temperature extremes on the planet is thermohaline circulation. That is, 
at the poles, cold, saline water sinks to the bottom of the ocean basin, travels slowly 
toward the equator, and rises, thus cooling tropical waters. It is a combination of the 
vertical motion of the thermohaline circulation with wind-driven surface currents, which 
produces ocean currents. 4 



Figure 1-1. Sea Water Stratification. 5 

The simulations of the climate model of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) project that 
the global thermohaline circulation will decrease in intensity as global warming occurs. 

This will be due to enhanced precipitation and runoff from the continents in high latitudes. 

The faster the build-up of CO,, the greater the eventual reduction in the thermohaline 
circulation and the longer the delay in its recovery. 6 Some scientists believe the 

' John Houghton and others, eds., Climate Change 1995, The Science of Climate Change. Summary for Policy Makers . 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 45. 

4 George L. Pickard and William J. Emery, Descriptive Physical Oceanography (Oxford, United Kingdom: Pergamon Press 
Ltd., 1990). 

5 John M. Collins, Military Geography: For Professionals and the Public (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University 
Press, 1998), 49. 

6 U.S. Global Change Research Information Office, “Our Changing Planet: FY 1999”, report from the USGC Research 
Program, 1998, accessed online, URL:<http://www.gcrio.org/ocp99/ch2.html>. 


1-2 















A CHANGING OCEAN ENVIRONMENT 


slowing of this circulation could result in dramatic temperature changes in coastal climates 
influenced by this circulation, such as Britain, Iceland, and the northeast United States. 
In addition, it could affect both living marine resources and the formation of mid-latitude 
storms/hurricanes. 

3. Sea Level Rises 

Over the past 100 years, global sea levels are estimated to have risen by about 5 to 25 
cm, based on analyses of tide gauge records. The IS92 model (considered “best estimate”) 
projects an increase in sea level of about 7 cm by 2020. 7 Another recent research effort 
used the same IPCC model, adding refined forcing indices, and reproduced similar results 
at year 2020. 8 Seawater thermal expansion, which is closely dependent on atmospheric 
warming, is the most significant cause of rising sea levels. Other factors changing sea 
levels include mountain glacier retreat and polar ice sheet ablation (erosion by melting) 
or accumulation. 9 

Even small increases in sea level can affect low-lying coastal areas and islands. The 
southern Atlantic and Gulf coasts, which are subsiding (sinking), are highly vulnerable. 
This is particularly true of southern Florida, where a third of the Everglades has an 
elevation of less than 12 inches 10 (30 cm) above sea level. The Marshall Islands, one of 
the United States territories in the Pacific, lie almost entirely within three meters of sea 
level. 

Cities close to sea level are being increasingly affected by subsidence due to overuse of 
groundwater. (High demand on underground aquifers can cause subsidence if aquifers 
are not allowed sufficient time to refill.) A rise in sea level could severely limit the 
regions available in densely populated areas for habitation and agriculture. 11 Home ports 
for maritime forces located near these cities would also be affected. 

a. Effects on Coastal Ecosystems 

This anticipated rise in sea level would place stress upon coastal ecosystems. As a result, 
river deltas, estuaries, beaches, wetlands, coral reefs, mangrove forests, and sea grass 
beds may face degradation or eradication as new sea levels affect substrate, 12 

7 John Houghton and others, eds., Climate Change 1995. The Science of Climate Change. Summary for Policy Makers . Intergov¬ 
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 46. 

x Thomas M.L. Wigley, “The Kyoto Protocol: CO,, CH 4 and Climate Implications,” Geophysical Research Letters . 25, (1998): 
2285-2288. 

9 John Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing , 2 nd Ed. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 109. 

10 White House Initiative, “Climate Change: State of Knowledge,” 1998, accessed online, 

URL:<http://www. whitehouse.gov/Initiatives/climate/next 100-plain. html>. 

11 John Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing , 2 nd Ed. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1 14 

12 Substrate refers to a surface on which plants or animals can grow or attach themselves to. 


1-3 










A CHANGING OCEAN ENVIRONMENT 


wave energy and bottom slope. 13 This degradation 
will reduce or limit areas needed by living marine 
resources to reproduce and feed. 

4. Storm Trends 

Warmer temperatures will lead to a more vigorous 
hydrological cycle. This translates into prospects for 
more severe droughts and/or floods in some places 
and less severe droughts and/or floods in other places. 
Knowledge is currently insufficient to say whether 
there will be any changes in the occurrence or 
geographical distribution of severe storms, such as 
tropical cyclones and mid-latitude storms. 

Evidence that the El Nino - Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO) 14 has varied in period, recurrence interval, 
and area and strength of impact is found in historical 
instrumental data and in palaeoclimatic data. The 
cause of these variations is not known. The rather 
abrupt change in ENSO and atmospheric circulation 
around 1976-77 has continued. Since then, there have 
been relatively more frequent ENSO episodes, with 
only rare appearances of the La Nina 1 '’ phenomenon. 
This ENSO behavior since 1989 is unusual in the 
context of the last 120 years. 16 Current knowledge of 
the ENSO phenomenon does not allow for accurate 
forecasting of future trends. However, research into 
ENSO and its effects has increased and may provide 
more information in the next ten years. 1 ' 


Reynolds Monthly SST (°C) 



El Nino Conditions December 1 $97 



100 C E 140°E 18CT 140°V 100°W 60°W 

TAG Omtd/F>«LA'IOrv*. 


Figure 1-2. These graphics represent the sea 
surface temperature during La Nina, and El Nino. 


13 George Maul, ed.. Climatic Change in the Intra-American Sea (New York, NY, Edward Arnold, 1993). 

14 El Nino is an irregularly occurring flow of unusually warm surface water along the western coast of South America 
caused by diminishing or reversed prevailing east to west winds across the Southern Pacific. ENSO is accompanied by 
abnormally high rainfall in typically arid areas and also prevents upwelling of nutrient rich cold deepwater, causing a 
decline in regional fish populations. 

15 La Nina and El Nino are opposite phases of the ENSO cycle, with La Nina sometimes referred to as the cold phase of 
ENSO and El Nino as the warm phase of ENSO. 

1(1 John Houghton and others, eds., Climate Change 1995. The Science of Climate Change. Summary for Policy Makers . 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 167-168. 

17 For example, ongoing research by NASA’s Mission to Earth program indicates there is correlation between ENSO and 
the duration of the North Atlantic ice season. 


1-4 



























A CHANGING OCEAN ENVIRONMENT 


5. Ice Formation 

Of concern to mariners and scientists studying global warming is the effect of the warming 
upon the Arctic/Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets and glaciers. The threat is two¬ 
pronged; sea level rising and the iceberg danger to shipping . 18 



Figure 1-3. Iceberg Routes to the North Atlantic. 


Most of the non-oceanic water on Earth resides in the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, 
and most of its volume lies on land above sea level. Thus, loss of only a small fraction 
of this volume could have a significant effect on sea level. In Antarctica, temperatures 
are so low that very little surface melting occurs and the ice loss is mainly by iceberg 
“calving,” the rates of which are determined by long term processes. In contrast, in 
Greenland, ice loss from surface melting and runoff is of the same order of magnitude 
as loss from iceberg calving. Consequently, climate change in Greenland could be 
expected to have immediate effects on the surface mass of the ice sheet through melting 
and runoff . 19 

C. UNCERTAINTIES STILL EXIST 

Scientists studying climate change generally agree that there are still uncertainties in 
general circulation model (GCM) results. While there is agreement that the global climate 
will continue to change, exactly where and how these changes will be realized is not 
known. At this time, models cannot predict which continents will suffer or benefit from 
climate change. (Refer to Appendix C for further discussion.) 

18 John M. Collins. Military Geography: For Professionals and the Public (Washington. D.C.: National Defense University Press, 
1998),101. 

19 John Houghton and others. Climate Change 1995, The Science of Climate Change, Summary for Policy Makers . Intergov¬ 
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 378-379. 


1-5 















































CHAPTER II 

CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


A. FORCES AFFECTING MARITIME SECURITY 

A variety of factors, many beyond the scope of the maritime arena, will have a substantial 
effect on maritime security through 2020. Most will be neither inherently stabilizing or 
destabilizing, but will encompass elements of each. These forces are already at work 
today; indeed, many profoundly affect the maritime security environment. By 2020, 
some will retain their prominence, and others will rise markedly in influence. Among 
these forces, of primary importance in 2020 will be global economic change, international 
migration, the growing importance of non-state actors, technological development, and 
the emergence of information operations. 

1. Economy 

The global economy will be one of the primary forces affecting activity in the international 
maritime environment through the year 2020. There are several enduring macro-economic 
trends that virtually all economic forecasters agree will characterize the international 
economic environment of the 21 st century. These trends are growing international trade, 
global economic growth, and macro-stability/micro-instability. 

Although international trade has grown for many years and most experts believe that it 
will continue to grow in the long term, a debate exists as to the direction that growing 
trade will take. The debate is characterized by three main views: 

Globalization. This view holds that increases in international trade prove that 
global economic integration is taking place, driven in part by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and the resulting spread of free-market capitalism 
among the Soviet successor countries, in Eastern Europe, and among former 
Soviet client states elsewhere. Such integration is forcing economies around the 
world to depend more upon one another. According to this view, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (GATT) 
will typify the future international trade environment. 1 

Regionalization. This view holds that the increase in international trade signals 
a regionalization of trade. The end of the bipolar Cold War world system has not 
resulted in a world without poles, but rather with a multipolar world based on 
regional interests. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
European Union (EU), and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
typify the future international trade environment in this view. 


1 Allen Hammond. Which World? Scenarios for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1997), 30. 


II-1 







CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


Regionalization Leading to Globalization. In this hybrid view, the creation ot 
regional trade groups and agreements is driving international trade now, but is 
an intermediate step toward an inevitable globalization of trade. 2 


Many other issues also are debated 
among experts on international 
trade. However, general agreement 
exists that international trade will 
continue to grow, and this growth is 
the real long-term trend on which 
maritime planners should 
concentrate. For the United States, 
this growth in trade is shown in 
Figure II-1. 3 


The effects of increasing trade on the maritime interests of the United States are many 
and varied. Approximately 98 percent of this trade is maritime, and at current growth 
rates, U.S. maritime trade will likely triple by 2020. 4 This tripling of trade will strain the 
U.S. port and intermodal transportation infrastructure. If the U.S. infrastructure does 
not keep pace with the increasing volume of trade, bottlenecks will occur or trade may 
be diverted to other North American ports, especially with the NAFTA agreement 
facilitating the transshipment of cargoes destined for the United States through Canadian 
and Mexican ports. 

In addition to the infrastructure challenges presented by growing international trade, 
safety challenges may emerge. A growing volume of cargo traffic will lead to increasing 
congestion of the nation's waterways, especially the deep-draft waterways capable of 
handling the largest international vessels. This growing congestion may lead to an 
increased number of maritime accidents, which in turn would lead to increased U.S. 
expenditures on Port State Control, law enforcement, and vessel traffic control services. 

Since at least the end of the Cold War, the dominant trend in the overall world economy 
has been growth and stability. In most nations around the world, every measure of material 
progress has shown an increase. These include measures of the wealth of nations, such 
as gross national product, and also measures of the wealth of individuals, such as per 
capita income. The National Intelligence Council's long-term projections forecast a 
continuation of this trend with real per capita income growing at over 2 percent per 


2 John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene, Megatrends 2000 (New York. NY: William Morrow & Co., 1990), 22. 

3 U.S. Exports/Imports History: Historical Summary 1992-1997 . CD-ROM. (Washington. D.C.: Bureau of the Census, 1998). 

4 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard 2020 (Washington, D.C.: United States Coast Guard, 1998), 4 and Charles Bookman, 
“U.S. Seaports: At the Crossroads of the Global Economy,” Issues in Science and Technology (Fall 1996): 71. 



1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 

Year 


Figure 11-1. U.S. International Trade, 
1992 to 1997. (Tot exp. + Tot imp.) 


II-2 

















































































CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


year.'’ This widespread, long-term growth is attributable to factors such as increased 
global trade and increased adoption of technology that has continued to raise individual 
productivity around the world. As this trend continues, global economic growth and 
stability will bring increasing material wealth to countries around the world. 

The path to economic growth, however, is not always smooth, as evidenced by the 
recent East Asian financial crisis and Russian default. Global economic growth is uneven 
and not uniformly distributed; this is referred to as macro-stability/micro-instability. 
From now until 2020, while it is predicted that the world economy will grow overall, 
there undoubtedly will be individual countries, and individual groups within countries, 
that will suffer significant setbacks. In fact, there is growing evidence that the economic 
rift between the developed nations and the developing nations is widening. This 
potentially growing inequity undoubtedly will lead to tensions and instability. 

This dichotomous nature in global economic growth has several implications for U.S. 
maritime interests. The developed world, with its increasing wealth, will look even 
more appealing as a destination for citizens of less developed nations. The United States, 
then, can expect economic pressures to increase immigration from Latin American and 
Asian countries. In addition, full-blown economic crises that will strike individual 
countries may trigger political instability, and perhaps a full-scale mass exodus of illegal 
migrants. 

2. Migration 

“In view of the imbalances in demographic trends between “have” and “have-not” 
societies, it seems unlikely that there will not be great waves of migration in the 
twenty-first century.” 6 


Paul Kennedy 


International migration, fueled by tremendous population increases in developing 
countries and uneven global economic growth, will be one of the most important factors 
affecting maritime security through 2020. This is particularly true for the United States, 
long a preferred destination for migrants the world over. While it is impossible to predict 
how many people from individual countries will attempt to migrate to the United States 
in the 2020 timeframe, many experts agree that the migration issue will be of great 
concern to U.S. national security. Furthermore, illegal migration via maritime means 
will be the most visible and problematic. “[Migrations by boat seem to evoke the greatest 
perception of threat, and hence the highest political levels of attention." 7 


5 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2010 (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 1997), 2. 

6 Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (New York, NY: 1 st Vintage Books Edition, 1993), 44. 

7 Michael S. Teitelbaum, “International Migration as a Pivotal Issue,” The Pivotal States . Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul 

Kennedy, eds. (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 1999), 273. 


II-3 









CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


Most of the world’s population growth over the next 20 years will be in developing 
countries. World population will increase from 6 billion in 1999 to 8 billion by 2020, s 
with around 95 percent of that growth in the developing world. The relationship between 
population growth and its potential to disrupt the international security environment, 
however, is not simply a function of population increases. Instead, population growth 
becomes a security concern when the effects of such growth (size, age breakdowns, 
urbanization, and annual growth rates for example), clash with standing economic 
resources and political institutions. 9 The huge population increases in many developing 
countries will overburden their labor markets, public systems, and social services, creating 
unrest and the incentive for migration. 


The movement of people between countries is driven by the interaction of two forces — 
the negative reality of life at home (often because of political violence, social instability, 
economic problems, or a combination of these) and the perception that a better life 
exists elsewhere. International migration spurred by a decline of social welfare or internal 
political unrest has become more common over the past decades and will continue to 
drive the movement of many people. 10 As a result, migration, the most natural economic 
response to population explosions and worsening living conditions in developing states, 
will remain a major challenge to global stability well into the twenty-first century." 


RANK 

COUNTRY 

POPULATION 

1 

China 

1,246,871,951 

2 

India 

1,000,848,550 

3 

United States 

272,639,608 

4 

Indonesia 

216,108,345 

5 

Brazil 

171,853,126 

6 

Russia 

146,393,569 

7 

Pakistan 

138,123,359 

8 

Bangladesh 

129,798,253 

9 

Japan 

126,182,077 

10 

Nigeria 

113,828,587 


Table 11-1. Countries Ranked by Population: 1999. 12 


8 United Nations 1998 Revision of the World Population Estimates and Projections, Population Division: Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, “Revision of the World Population Estimates and Projections,” accessed online, URL: <http://www.popin.org/ 
pop/1998/>. 

9 Jack A. Goldstone, “Population and Pivotal States,” The Pivotal States . Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds. 
(New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 1999), 248. 

10 Patrick M. Cronin, ed., 2015: Power and Progress (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), 61. 

11 Hamish McRae, The World in 2020 (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1994), 116. 

12 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. “Countries ranked by Population: 1999,” accessed online,URL: <http:// 
www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbrank.pl>. 


II-4 























CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


RANK 

COUNTRY 

POPULATION 

1 

China 

1,397,433,520 

2 

India 

1,340,864,767 

3 

United States 

323,051,790 

4 

Indonesia 

276,016,988 

5 

Brazil 

204,186,970 

6 

Pakistan 

198,723,118 

7 

Nigeria 

183,962,179 

8 

Bangladesh 

172,098,472 

9 

Russia 

141,310,968 

10 

Mexico 

134,387,283 


Table 11-2. Countries Ranked by Population: 2020. 13 


The world of 2020 will see increasing disparities between the haves and the have-nots, 
not only between the rich and poor in a given country, but also between the developed 
and developing nations. Latin America, for example, has the highest income disparities 
in the world; in Brazil, the top fifth of the population has 32 times the income of the 
bottom fifth. This is only expected to worsen in the future. 14 Income disparities between 
developed and developing nations are expected to widen as well. In 1995, the average 
annual income gap per person between developed and developing nations was 
approximately $18,000. By 2020, that difference will increase to about $30,000 (in 
1995 dollars). 15 These inequities in the global economy will be primary incentives for 
international migration toward developed nations such as the United States. 

Due to the factors that draw the poor to the United States, in 2020—as in 1999—there 
will be more people wanting to migrate to the United States than will be legally permitted. 
The illegal migration problem will therefore remain, and in all likelihood worsen. Illegal 
migration to the United States will vary, with Latin America and the Caribbean continuing 
as the primary source, followed by several Asian nations. Migration in 2020 from 
particular regions and countries is addressed below. 

a. Latin America and the Caribbean 

Latin America and the Caribbean, the region with the greatest potential migration impact 
on the United States, will be the world's second fastest growing region over the 


13 u.s. Census Bureau, International Data Base. “Countries Ranked by Population: 2020,” accessed online, URL: chttp:// 
www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbrank.pl>. 

14 Allen Hammond. Which World? Scenarios for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1997), 81. 

15 ibid., 80. 


II-5 






















CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


next 20 years. By 2020, Latin America’s population will 
be close to 800 million and will constitute close to 10 
percent of the global population. 16 While the Latin 
American economy as a whole also is expected to grow, 
the distribution of wealth will not be uniform, and the 
number of poor will increase. The economic and social 
opportunities available in the United States, its 
geographic proximity, and the large populations of Latin 
American and Caribbean natives already living in the 
United States will continue to make the United States a 
desirable destination. 


The maritime illegal migration of Caribbean people, 
particularly Cubans, Haitians, and Dominicans, to the 
United States has been particularly serious over the last 
20 years. Illegal migration from these countries over 
the next two decades will take two forms. First, a rather 
constant stream of people will arrive in the United States 
by varied illegal means, most using maritime transit for 
some part of the trip. Second will be the more dramatic 
problem of a mass migration from one or more countries 
by maritime means - a “boatlift”- as has happened 
several times in the past. 



Figure 11-2. 

Interdicting Cuban rafters. 


b. Cuba 

The future of Cuban migration, like everything else in Cuba, is inextricably linked to the future of the 
government of Fidel Castro. Cuba, because of its poor economy and political repression, will remain a 
consistent source of illegal immigrants and a mass migration threat as long as the Castro regime stays 
in power. At any given time, tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, want to leave Cuba. 
Castro may allow their departure by boatlift at any time he deems it in his best interest, as he did in 
1965, 1980, and 1994. 17 


16 United Nations 1998 Revision of the World Population Estimates and Projections, Population Division: Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, “World Population Growth from Year 0 to 2050,” accessed online, URL: <http://www.popin.org/popl998/ 
4.htm>. 

17 In October-November 1965, 5000 Cubans departed the port of Camarioca for the United States. From April-September 1980, 
125,000 Cubans left via the port of Mariel. In 1994, over 38,000 fled Cuba from various locations along Cuba’s north coast, 
from Havana to Caibarien. 


II-6 










CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 



The likelihood of a mass migration from Cuba will be the greatest following Castro’s 
death or at the beginning of the ensuing political transition period. The stability of the 
Cuban population during this period will hinge greatly on the method of Castro's 
departure. Two factors in particular will affect Cuban security and therefore the chance 
of a mass migration. First, at the present time, there is no successor charismatic enough 
to keep the Communist Party alive once Castro is gone. Consequently, there could be a 
power struggle or period of instability following his departure, especially if it is a sudden 
departure. Second, the stated desire by the Cuban emigre community in the United 
States to be a part of post-Castro Cuba will exacerbate the instability of any regime 
change. Is While a mass migration from Cuba will remain a viable threat well into the 
next decade, the intensity of this threat should decrease by 2020; by that time Cuba 
should be well past the projected social, economic, and political turmoil of the post- 
Castro transition period. However, Cuba will likely remain a source of constant illegal 
migration, akin to the current Dominican migration. 

c. Haiti 

Illegal migration from Haiti to the United States will encompass two different challenges 
over the next 20 years. The first is the possibility of a mass migration from Haiti by 
boat. In the past, political instability and violence have triggered Haiti’s mass migrations, 
and these will likely remain mass migration indicators well into the future. The most 
recent example was in 1994, when the overthrow of elected President Jean Bertrand 
Aristide led to the mass exodus of over 25,000 Haitians by boat. The nation’s current 
struggles as a fledgling democracy are just the latest evidence that, politically, nothing 
seems to change in Haiti. Political instability and ineffective government will probably 



Figure 11-3. Haitian migrants. 


18 Hans A. Binnenddijk and Patrick L. Clawson, eds.. Strategic Assessment 1997: Flashpoints and Force Structure (Washington, 
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), 218. 


11-7 













CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


remain over much of the next 20 years, continuing the environment conducive to periodic 
mass migrations. Furthermore, there is a substantial risk that organized criminal groups, 
particularly drug traffickers, will become entrenched in Haiti, bringing more corruption 
and even more instability to the government. There are already signs of this occurring; 
cocaine smuggling through Haiti has increased over 50 percent between 1996 and 1998, 
and intelligence reporting indicates cocaine traffickers may have gained influence within 
government organizations. 19 

The second challenge posed by Haiti is the problem of constant migration brought on 
by the country’s miserable economy. Haiti is likely to remain the poorest nation in the 
Western Hemisphere, with its wealth concentrated in the hands of very few. The country 
has few natural resources and has been unable to attract much foreign investment because 
of its instability. Moreover, Haiti’s population is projected to increase from under 6 
million in 1990 to close to 10 million in 2020, further straining the already moribund 
economy. 



Figure 11-4. Population in Haiti. 20 


As they have in the past, Haitians will surely try to escape their plight by attempting to 
migrate illegally to the United States. Most of these illegal migration attempts will involve 
large groups of people moving by boat, since most Haitians do not have the means to 
migrate by more sophisticated methods involving false documentation and air travel. 


19 Defense Intelligence Agency, Semi-Annual Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement 13 th Ed., Classified. DI-2550- 
138-97, February 1997; Defense Intelligence Agency, Semi-Annual Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement . 15 th Ed.. 
Classified. DI-2550-141 -98, February 1998; and Defense Intelligence Agency. Semi-Annual Interagency Assessment of Cocaine 
Movement . 16 th Ed., Classified. DI-2550-152-98, August 1998. 

20 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. “Haiti, Midyear Population Estimates and Average Annual Period Growth 
Rates: 1950 to 2050,” accessed online, URL: <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbsum>. 


II-8 


















































CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 









40000 
38000 
36000 
34000 
32000 
30000 
28000 
w 26000 
| 24000 
22000 
- 20000 
fc 18000 
£ 16000 
Z 14000 
12000 
10000 
8000 
6000 
4000 
2000 
0 



1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 

Fiscal Year 


Figure 11-5. Haitian Migrants Interdicted at Sea by U.S. Coast Guard, 

FY90 - FY 98. 


II-9 

























































































CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


d. Dominican Republic 

Migration from the Dominican Republic over the next two decades will take the form ot 
a fairly consistent stream of people moving to the United States either permanently or 
temporarily for economic reasons. The Dominican economy is more stable and advanced 
than that of Haiti, but the country's ability to develop beyond a third-world state will be 
limited by continued internal political corruption and a weak infrastructure. Moreover, 
between 1990 and 2020, the population in the Dominican Republic is predicted to increase 
from 7 million to over 11 million people. The combination of a weak economy and a 
growing population will ensure there is a large pool of people desiring to travel to the 
United States. 


12 



1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 


Figure 11-6. Population in the Dominican Republic. 21 


Although Dominicans illegally migrate to the United States by various methods, 
movement by small boat, or yola, to the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico will remain a 
primary method. The trip across the Mona Passage to Puerto Rico is only about 60 
miles, and once there, Dominicans do not have to clear customs and immigration to get 
to the United States. Sustained law enforcement pressure by both the Dominican and 
U.S. governments will be able to curtail, but not eliminate, yola transits in the future. 
Figure II -7 contains historical information on the interdiction of Dominicans at sea by 
the U.S. Coast Guard. 


21 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. “Dominican Republic, Midyear Population Estimates and Average Annual 
Period Growth Rates: 1950 to 2050,” accessed online, URL: <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbsum>. 


II-10 













































CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 



o 

hm 

0 > 

JCt 


E 

3 



1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 

Fiscal Year 


Figure 11-7. Dominican Migrants Interdicted at Sea by 
U.S. Coast Guard, FY 90 - FY 98. 


The probability of mass migrations from the Dominican Republic is less than that for 
Cuba or Haiti, although the possibility will exist through 2020. Political upheaval, 
violence, or government complicity (as in the case of Cuba) generally trigger mass 
migrations, 22 but violent rebellion or revolution is not a part of the country’s recent 
history. However, governmental corruption and inefficiency are rampant, factors which 
eventually could lead to greater instability and an increased risk of mass migration. 
Also, economic migration will fluctuate, and at times may become pronounced, especially 
with the economy’s inability to cope with the large projected population increase. 


22 Even the widespread destruction in the Dominican Republic caused by Hurricane Georges in September 1998 failed to 
instigate a mass migration, further evidence that mass migrations are generally driven by political violence or the fear of political 

violence. 


Ill 1 




















































CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 



Figure 11-8. Dominican migrants in a yola. 


e. Mexico 

From the migration perspective, Mexico will present the largest challenge to the United 
States well into the 21st century. Mexico is the single greatest source of both legal and 
illegal immigrants to the United States, 23 and serves as the final transit country for 
many other U.S.-bound illegal migrants. Currently, maritime migration from Mexico is 
low because the vast majority of migrants cross over the Mexican-U.S. land border. 

However, maritime migration from Mexico may rise in the future if the United States 
substantially strengthens customs and immigration enforcement on the land border. 

Population growth in Mexico, a U.S. labor market in need of Mexican workers, and the 
established historical pattern of Mexican migration to the United States will ensure 
legal and illegal migration of Mexicans to the United States remain a constant 
phenomenon over the next 20 years. It is impossible to count the number of Mexicans 
who illegally enter the United States from Mexico, but recent estimates project that 
illegal migration from Mexico accounts for 55 to 60 percent of unauthorized residents 
within the United States. 24 The Mexican population is estimated to increase from 
approximately 85 million people in 1990 to over 134 million people by 2020, ensuring 
there will be strong pressure to migrate to the United States in the future. Furthermore, 
migration to the United States, either permanent or temporary, has become a way of life 
for many Mexicans, who can make more money in the United States and even send 
some of it back to relatives in Mexico. 

22 Michael S. Teitelbaum, “International Migration as a Pivotal Issue,” The Pivotal States . Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul 

Kennedy, eds. (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 1999), 279. 

24 Peter H. Smith, “Mexico,” The Pivotal States . Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds. (New York, NY: W. W. 

Norton & Co., 1999), 232. 


11-12 









CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 



Figure 11-9. Population in Mexico. 25 

Mexico is and will remain a key transit country for U.S.-bound illegal migrants from 
around the world. The country forms a natural land bridge between the United States 
and the rest of Latin America, and, with its long coastlines, ineffective law enforcement, 
and a 2,000-mile land border with the United States, Mexico is an optimal migration 
gateway to the north. Smugglers of Central Americans and Asians, Chinese in particular, 
will continue to use Mexico as their entry point to the United States. Thousands of 
Central Americans annually make the trek through Guatemala into Mexico, and into the 
United States. In the past few years, Chinese smugglers have begun bringing illegal 
Chinese migrants by boat into Mexico or Central American countries for further transport 
overland to the United States. There are no indications that any of this will change in the 
foreseeable future. In fact, the increase in cross-border trade between Mexico and the 
United States created by NAFTA will only serve to make Mexico more inviting to 
smugglers of all types of contraband, including humans. 

Though illegal migration from Mexico to the United States by maritime means is currently 
low, it may well increase in the years ahead should the United States substantially stiffen 
its land border enforcement. There are periodic reports of small vessels skirting around 
the Tijuana-San Diego border, carrying illegal migrants into California. This type of 
activity will increase, both on the Pacific and Gulf coasts, should it become more difficult 
to cross the land border. Because the United States appears committed to raising the 
priority of enforcement of its southwest border, as evidenced by recent initiatives to 
substantially increase the number of U.S. Border Patrol agents, much stronger border 
enforcement is not unrealistic. Smugglers will adapt; if crossing the land border becomes 
too risky or unprofitable, they will find new means to move their customers. Maritime 
transport of larger numbers of people by larger vessels is one logical possibility. 


25 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. “Mexico, Midyear Population Estimates and Average Annual Period Growth 
Rates: 1950 to 2050,” accessed online, URL: <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbsum>. 


11-13 




















































CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


f. Central and South America 

As occurs today, many Central and South Americans will attempt to migrate, legally or 
illegally, to the United States through 2020. The amount of migration will depend on the 
level of growth of Latin American economies, but, given the anticipated population 
growth and widening disparity between rich and poor, migration north to the United 
States will undoubtedly be a desirable option for many. Mass migrations will not likely 
be a major concern; the challenge of migration from Central and South American states 
will result from its constancy, not from its peaks. 

Because of the success of smuggling illegal migrants overland into the United States, 
maritime migration will probably not become a great concern. Overland smuggling 
groups, routes, and methods are well entrenched throughout Central America, and the 
development of maritime routes and methods is unlikely unless a concerted effort is 
mounted against overland smuggling. While the United States may mount a stronger 
effort at its southwest border, there is little prospect for greater enforcement by Central 
American countries forming the land bridge to the United States. Central American 
states may make token efforts in response to U.S. pressure, but migrant smuggling is 
not one of their primary concerns. For most of these states, migration is an important 
“safety valve” that helps to relieve domestic pressure. Moreover, money sent back to 
relatives from Latin Americans who have made it to the United States is a significant 
source of revenue for the economies of these nations. El Salvador estimates that 
Salvadorans residing in the United States remit $3 billion (U.S.) annually to its economy, 26 
equaling between a quarter and a third of its gross domestic product. 

g. Asia 

The population of Asia will increase significantly over the next 20 years, and population 
growth in already over-crowded states may trigger an increase in migration abroad, 
including maritime migration to the United States. Asia’s population will grow at a 
slower rate than Africa and Latin America, but it will still retain half of the world’s 
population in 2020. While this lower rate of population growth will enable some Asian 
countries to adjust to the effects of demographic change, the projected population growth 
in countries such as China, India, and Pakistan may introduce or accentuate internal 
pressures for international migration. The key will be whether economic growth can 
raise the standard of living in these countries enough to offset the lure of migration to 
nations such as the United States. Strong economic growth will moderate migration 
pressures. 


26 Hans A. Binnenddijk and David C. Gompert, eds.. Strategic Assessment 1998: Enpainne Power for Peace (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 1998), 106. 


11-14 









CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


Over the course of the next 20 years, illegal Asian migration will likely remain a major 
concern for the United States. Population growth and economic pressures will continue 
to drive Asians, particularly Chinese, to leave their homelands for the United States. In 
addition, the expansion of organized alien smuggling operations will provide migrants 
with multiple channels to the United States. 

h. China 


Illegal migration from the People’s Republic of China has intensified over the past decade 
and is expected to remain a challenge through 2020. This problem is particularly troubling 



Figure 11-10. Chinese migrants interdicted en route 
to the United States. 


because of its increasing association with 
organized smugglers and international crime 
syndicates. These criminal groups actively recruit 
Chinese nationals, promising safe passage to the 
United States, in exchange for horrendous fees, 
inhumane transportation conditions, and possible 
indentured servitude upon arrival. As the 
population increases in the People’s Republic of 
China, and as China undergoes the painful, but 
necessary, reform and restructuring of its 
economy, potential migrants will continue to use 
every means available to depart their country 
illegally, including paying smugglers money to 
be transported to the United States and enduring 
a 6-month voyage by sea. 



27 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. “China, Midyear Population Estimates and Average Annual Period Growth 
Rates: 1950 to 2050,” accessed online, URL: <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbsum>. 






































































CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


i. India and Pakistan 


The projected population growth in India and Pakistan wdl increase internal pressures 
lor international migration, including migration to the United Stales. While the lull 
extent of illegal migration from India and Pakistan to the United States is presently not 
known, it does occur and typically involves a combination of land, sea, and air travel. It 
is believed that the majority of illegal entries are made at IJ.S. airports using false 
documentation, bill Indian and Pakistani nationals also have been stopped in Latin 
America, the Bahamas, and the ('urihbean while trying to enter the l Jnited Stales illegally 
by maritime means. Maritime transport will be employed in the future by Indians and 
Pakistanis trying to illegally migrate to the United Stales, but will likely remain simply 
one element of a multi modal voyage from India or Pakistan, Finally, while the future 
level of illegal migration from India and Pakistan cannot be identified now, the projected 
population growth in both countries may create the potential for a migratory challenge 
similar to that currently presented by Chinn. 



Figure 11-12. Population in India.*" 


’ s U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. “India. Midyear Population Estimates and Average Annual Period Cuowth 
Rates: 1950 to 2050." accessed online. URI : <http://www.eensus.gov/egi hin/ipc/idhsum>. 


II- Ui 

















































CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 



Figure 11-13. Population in Pakistan/' 5 


j. Africa 

Africa, the fastest growing region in the world, will constitute over 15 percent of the 
world’s population by 2010. In particular, Sub-Saharan Africa will undergo the most 
significant population explosion, with major population increases in Rwanda. Burundi. 
Ghana, Malawi. Nigeria, and Uganda. However, the migration of large numbers of 
Africans by maritime means to the United States has not been a significant problem in 
the past, and is unlikely to become one for the foreseeable future. Between 1992 and 
1998, less than 370 illegal Af rican immigrants a year were interdicted by the U.S. Border 
Patrol at U.S. borders and ports. 



Figure 11-14. Africa's population will expand significantly by 2020. 

' U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. Pakistan. Midyear Population P.stirnates and Average Annual Period Growth 
Rales: 1950 to 2050" accessed online, URL: <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbsum>. 

"■ Border Patrol Apprehensions by Country of Origin f Y92-VH. Office of Intelligence, Immigration and Naturalization Serv ice. 


11-17 


























CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


The maritime movement of Africans, particularly those from the northernmost countries, 
is generally aimed at the European continent in general and at France and Spain in 
particular. Over the next two decades, migration is projected to become the single most 
important issue in relations between the European community and Arab states of Africa. 31 
For Africans, Europe is a closer refuge, while there is no historical precedent for major 
voluntary migrations of Africans to the United States. 

Although Africans account for some 48 percent of the world’s displaced persons, mass 
migrations by maritime means to the United States or other countries have not yet occurred 
and are unlikely to occur in the future. 32 African mass migrations have largely been, and 
will continue to be, an intra-continental and temporary solution to economic strife, ethnic 
warfare, or epidemics. Additionally, when such migration occurs, it primarily takes place 
overland on foot or by vehicle. 

3. Non-state Actors 

By 2020, non-state actors will challenge the sovereignty of the state and have a greater 
effect on international affairs. While the state will still play the predominant role in the 
international political system, national and international security will be affected by the 
interactions between state and non-state actors, owing to the inclusion of a greater number 
of players in international affairs and the development of alternative forums for grievances 
and action. 33 

Non-state actors can be separated into two categories, civil actors and non-civil actors. 
Civil actors are defined as non-state groups whose actions complement the values of the 
international community and its state members. Non-civil actors are those groups whose 
actions defy the values of the international community and its members. Both types of 
non-state actors pose transnational challenges to individual states insofar as they have 
the ability to “undermine law and order, and create disaffection and alternate loyalties. 
Over the long term, they create conditions conducive to instability and conflict.” 34 
Consequently, the potential exists for non-state actors to decisively affect global 
conditions by causing governments to lose some measure of control and inhibiting their 
ability to deliver solutions to their citizens’ problems. 35 


31 Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (New York. NY: I s1 Vintage Books Edition. 1993), 276. 

32 Richard D. Kohout and others, Looking out to 2020: Trends Relevant to the Coast Guard (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval 
Analyses, 1997), 21. 

33 ibid., 329. 

34 William Rosenau, Gay Kemper, and David Mussington, “Transnational Threats and U.S. National Security.” Low Intensity 
Contiict and Law Enforcement , 6 (1997): 146. 

35 David Gompert, “National Security in the Information Age.” Naval War College Review . Vol. LI, No. 4, Seq. 364. (Autumn 
1998): 8. 


11-18 











CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


a. Civil Actors 

The ever-growing importance of civil actors in the international arena is a trend that will 
continue through 2020. While the objectives of individual civil actors may contradict or 
challenge the goals of the states in which they operate, the civil actors and the state 
peaceably work to resolve their differences in the interest of promoting the greater good. 
The media, multinational corporations, and non-governmental organizations constitute 
the three major types of non-state civil actors. All three will be able to exert a greater 
impact on international relations because they have access to resources governments 
cannot harness and because they often are able to rally international opinion more easily. 
For example, the media controls what is essentially an extensive intelligence collection 
capability, and can use the information it gathers to influence its audience and affect 
policy decisions at the local, national, and international levels. Multinational corporations 
can have extraordinary influence on local or even national economies, and thereby affect 
the underlying security of a state. For example, cruise lines, some of which have operating 
budgets larger than the combined national budgets of several eastern Caribbean states, 
can greatly affect the economic well-being and thus security of many small states by 
their decisions on ports of call. 36 Finally, non-governmental organizations can be very 
effective at advancing their agendas in international forums by mobilizing their 
constituencies and skillfully pressuring government policymakers, as well as by 
organizing collective action in response to crises, providing forums for negotiations to 
mitigate crises, and monitoring post-crisis agreements. 

(1) Environmental Activist Groups. One particular type of non-state civil actor that 
may have great impact in the maritime sphere through 2020 is the environmental activist 
group. With growing concern about the rising stress on the environment created by 
population growth and increasing development, environmental groups will likely gain 
in number and influence. Groups such as Greenpeace already have a large support base 
of contributors, and carry out operations across the globe. 

The marine environment will be of great concern to environmental groups in 2020, with 
living and non-living marine resource exploitation the primary focus. These groups will 
not only try to influence public opinion and government policies through media 
campaigns, but also by taking direct action on the seas, demonstrating against operations 
they oppose. While most of these demonstrations will be non-violent, the possibility 
exists for violence to break out when opposing groups come in contact, and conflict in 
the maritime environment is doubly dangerous for the safety of life and property. 
Furthermore, some groups may advocate taking aggressive measures to push their causes. 
There have already been incidents of violence involving environmental activist groups, 


36 Draft, John Cope, “Western Hemisphere: Response to Democratic Change Strategic Assessment 1999 (Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1999), 262. 


11-19 







CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


such as the ramming of whaling vessels by ships belonging to the militant Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society. 


Future operations by environmental groups will likely 
increase in complexity and scope. Greenpeace already has 
a six-ship fleet it uses to carry on its activities worldwide, 
and in 1998 demonstrated the ability to locate and board a 
ship on a sensitive mission carrying nuclear waste from 
France to Japan. Greenpeace also conducted operations in 
1998 featuring deception, with their activists posing as 
security personnel or government inspectors. Success in 
these operations, particularly if accompanied by media 
attention, will spur attempts at larger and even more intricate 
operations aimed at garnering big headlines to further 
environmentalist causes. 



Figure 11-15. One of six vessels operated by 
the environmental group Greenpeace. 


An emerging development that may become a source of considerable conflict in 2020 is 
the diverging interests between environmental groups and native peoples. As native 
peoples around the world attempt to continue or reestablish customary practices deemed 
harmful to the environment by activist groups, disagreements and outright hostility may 
arise. For example, in 1997 the International Whaling Commission (IWC) authorized 
subsistence hunting of gray whales by the Makah Indian tribe in Washington state and 
the Chukotka people in Russia. These two peoples claimed that gray whale hunting was 
a part of their culture; in fact, the Makah cited an 1855 treaty granting its whaling rights. 
The IWC established a 5-year block quota of 620 gray whales. The plan by the Makah 
tribe to renew hunting whales is vigorously opposed by environmental groups, especially 
the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, which has threatened to disrupt any whale hunt 
by the Makah. Potential conflicts such as these will likely increase in the future as 
environmental groups rise in influence and oppose native claims. 


b. Non-civil Actors 


Non-state non-civil actors such as organized criminal groups and terrorists will continue 
to pose a constant challenge to the security of nations and international organizations 
through 2020. In contrast to civil actors, non-civil actors will not attempt to resolve 
their differences peacefully within the international system or with individual states. 
Rather, non-civil actors may use violence or intimidation to oppose the states in which 
they operate and the international system. 

(7) Organized Crime. Organized crime will increase in influence and scope over the 
next 20 years as organized criminal groups become increasingly entrenched in the inter¬ 
national economy and as demand for and profits from the illicit transportation of 


11-20 











CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


people, drugs, and contraband multiply. If left unchecked, international criminal 
organizations will continue to expand their illegal activities in the 21st century. 
International criminal organizations will increase in number and influence as they become 
more adept at manipulating and challenging local and national governments and 
international organizations and consolidating their power bases. 37 The expected growth 
of transnational criminal organizations will be exacerbated by advances in 
communications and transportation technologies; a decrease in governmental controls 
over the international flow of goods, services, and money; the establishment of 
international affiliations among immigrant communities; and the projected rates of 
unemployment in developing countries and in the Soviet successor countries and Eastern 
Europe. Relying on a myriad of international connections to provide them with both 
human and financial resources, by 2020 transnational criminal syndicates will be as 
problematic for global security as organized insurgent groups and terrorists. 

According to Dr. Kimberly Thachuk, an organized crime expert, 

“International organized crime is more than simply an extension of domestic crime. It is 
crime ordered into complex clandestine, hierarchically-organized networks that operate 
internationally with little regard for the borders of states. The gravity of the problem lies 
not only in the increasing complexity of these organizations, but, more importantly, with 
the serious challenge they pose in their ability to penetrate and operate with relative 
impunity in several states simultaneously. These illegal enterprises not only threaten aspects 
of state sovereignty and security that have traditionally been taken for granted, but they 
prove the permeability of national borders and the vulnerability of state institutions.” 38 

Criminal organizations will continue to attempt to deceive law enforcement authorities 
by integrating legal and illegal operations. For example, Chinese triads (organized 
criminal groups) involved in heroin and maritime alien smuggling set up legitimate 
businesses in the United States that are used to channel money from their smuggling 
ventures. Organized crime also will continue to develop business strategies similar to 
those used by legitimate corporations. The application of these business practices will 
enable transnational criminal groups to increase the efficiency and profit margins of 
their operations. 34 

Transnational criminal organizations can not only adversely affect civil society, but 
they can also threaten the power and sovereignty of the states in which they operate. 


37 Dr. Kimberley Thachuk, Visiting Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies. “International Organized Crime and Drug 
Trafficking,” paper presented at the Transnational Issues Conference, 14-15 October 1998 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 

University, 1998), 1. 

38 ibid., 1. 

39 Hans A. Binnenddijk and Patrick L. Clawson, eds.. Strategic Assessment 1997: Flashpoints and Force Structure 
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), 201. 


11-21 









CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


The willingness of transnational criminal organizations “to use force against the state 
and its law enforcement agencies, challenges the state monopoly on organi[z]ed violence 
and can be more destabilizing than the activities of revolutionary or terrorist groups." 411 
For example, the Russian Mafia has influenced and corrupted national banking systems, 
commodity markets, and internal security systems, areas that normally fall solely under 
the purview and authority of the state and its official agents. In Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 

“The problem of corruption, in which formal political organizations are steadily 
undermined in their capacity to operate efficiently, cannot be overstated... Where organized 
crime has made a significant inroad, as in Mexico, Colombia, Jamaica, Haiti, and Bolivia, 
corruption has so undermined legitimacy that these states have at times been unable to 
guarantee even the most basic order for their citizens.” 41 


Over the next 20 years, Russian crime syndicates, Latin and South American drug cartels, 
and Asian triads and ethnic gangs will continue to vie with one another for regional 
superiority and the control of illicit activities. All of these criminal organizations possess 
and will continue to possess the ability to threaten weak states in Eastern Europe, Asia, 
and Latin America through alliances forged with insurgent groups and by the corruption 
of police, military, or political authorities. 42 

The end of the Cold War and the opening of Eastern Europe, Russia, and the other 
Soviet successor countries have brought to light the significant role played by large 
organized groups in international crime. For example, drug trafficking organizations, 
seeking to diversify, have extended their connections with criminal groups abroad to 
expand their operations in both Eastern and Western Europe. The European organized 
crime groups not only have capitalized on these international connections, but also have 
seized the market opportunities made available in Eastern Europe and the Soviet successor 
states by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. 

Developing states. Eastern European countries, and the Soviet successor states will be 
particularly susceptible to the perverse influence of transnational organized crime and 
will remain susceptible well into the 21 st century. Over 8,000 criminal enterprises operate 
in the 15 countries that succeeded the Soviet Union and at least 200 of those organizations 
are international in scope. 43 In the absence of effective governments and the 


40 ibid., 329. 

41 Hans A. Binnenddijk and David C. Gomnert. eds.. Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging Power for Peace (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 1998), 109. 

42 William Rosenau. Gay Kemper, and David Mussington, “Transnational Threats and U.S. National Security,” Low Intensity 
Conflict and Law Enforcement. 6 (1997): 146. 

43 Dr. Kimberley Thachuk, Visiting Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, “International Organized Crime and Drug 
Trafficking,” paper presented at the Transnational Issues Conference, 14-15 October 1998 (Washington, D.C.: National 
Defense University, 1998), 3. 


11-22 










CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


ability to enforce national and international laws, transnational crime will thrive and 
could hamper or even cripple the ability of some states to effectively manage their 
society and even their sovereignty. The growing influence of international organized 
crime is even felt in developed nations such as the United States. For example, the 
Chinese triads, which illegally move Chinese nationals to the United States, have almost 
single-handedly brought the practice of indentured servitude back to the United States. 

International organized crime is involved in a wide variety of criminal enterprises, of 
which the highly visible drug and arms trafficking activities are only a part. Maritime 
alien smuggling from Asia and the Caribbean to the United States has become a growth 
industry for large- and small-scale organized criminal groups. Most international 
organized crime groups are also involved in fraud, cargo theft, the acquisition and sale 
of precursor chemicals for both drug production and weapons of mass destruction, 
extortion, etc. The decline in importance of state borders to international business has 
the negative collateral effect of facilitating the free movement of organized crime 
operations across national borders and will continue to enable organized crime groups 
to exert their power globally. 

(2) Violent Maritime Crime. Incidents of violent maritime crime will probably not 
significantly change either in nature or frequency out to and beyond 2020. Consistent 
with current experience, the vast majority of incidents will occur within port areas, at 
anchor or in coastal waters. The primary forms of violent maritime crime are piracy 
and terrorism. 




(a) Piracy. While the number of piracy incidents will most likely remain constant over 
the next 20 years, there will be an increase in incident reporting. It is widely accepted 
among the government and non-government organizations that track piracy worldwide 

(including the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), U.K. 
Defense Intelligence Service (DIS), Australian Defence 
Intelligence Organization (DIO) and the International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB)), that the annual number of piracy 
cases is seriously undercounted. DIS estimates the actual 
number of piracy cases could be 2,000 percent higher on 
an annual basis while DIO estimates the underreporting to 
be 20 to 70 percent. 44 Since the establishment of the IMB's 


Figure 11-16. Chinese pirate vessel. 


44 Defence Intelligence Analysis Staff, Maritime Piracy Today . Classified (London, United Kingdom: Ministry of Defence, 10 
July 1998), 1 and Defence Intelligence Organization, Maritime Piracy: Rough seas ahead? . Classified (Canberra, Australia: 

Department of Defence, October 1996), 3. 


11-23 









CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


Regional Piracy Center in Malaysia in 1992 and its subsequent efforts to publicize the 
piracy problem, there has been increased reporting on major incidents (See Figure II- 
17), but incidents involving fishermen and recreational boaters are still heavily 
undercounted. Also, the average loss from a piracy incident does not cross the monetary 
threshold for insurance action, further contributing to underreporting. 45 Most incidents 
will continue to go unreported except in cases where there is serious loss of property 
and life or damage to a foreign interest. 



Figure 11-17. World Maritime Piracy Incidents. 46 


The concentration of piracy incidents will continue to be located in areas with little or 
no maritime law enforcement, political and economic stability, and a high volume of 
commercial activity. Incidents of piracy tend to occur in four regional areas: Southeast 
Asia, Africa, South America, and Central America (see Table 11-3). Furthermore, most 
incidents of maritime crime occur in coastal waters with nearly 80 percent of all reported 
piracy incidents occurring in territorial waters (See Table II-4). 


45 The most common stolen items from piracy incidents are paint and mooring lines as most pirates are analogous to street 
muggers. 

46 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships : Annual Report 1 st January -3U December 1997 
(Essex, United Kingdom: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 1998), 3. 


11-24 























































CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


AREA 

TYPICAL TARGETS 

CAUSE 

Caribbean 

Pleasure Craft, 

Small Merchant Ships 

Common Crime, Lack of 

Government Attention 

Central America 

Fishing Boats 

Common Crime, Lack of 

Government Attention 

South America 

Merchant Ships, 

Fishing Boats 

Common Crime, Lack of 

Government Attention 

West Africa 

Merchant Ships, 

Oil Industry 

Common Crime, Poor 

Security Environment 

East Africa 

Merchant Ships 

Traditional Culture, Common 

Crime, Poor Security Environment 

SE Asia 

Merchant Ships, 

Fishing Boats 

Organized Crime, Common 

Crime, Traditional Culture, 

Poor Security Environment 

East Asia 

Merchant Ships 

Organized Crime, Common 

Crime, Traditional Culture, 

Poor Security Environment 


Table 11-3. Piracy Prone Areas. 47 


GEOGRAPHIC 

AREA 

INCIDENTS AT 
ANCHORAGES/BERTHS 

(%) 

INCIDENTS WHILE UNDERWAY 

(%) 

Worldwide 

79 

21 

Africa 

71 

29 

Far East 

70 

30 

Americas 

95 

5 


Table 11-4. Location of Pirate Victims. 48 


47 Information compiled from various reports received and analyzed at Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center. 

48 Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO). Newsletter: “Analysis of 1997 Piracy Incidents,” 18 February 1998, 3. 


11-25 



























CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


Piracy in the 1990s against commercial shipping 
reveals increasing violence and professional 
organization. A dangerous trend is the emergence 
of organized pirate gangs, which may conduct 
multi-ship operations, and/or use tactics of a 
quasi-military nature. 49 These gangs may acquire 
the capability to target ships on the open ocean, 
thus increasing the potential number of piracy 
victims. Of greater concern to the shipping 
industry is the level of violence used during 
attacks. The criminals carrying out pirate attacks 
often display a complete lack of concern for the 
victimized crews, who are at risk of being severely 
wounded, killed, or set adrift. 50 The 1998 
hijacking cases of the CHEUNG SON and 
TENYU in Southeast Asia illustrate the use of 
violence by pirates. In both cases, the crews were 
missing and presumed dead (21 total) after the 
ships were recovered from pirates. 

(b) Maritime Terrorism. Future terrorist 
organizations will continue to use attacks on 
maritime targets as a means of furthering their 
political goals. From the 1961 hijacking of the 
Portuguese Fagged passenger vessel SANTA 
MARIA to the numerous maritime attacks of the 
Sri Lankan Tamil Sea Tigers during the 1990s, 
widely publicized incidents of terrorism in the 
maritime environment have drawn immediate 
concern and action. There has been a marked 
tendency when discussing maritime terrorism to 



Figure 11-18. Law 

enforcement personnel developing 
counter-terrorist exercises. 


address it as an approaching trend and as a phenomenon somehow different from, and 
possibly greater than, the broader problem of terrorism. This is particularly true whenever 
some incident grabs the public attention through extensive media coverage. But analysis 


4y Samuel P. Menefee, Trends in Maritime Violence (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group, 1996), I. 

511 Defence Intelligence Analysis Staff, Maritime Piracy Today . Classified (London, United Kingdom: Ministry of Defence, 

10 July 1998), 1. 

51 Charles N. Dragonette, “Maritime Terrorism: Underway as Before?,” International Perspectives On Maritime Security . 
Thomas C. Fitzhugh III, ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1997), 159. 


11-26 











CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


of maritime terrorism shows that it is not new and that it differs little, if at all, from 
terrorism ashore or, for that matter, in the skies. In fact, maritime terrorism occurs in the 
same forms and methods as acts perpetrated ashore. 51 

Trends seen in terrorism during the late 1980s and 1990s will likely continue in the 
future. The number of terrorist incidents worldwide has decreased while the number of 
casualties inflicted has risen. The typical terrorist tactic of holding hostages has declined, 
due in part to the growing sophistication of counter-terrorist forces worldwide.'' 2 Also, 
the number of terrorist groups espousing a leftist ideology such as Marxism and Socialism 
has decreased, with a subsequent rise in the number of groups based on nationalism, 
ethnicity and religion. 

While terrorists would prefer to attack a target that is immobile and easy to survey, there 
will continue to be a small number of attacks in the maritime environment. 53 For example, 
several Middle Eastern terrorist groups maintain a maritime attack capability through 
diver and underwater warfare training provided by Iran and Libya. 34 Other groups with 
a cultural maritime heritage find it easier to develop a competent maritime attack 
capability. The Sri Lankan Tamil Sea Tigers and the Filipino Abu Sayyang Group are 
examples of seafaring groups that have conducted multiple maritime terrorist attacks, 
as well as piracy acts for fundraising puiposes. The concern for the future is that terrorists 
will shift emphasis and make the rapidly growing cruise line industry a new target of 
opportunity. 

Major financial loss, significant loss of life, or widespread publicity surrounding 
environmental damage caused by violent maritime crime will increase pressure upon 
coastal states to coordinate maritime law enforcement actions. U.S.-Cuba anti-hijacking 
agreements and anti-pirate agreements between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore 
may prove to be forerunners of many such accords that will attack the centers of maritime 
crime. 55 However, international law enforcement coordination will be successful only 
if it can overcome exaggerated pride, self-sufficiency, and sovereignty concerns of many 
developing coastal states. Confusion over the proper legal definition of piracy is itself 
hindering potential international cooperation; the UN definition is concerned with 
international waters while the shipping industry definition covers all waters (See Text 
Box, page 11-28). This lack of a common definition slows down the creation of 
international agreements designed to combat piracy. 


52 Interview with Jeff Shumaker, Senior Terrorism Analyst at U.S. Department of Transportation, interview 
with author, 14 January 1999. 

53 Since 1978, the annual number of international terrorist attacks has ranged from 296 to 666 but maritime incidents have 
averaged around 20. 

54 Open source reporting indicates Lebanese Hezbollah and Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine are conducting maritime 
training at various sites. References available from Intelligence Coordination Center. 

55 Samuel P. Menefee, Trends in Maritime Violence (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group. 1996), 13. 


11-27 










CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


VARYING PIRACY DEFINITIONS 

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU 

“Piracy is the act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or other crime and the 
capability to use force in the furtherance of the act.” 

UN LAW OF THE SEA 
(1958 & 1982 CONVENTIONS) 

“Any illegal acts of violence or detention or any act of depredation committed for private ends by 
the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft and directed: 

1. On the high seas against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property onboard 
such ship or aircraft. 

2. Against a ship, aircraft, persons, or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state” 56 


The continuance of maritime violent crime will lead to regionalization of anti-crime 
efforts and the creation or revitalization of foreign maritime law enforcement agencies. 
In most cases, especially with developing states, this will require major training and 
equipment infusions from outside sources. Unilateral support to individual coastal states 
by donor countries without the intervention of a multinational group (IMO, ASEAN, 
OAS, etc) or non-governmental organization (BIMCO, IMB, etc.) probably will be 
minimal and will tend to be rejected by the affected coastal states as infringing on 
sovereignty. 57 

4. Technology 

Technology development will be another overarching influence on the maritime 
environment over the next two decades. Through 2020, advanced and commercial 
technologies will continue to spread worldwide, enabling state and non-state actors to 
acquire information and communication systems that will decrease the United States’ 
technological advantage. “From a national security perspective, the most salient trend 
in the new information environment is that the capabilities DOD [the Department of 
Defense] spent billions to build in the 1980s are increasingly available for other nations 
[or non-state actors] to rent or buy at a fraction of that cost.” 58 Therefore, while the 


56 Hans A. Binnenddijk and Patrick L. Clawson, eds., 1998 Strategic Assessment : Engaging Power for Peace (Washington, 
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), 106. 

57 IMO is the International Maritime Organization, ASEAN is the Association of South East Asian Nations, OAS is the Organization 
of American States, BIMCO is the Baltic and International Maritime Council, and IMB is the International Maritime Bureau. 

58 Hans A. Binnenddijk and Patrick L. Clawson, eds., 1995 Strategic Assessment : U.S. Security Challenges in Transition 
(Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 151. 


11-28 











CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


United States will move forward with advancements in power sources, space, electronics 
and materials, the overall edge that it has enjoyed during much of the 20th century will 
begin to diminish. 

Even though the U.S. technological advantage will decrease by 2020, the United States 
will remain one of the most technologically advanced states. The American application 
of existing technological innovations will continue to yield major advancements in 
defense systems and infrastructure, ensure American technological progress, and reduce 
the cost of high-end technological products. 59 At the same time, these technological 
advancements also will produce benefits that can be shared by non-defense industries. 
For example, the application of technological advancements to the private sector will 
promote American progress in commercial industry, national economic development, 
labor efficiency, global production and marketing, creation of a new information 
infrastructure, and the integration of healthier nations into the core. 60 In fact, even the 
most advanced militaries around the world increasingly will rely on commercially 
developed technologies for their highest-technology systems, a reverse of the pattern 
observed until late in the 20th century, when militaries themselves generally developed 
the highest technologies. The existence of the highest technology in private, commercial 
hands before it even is applied to military use will further allow these technologies to 
find a wide range of non-military applications, and more quickly than in the 20th century. 

The hallmark technologies of the 21 st century will be power sources (including propulsion 
equipment and lasers), space satellites and vehicles, electronics (information technologies, 
communications equipment, and robotics) and design, construction, and composition 
materials. Emerging technological advancements will include the digitization of all media 
and data, significant increases in computational capabilities and global interconnectivity 
on wide band, high-speed networks. There also will be an accelerated global shift to 
digital, multimedia, and interactive communications and computing. 

While the United States will continue to be one of the biggest beneficiaries of future 
technological advancements and their subsequent applications in the maritime arena, 
other nations and non-state actors will be able to acquire the same capabilities. Through 
2020 and beyond, the operational capabilities of foreign naval forces will increase as 
more sophisticated weapons and maritime platforms enter service and are made available 
for international purchase and/or production. Allies and adversaries alike will be able 
to acquire advanced systems through a variety of avenues, including indigenous and 
cooperative production, technology transfers, legal arms sales, illegal arms transfers, 
and the outright purchase and military application of commercially available, “off-the- 
shelf” civilian technologies. The appearance of high-technology systems world- 


59 David Gompert, “National Security in the Information Age.” Naval War College Review . Vol. LI, No. 4, Seq. 364. (Autumn 
1998): 28. 

60 ibid., 27. 


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CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


wide, as well as their application to every possible contingency-1 rom conventional 
operations to asymmetric warfare 01 will ensure that the maritime environment continues 
to present a challenge to U.S. maritime forces. 

a. Platforms 

Technological trends for surface ships will include an increase in modular armament 
and combat systems, decreased radar cross-section, and reduced emitted signatures. In 
addition, a large number of surplus or retired Western ships will introduce relatively 
new technologies to the navies of less-developed countries across the globe. Technological 
improvements will lead to enhanced survivability, improved sensors, and advanced 
weapon and combat systems in maritime aircraft and vessels through 2020. 02 Increased 
maneuverability, redundancy in mission critical systems and reductions in emitted 
signatures will also lead to more capable and survivable maritime aircraft. 

b. Naval Weapon Systems 

The application of expected technological advancements to naval weapon systems will 
yield more versatile, accurate, and enhanced defense penetration measures, leading to 
an overall increase in w eapon lethality by 2020. Weapon systems versatility will improve 
through the use of multi-role weapons that can engage a host of targets, be launched 
from a host of platforms, and be outfitted with a number of different warhead options. 


Technological advances will also lead to improvements in weapon performance. 
Advanced propulsion schemes for missiles and torpedoes, for example, will lead to 
higher average and terminal velocities of individual weapon systems, while the use of 
thrust vectoring and advanced materials and control systems will lead to increased 
maneuverabilit\ for maritime w eapon systems. In addition, the widespread use of satellite 
navigation systems will increase the accuracy of weapon systems. 03 The eventual 
widespread use of multi-spectral and imaging seekers w ill allow for better aim-point 
determination and an increased ability to counter countermeasures. Enhanced defense 
penetration features added to missile systems w ill improve the ability of the projectiles 
to counter close-in-weapon systems. Finally, signature reduction features also will be 
incorporated into a variet) of maritime weapons, and future missiles may even be 
equipped with on-board self-protection suites. 


01 For a definition and discussion of the parameters of asymmetric warfare, see Section HI. 

'' Draft, “Ad\ ancedTechnology Integrated Warfare Architecture Stud\: Platforms,” Classified (Washington. D.C.: Office of Naval 
Intelligence. November 1998), 1 and Joint Warfare Anah sis Department. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 
Littoral Warfare Handbook for Surfa ce Combat S wem T ngineering . Vol. 1, Classified. March 1997. 3-55. 3-56. 3-57. 

Draft. "Advanced Technology* Integrated Warfare Architecture Stud\: Naval Weapons,” Classified (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
Naval Intelligence. November COS). 1-7 and Joint Warfare Analysis Department. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 
Laboratory. 1 moral W arfare Handbook for Surface Combat S\stcm Fngineering . Vol. 1. Classified. March 1997, Chapter 3. 


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CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


c. Navigation 

Technological advances will influence future maritime navigation significantly by 
providing more accurate, reliable, and accessible information. By 2020, more vessels 
will be able to receive up-to-date information about water levels, currents, and 
obstructions. This will allow new, deeper-draft container ships to operate more efficiently 
and safely in U.S. ports. Mariners will rely more heavily on real-time information coupled 
with integrated systems to aid their navigation. Marine safety also will be improved 
with the pending integration of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
(GMDSS). GMDSS will rely on a combination of satellite and terrestrial radio services 
to facilitate ship-to-shore communications in case of maritime emergency. GMDSS 
provides for automatic distress alerting and locating and, for the first time, requires 
ships to receive broadcasts of maritime safety information. According to the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention, all commercial ships larger than 300 gross tons were 
to be fitted with GMDSS equipment by 1 February 1999. 

d. Technological Impact on Asymmetric Warfare 

Over the next two decades, adversaries of the United States will be more likely to engage 
in asymmetric warfare whereby they use “unconventional approaches to circumvent or 
undermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities.” 64 Asymmetric warfare 
concepts could include terrorism; chemical, nuclear, or biological attacks; information 
warfare; or acts of military sabotage. The technologies that will be employed in these 
actions range from obsolete to state-of-the-art, and will attempt to defeat a stronger 
opponent on a political and/or social level without resorting to an unequal, force-on- 
force battle. The technologies that can be used in asymmetric warfare will be limited 
only by the imagination, as most technologies can be deployed in either symmetric or 
asymmetric ways depending upon the particular method of employment, the desired 
result of the employment, and the overall nature of the conflict. For example, ballistic 
missiles - both obsolete and advanced terminally guided systems - whether armed with 
high-explosive, submunition, chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads; naval mines; 
information warfare; and information operations tools are types of technology that could 
be employed against the United States in an asymmetric manner through and beyond 
2020. 65 


64 Donald C.F. Daniel and Andrew L. Ross, “U.S. Strategic Planning and the Pivotal States,” The Pivotal States . Robert Chase, 
Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds. (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 1999), 390. 

65 Draft, “Advanced Technology Integrated Warfare Architecture Study: Technological Impact on Asymmetric Warfare,” 
Classified (Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence, November 1998), 1-7 and Jeffrey B. White, “A Different Kind of 
Threat: Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare,” Classified, Studies in Intelligence . Central Intelligence Agency, Vol. 39, No. 5, 
1996: 5. 


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CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


e. Ocean Monitoring 

Rapid technological growth over the next 20 years will greatly increase the use of space 
and earth-based remote sensing for several ocean monitoring applications. The growth 
of the remote sensing industry will be bounded only by its ability to attract customers 
willing to pay for the vast array of potential services. The space-based remote sensing 
industry will experience the greatest growth, in both number and capability, as more 
countries enter a field that was once the sole province of the U.S. and Soviet militaries. 
While not experiencing similar rapid growth, earth-based remote sensing systems will 
continue to provide detailed ocean data to maritime customers. While these advances 
will increase the availability of high resolution imagery data and thereby improve the 
efficiency and safety of maritime operations, our adversaries will have the same access 
to this information, which will create security and law enforcement challenges. Remote 
sensing, therefore, is becoming increasingly dual-use and will allow all users, both licit 
and illicit, to gain a wide range of ocean monitoring information. This open access to 
such a wide range of information will present maritime challenges to the United States. 

(1) Space-based monitoring. This is an era of rapid growth for the commercial satellite 
imagery industry. In 1975 there was one operational commercial remote sensing satellite. 
In 1995 there were 12 satellites operating in orbit. By 2005 there will be 45 operational 
remote sensing satellites. 66 Because this industry is commercially driven, only customer 
demand and the ability to pay for imagery products will limit growth during the next 20 
years. 

(a) Electro-optical. Electro-optical (EO) sensors dominate today’s satellites. These 
sensors are either panchromatic (black and white in the visible spectrum) or multispectral 
(color representation of spectral bands in the ultraviolet through infrared bands). The 
resolution of these sensors is expected to improve rapidly from today’s best panchromatic 
resolution of 2 meters, available from degraded Russian military systems, to better than 
1 meter resolution, from the Ikonos satellite which will be launched in June 1999. 67 
Multispectral (MSI) quality is measured in spectral and spatial resolution. The LANDSAT 
Thematic Mapper, today’s standard for MSI sensors, has seven relatively wide spectral 
bands and is capable of a spatial resolution of 30 meters. Future systems will be 
hyperspectral (HSI) and capable of discriminating in hundreds of bands with a spatial 
resolution of less than 5 meters. 68 


66 National Imagery and Mapping Agency, “Commercial Remote Sensing Satellites - Current and Planned,” accessed online, 
URL: <http://jws.stl.nima.ic.gov/information/cst/post_conf/commi_conf/>. 

67 Air Force Research Lab, “Commercial Imaging Threat," accessed online, URL: <http://phillipslab.ic.gov/docs/ASAP2>. 
“William F. Belokon and others, Multispectral Imagery Reference Guide (Fairfax, VA: LOGICON Geodynamics, Inc, 1997), 
1-3. 


11-32 







CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 



Figure 11-19. St. Petersburg, Russia: 5-Meter Imagery from 
the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite’s Pan Sensor. 69 


Hyperspectral sensors (which are also EO) will revolutionize the concept of imagery. In 
essence, HSI sensors detect the spectral signature of an object's component materials— 
not necessarily a spatial image. HSI represents a fundamental shift in comprehension 
over the current MSI sensors by a factor of 10. Whereas MSI sensors can break the 
spectrum into several wide bands, HSI will vastly expand the capability to examine 
hundreds of discrete and narrow spectral bands. In addition, future HSI sensors will 
expand the sensed spectrum far into the short-wave infrared segment. These 
measurements of an object’s spectral reflectance allow minute differences, which are 
not visually discernible, to be analyzed and can provide much fuller understanding of 
activity in an area of interest. 70 The first true HSI system, the Orbview-4, is scheduled 
to be launched in 2001 by the U.S.-based Orbital Sciences Corporation. Once the 
technology is fielded, other countries, which are well aware of the value to be gained 
from HSI, can be expected to follow suit. 71 

(b) Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). As good as EO systems are at providing high- 
resolution imagery of points on earth, they are unable to see through clouds. SAR, 
however, can provide all-weather remote sensing capability. Commercial SAR systems 
are improving as rapidly as the EO systems. Canada's RADARSAT system, launched in 

69 Space Imaging, Inc, accessed online, URL: <http://www.spaceimaging.com/home/galIery/index.html>. 

70 William F. Belokon and others, Multispectral Imagery Reference Guide (Fairfax, VA: LOGICON Geodynamics, Inc, 1997), 
7-1 -7-8. 

71 McMunn Associates and Tera Research Inc., Handbook of Unmanned Civilian Imaging Satellites (Washington, D.C.: Office 
of Naval Intelligence, 14 October 1998), 4. 


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CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


1995 became the standard for performance in commercial SAR systems. It provided, 
for the first time, widely available 7.5-meter resolution. Future systems are expected to 
have better than 3-meter resolution. 72 

Space-based SAR sensors will provide a unique capability to monitor relatively large 
ocean areas for suspect activity. In particular, RADARSAT has a proven capability to 
detect ships in an ocean surveillance mode. 73 It also has been effective at detecting “go- 
fast” boats smuggling drugs. This is the first time that a commercial space-based system 
has demonstrated a capability in what until now has been a military bastion: open ocean 
surveillance. 74 

(c) Satellite Technology. Emerging SMALLSAT technology is largely responsible for 
the exponential growth in the commercial satellite industry. This technology incorporates 
miniaturized electronic components, lightweight structure, and “assembly-line” 
manufacture techniques. 75 SMALLSAT technology is capable of producing EO 
resolutions of better than 1 meter at a fraction of previous development costs and allows 
the development of commercial “turn-key” reconnaissance systems. Most important, 

SMALLSAT technology makes deploying a constellation of remote sensing satellites 
commercially viable. Such a constellation, comprising four or more satellites, will also 
overcome one of today’s obstacles to wider tactical use of space-based remote sensing. 

Current constellations, comprising one or two satellites, are limited in their capability to 
frequently revisit points of interest on earth. As an example, in higher resolution modes, 
a single satellite will only revisit a point on earth every 20 or so days. 76 Lurther, many of 
these constellations will feature satellites with multiple sensors such as MSI and SAR. 

The synergy of such a system will allow greater understanding of the activity and 
characteristics in an area of interest. 77 

SAR systems are also on the brink of revolutionary advances. The same technology that 
is responsible for the boom in EO suites is also responsible for the construction of 
LIGHTSARs—SAR satellites that are orders of magnitude cheaper to build. 78 The 
technology is available today to build and deploy a cost-effective SAR satellite that is 
capable of providing data at better than 1 meter resolution. The only obstacle to deploying 
such systems is U.S. Government policy that restricts U.S. companies to marketing 
only 5-meter data to non-U.S. Government customers. However, by 2002, Canada’s 

72 Air Force Research Lab, “Commercial Imaging Threat,” accessed online, URL: <http://phillipslab.ic.gov/docs/ASAP2>. 

7 - M. D. Henschel and others. Comparison of Probability Statistics for Automated Ship Detection in SAR Imagery. (Halifax, Nova 
Scotia. Canada: SATLANTIC INC., July 1998), 6. 

74 RADARSAT International, Ship Detection and Monitoring Using RADARSAT . brief, 1996. 

75 SMALLSAT Conference. Logon, UT, September 1996. 

7(1 KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, The Satellite Remote Sensing Industry: A Global Review. (Washington, D.C.: KPMG, 1998), 
20-30. 

77 Office of Naval Intelligence, Commercial Imagery Trends , brief, 1996. 

7x Jet Propulsion Laboratory, LIGHTSAR (Pasadena, CA: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1996). 


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CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


RADARSAT is expected to provide SAR data of at least 3-meter resolution. Other 
countries, such as France, Germany, India, and Japan, would be able to quickly equal 
this capability. 79 



Figure 11-20. RADARSAT Image of Honduras after 
Hurricane Mitch. 80 

Improvements in SAR designs, such as the LIGHTSAR concept, will encourage a 
proliferation of SAR satellites. Although they will be smaller and cheaper, future SAR 
satellites will have the same capabilities as the larger models, either on a single vehicle 
or divided among a number of satellites. These capabilities will include multiband, 
multipolarization, and electronic beam steering for variable swath width and resolution. 
The synergy of these capabilities, especially when fused with EO data, will provide far 
more knowledge of an area of interest. 81 


79 Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Operational Use of Civil Space-Based Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), JPL Publication 96-16, 
(Pasadena, CA: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 21 August 1996), 3-1 -4-2. 

80 Radarsat International, accessed online, URL: <http://www.rsi.ca>. 

81 Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Operational Use of Civil Space-Based Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), JPL Publication 96-16, 
(Pasadena, CA: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 21 August 1996), 3-1 -4-2. 


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CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


The following table illustrates current and projected space-based remote sensing 
capabilities. 82 


SYSTEM 

NOW 

2020 

ELECTRO-OPTICAL 


NUMBER 

10-11 

30 

RESOLUTION 

2 METER 

< 1 METER 

SPECTRUM 

MULTISPECTRAL (5-7 BANDS) 

HYPERSPECTRAL (250 BANDS) 

SYNTHETIC APERATURE RADAR (SAR) 


NUMBER 

3 

6 

RESOLUTION 

7.5 METER 

1-3 METER 

BAND NUMBER 

SINGLE 

MULTIPLE 

POLARIZATION 

SINGLE 

MULTIPLE 

GENERAL SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 


TIMELINESS 

HOURS 

MINUTES 

OWNERSHIP 

NATIONAL 

MUTINATIONAL 


Table 11-5. Future Commercial Satellite Capabilities. 

The amount of information that can be gained from space-based remote sensing systems 
will greatly improve the execution of many maritime activities such as the following: 

• Safe Navigation - Real or near-real time satellite data could supply mariners with 
information about a surrounding area. One application of this information could be 
detection of nearby ships for safety of navigation. Information gathered on wind, wave, 
and current conditions could also be used for safe navigation or maintaining station. 

• Ship Detection - Port vessel traffic systems, which currently use earth-based sensors, 
could benefit from real or near-real time satellite imagery to safely direct harbor traffic. 
Overhead imagery would provide the big picture of the harbor and supply an additional 
source of information for efficient vessel traffic management. 


• Fisheries - Commercial satellites could provide fishing fleets with data to target 
potential fishing areas. These satellites would identify large masses of phytoplankton, 
which are likely feeding grounds for fish. Surface temperature measurements also could 
help fishermen target migratory species such as tuna, salmon, and shark. Remote sensing 
already is beginning to affect fisheries activities. “The UN Food Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) is developing a GIS [Geographic Information System] system that includes remote 
sensing data for use in world ocean fisheries. FAO is using remote sensing data to detect 
both physical and human resources related to marine fisheries and baseline inventory 
and coastal monitoring.” 83 

K2 McMunn Associates and Tera Research Inc., Handbook of Unmanned Civilian Imaging Satellites (Washington, D.C.: Office 
of Naval Intelligence, 14 October 1998), 3-4. 

83 KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Space and High Technology Practice, The Satellite Remote Sensing Industry: A Cdobal Review . 
(Washington, D.C.: KPMG Peat Warwick LLP, 1998), 45. 


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CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


• Ocean Routing - Using satellite information, shipping companies can route vessels 
around dangerous weather or other potentially harmful conditions. Remote sensing data 
is already being used to detect ice in the Arctic, Antarctic, Great Lakes, and Chesapeake 
Bay. As a result, ocean routing can improve safety for the ship, cargo, and crew as well 
as save time and money. 

• Aquaculture - Remote sensing data could be used to monitor the water quality where 
fish are being commercially grown. In the event polluted waters are detected, authorities 
could prevent the sale of contaminated fish. 

• Search and Rescue - A wide variety of remote sensing applications could be applied 
to vessels in distress. Technology could furnish satellite imagery to search large open 
ocean areas. In addition, satellite information could provide authorities with important 
data for operational rescues. Weather conditions on scene including wind, waves, currents, 
and water temperature are some examples of valuable data. 

• Environmental Protection - Remote sensing can detect oil spills and help track spill 
movement, particularly with respect to large spills. During clean-up operations, remote 
sensing data could track progress as well as provide important weather conditions to 
help predict the movement of an oil spill. Furthermore, satellite imagery could possibly 
identify vessels suspected of dumping pollutants into the ocean. 

• Law Enforcement - Commercial remote sensing could aid law enforcement agencies 
by providing quick and cost effective solutions to area surveillance limitations. There is 
a wide range of potential applications for remote sensing in the law enforcement 
community. These include fisheries enforcement, drug smuggling interdictions, 
immigration detection, and maritime boundary enforcement. 84 

The challenges posed by the availability of increasingly sophisticated imaging systems, 
if anything, will grow. While the information gained from remote sensing will greatly 
increase knowledge of the maritime environment for peaceful purposes, U.S. adversaries, 
who will have access to this same information, will be able to apply this knowledge to 
exploiting gaps in law enforcement operations, or monitoring military presence or 
operations. Regardless of U.S. policy, the world market is quickly developing high 
resolution, information dense imagery. This trend can be expected to continue as 
commercial—rather than military—demand develops. 

Although most threat analysis for adversary use of commercial satellite imagery has 
been focused on military operations, there are similar threats to other maritime operations. 
The principal threat is disclosure of operating positions, forces, and movements. 


84 Gordon Campbell and Brian Whitehouse, “Satellite Surveillance for Civilians,” Backscatter , Vol. 9, No. 1 (February 1998): 15. 


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CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 



In 1989, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace studied the threat posed by 
commercial satellite imagery. Carnegie researchers tested the French SPOT company's 
Open Skies sales policy under the premise that if SPOT sold imagery of sensitive areas 
in its own country, it would probably sell imagery of other states without restriction. 
Using SPOT imagery of French territory, Carnegie’s lead researcher. Dr. Bhupendra 
Jasani, identified controlling headquarters, security fences, perimeter roads, and 18 

probable launch silos. Dr. Jasani was 
convinced that even 10-meter data is usable 
in intelligence. With 1-meter resolution data, 
the applications increase exponentially.* 5 


Groups involved in criminal activities, such 
as smuggling and poaching, also would 
benefit through unrestricted access to high- 
resolution commercial satellite imagery. For 
example, “front companies" for organized 
crime groups could buy commercial satellite 
imagery to locate law enforcement assets at 
sea to help avoid interdiction of illicit cargo. 
The revolution in remote sensing will also 
greatly improve the ability of distant water 
fishing fleets to pinpoint the location of high 
value fish stocks, making it easy for them to 
quickly harvest fish stock and depart the area 
before enforcement assets. 


Figure 11-21. Six-meter NOAA weather 
buoy. 

(2) Earth-based. Although the most significant growth will occur in the space-based 
systems, the need for earth-based sensors will not diminish. These sensors will provide 
accurate data, which will calibrate and validate information derived from satellites. These 
sensors also will provide real time information to aid mariners and improve safety on 
the waterways. 

Over the next 20 years, mariners will continue to rely on important data such as current 
and weather information to navigate the oceans and harbors safely. Although such data 
traditionally have been recorded in tables and books that are regularly updated, 
technological advances have enabled mariners to obtain near real-time data directly. 
Weather buoys such as the one shown here are maintained by the National Oceanographic 


85 Central Intelligence Agency, “Verification Implications of Commercial Satellite Imagery,” unpublished research 
paper for Central Intelligence Agency, accessed on Intelink. 


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CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and provide localized data. Weather buoys 
will continue to provide valuable information to mariners and weather forecasters relying 
on real-time data. Members of the NOAA’s National Data Buoy Center (NDBC) who 
currently manage roughly 70 weather buoys predict that the number of buoys will at 
least stay the same and could possibly double by 2020. 86 In addition to the weather 
buoys, NOAA also partially manages and operates the Physical Oceanographic Real 
Time System (PORTS) which is an information acquisition and dissemination technology. 
PORTS includes the integration of real-time currents, water levels, winds, and water 
temperatures at multiple locations within the port. The information is disseminated 
through a telephone voice response system, a direct dial-up using a modem, and via the 
internet. The PORTS program currently is active in four ports and is an example of the 
type of systems and information that mariners will depend on in the future in order to 
safely navigate U.S. waters. 

There also is a growing demand for scientific measurements to help study the oceans. 
Several representatives from organizations such as NOAA, the National Science 
Foundation, Scripps Institute of Oceanography, and the Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institution testified before Congress in July 1998 on the status of oceanographic 
monitoring and assessment efforts on both the global and local scales. Dr. Fred Grassle, 
Director of the Institute of Marine and Coastal Sciences, commented, “Efficient, safe, 
sea transportation is a requirement for the economic success of our ports and coastal 
economies. We need better prediction of coastal hazards including storms, coastal erosion 
events, harmful algal blooms, and oil spills, or even when and where to spend a pleasant 
day fishing or swimming.” 87 The growing market for timely, accurate ocean information 
will certainly lead to an increase in both earth-and space-based sensors during the next 
20 years, bringing both tremendous benefits and challenges to those responsible for 
maintaining safety and security on the sea. 

5. Information Operations 

With the growing availability of vital information in electronic form, accessible through 
the Internet or private computer networks, the future security threat to information and 
technology infrastructures will increase exponentially. Despite efforts to construct 
firewalls and secure networks, vital military and economic data will be more vulnerable 
than ever to attacks by individual hackers and organized sabotage operations. Information 
warfare will increase by 2020; the dependence of the United States on information 
networks makes it especially vulnerable to information attack. Although the United 
States is strategically placed to benefit from, and perhaps even continue to dominate, 

86 Interview with Mr. Erik Meindle and Mr. Doug Scally, National Data Buoy Center, interview with author, August 1998. 

87 Congressional Quarterly Inc., “House Resources Hearing: Ocean Observation Systems,” U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on 

Fisheries Conservation, Wildlite and Oceans, accessed online. 


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CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


information technologies, the ability of the United States to operate without fear of 
attacks against its information infrastructure will erode as other states choose information 
over industry as an instrument of national power. SN 

Key functions of maritime operations, such as navigation, communications, and maritime 
surveillance, have always had a significant information component. The information 
revolution has only intensified that characteristic. The obvious dependence of maritime 
security and law enforcement on information makes the information itself a high-payoff 
target for adversaries, whether state-sponsored or not. 


Although maritime law enforcement 
information systems tend to have a lower 
profile than national security systems as 
prestigious targets for amateur hackers, the 
consequences of even prank hacking are 
unacceptable. At the same time, the 
availability of sophisticated but affordable 
sensor and communications systems will 
enhance the capabilities of smugglers, 
illegal fishermen, terrorists, foreign special 
operations forces, dumpers of 
environmentally hazardous materials, 
pirates, and others. 

Figure 11-22. Attacks against the U.S. 
information infrastructure could 
potentially disrupt maritime operations. 

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) plans to harden all national defense 
information systems, including those used at sea, to keep out casual intruders and to 
limit the damage even successful intruders can inflict. Actions taken to increase 
information security will clear the information battlefield for the contest against 
opponents who have the most resources and skill. The future field of conflict, 
however, will not be confined to computer networks, but will include all aspects of 
information security: personnel security (including awareness of and resistance to 
human intelligence operations), operational security, signals security, counter- 
deception, public affairs/media policy, etc. Adversaries can be expected to employ a 
multi-disciplinary approach to acquiring foreknowledge of maritime operations, 
which must be matched by a full-spectrum information security plan. As U.S. 
maritime surveillance in the coastal zone becomes more sophisticated and 
comprehensive, adversaries may attack that system through its own sensors, providing 



ss Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 9 October 1998), 
III-1. 


11-40 







CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


multiple credible false targets to diffuse coastal patrol efforts. The legitimacy and efficacy 
of U.S. maritime security operations may even be called into question by adversary- 
funded media campaigns, requiring a “counter-punch” public affairs stance. 

Since U.S. civil infrastructure also has a heavy information component, those attacking 
maritime infrastructure facilities—including port facilities, bridges, navigation aids, and 
shipping— have the option of using information-based means. 89 Infrastructure attacks 
may be perpetrated not only by non-state groups and individual hackers, but by foreign 
countries as part of an asymmetrical strategy for confronting the United States. In brief, 
U.S. dominance in high-technology conventional expeditionary warfare may motivate 
non-state adversaries and foreign countries to carry the conflict to U.S. territory, over 
the heads of deployed forces, with at least two objectives: 

• to visit the consequences of activist U.S. foreign policy on the electorate, possibly 
preventing the formation of a national consensus for that policy, and 

• to interfere with military force generation, deployment, and sustainment from 
U.S. bases. 90 

Given the unquestionable superiority of American military might, foreign states, should 
they choose to attack the United States, are likely to use unconventional strategies, such 
as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and information warfare. In addition, “[n]on- 
state actors, such as international crime rings, terrorist organizations, separatist groups, 
and cults, can acquire Information Warfare (IW ) weapons or hire IW warriors. Compared 
to the acts of clumsy governments, their attacks could be hard to trace, punish and 
deter.” 91 


6. Law of the Sea 

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) will remain the 
guiding global authority on maritime activities through 2020. The UNCLOS regime 
will be strengthened by an increase in the number of states that ratify or accede to 
UNCLOS and by the negotiation of corollary agreements consistent with UNCLOS. 
The law of the sea, designed to be upheld and executed through additional maritime 
conventions, will continue to be tailored to address and resolve global and regional 
issues through the development of global, regional, or bilateral treaties. The UNCLOS 
regime will not undergo any great or fundamental changes over the next 20 years and 

89 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63. “Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructures.” 22 May 1998. Critical Infrastructure 
Assurance Office, accessed online, URL: <http://www.ciao.gov/63factsheet.html>. 

V.K., Nair, Brig., VSM fret.) War in the Gulf: Lessons for Third World Nations (New Delhi, India: Lancer International, 1991). 
91 David Gompert, “National Security in the Information Age.” Naval War College Review . Vol. LI, No. 4, Seq. 364. (Autumn 
1998): 33. 


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CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


there is little chance that present state members will withdraw from the Convention or 
challenge its fundamental provisions. 92,93 

UNCLOS entered into force in November 1994, 1 year after the 60th state deposited an 
instrument of ratification or accession. 94 One hundred and thirty states are now party to 
UNCLOS, which codified the extent of offshore jurisdiction that states could exercise, 
establishing the following: 

• a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea 

• an additional 12-nautical-mile contiguous zone for customs, fiscal, immigration 
and sanitary regulation 

• an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 miles 

• coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf, including where the 
continental shelf extends beyond the limits of the EEZ. 95 (See Figure 11-23) 


LOS Convention: Structure of Sea Claims 

Contiguous Zone 
(Customs, Fiscal, 
and Sanitation Enforcement) 

Territorial Sea 
(Innocent Passage) 


Shoreline 

Land 


02 24 
n.m; n.m. 

! 


High Seas (Transit) 

200 

n.m. 


I, Hi 


Exclusive Economic 
Zone 


A 

A 


350 

n.m. 


High Seas 
(Fishing) 

- — T y - 




Continental Shell 1 
(Seabed and Subsoil Resources) 


Area J 




Continental Shetf extends no less than 200 n.m, and no more than 350 n.m. ftom shoreline. 
A<ea comprises seabed and subsoil tesources beyond the Units ot national (unsdlctioii 


Figure 11-23. LOS Convention: Structure of Sea Claims. 96 


Interview with Dr. Christopher Joyner, Professor of Government at Georgetown University, interview with author, 26 January 
1999. 

93 Interview with J. Ashley Roach, Capt. USN (ret.), Legal Advisor at Department of State, interview with author, 4 February 
1999. 

94 The four occasions when the international community has come together to codify public international maritime law are 1) 
The Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law in 1930, 2) the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
3) the 2 nd U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1960, and 4) the 3 rd U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1973-1982. 

95 Hans A. Binnenddijk and Patrick L. Clawson, eds.. Strategic Assessment 1995: L.S. Security Challenges in Transition 
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 1 10. 

% Hans A. Binnenddijk and Patrick L. Clawson, eds.. Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition 
(Washington. D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 111. 


11-42 
























CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


UNCLOS also guarantees the preservation of the rights of maritime custom, such as 
freedom of navigation and innocent passage, and outlines a regime for fisheries, pollution, 
and marine scientific research in the maritime environment. 

As marine pollution and the competition for living and 
non-living marine resources increases, coastal states 
may threaten to extend enforcement beyond areas of 
national jurisdiction (i.e., their territorial waters, 
contiguous zones, and EEZs). 97 Such an increase in the 
exercise of coastal state jurisdiction may impinge on 
traditional maritime rights (such as freedom of 
navigation) and could conceivably affect the movements 
and operations of maritime law enforcement services 
or military forces. More active or extended coastal state 
law enforcement capabilities, however, could also 
hamper commercial shipping activities, especially in 
cases where flag states fail to enforce fishing and/or 
pollution regulations. 98 For example, some coastal 
states, including the United States, may try to enforce 
environmental controls by regulating commercial 
activities within their EEZs in ways that the convention 
does not specifically mandate. 99 The United States is 
also one of a small group of coastal states with the 
capability and the incentive to institute more stringent 
enforcement of UNCLOS fishery agreements on vessels 
flying the flag of other countries on the high seas. In the 
same vein, the pressure of increased marine pollution 
and its effect on national fisheries may prompt coastal 
states to engage in extra-territorial enforcement to 
protect their national marine resources. For example, in 
1995 the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans 
seized a Spanish trawler that was fishing in the North 
Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) regulatory area 
in violation of the NAFO catch restriction on Greenland 
halibut (turbot). Similar activities are projected to occur 
more frequently as competition for marine resources 
intensifies. 

97 98 Interview with J. Ashley Roach, Capt. USN (ret.), Legal Advisor at Department of State, interview with author, 4 February 
1999. 

99 Interview with Dave Balton. Director of the Office of Marine Conservation at Department of State, interview with author, 

4 February 1999. 


Law of the Sea Terminology 

Territorial Sea: Territorial sea extends seaward 
from the baseline up to a limit not exceeding 12 
nautical miles. 

Innocent Passage: Maritime passage is inno¬ 
cent if it does not violate the peace or good or¬ 
der or security ; of the coastal state. 

Contiguous Zone: The sea area adjacent to the 
territorial sea and having, together with it, a 
width of no more than 24 miles within which 
the coastal state may exercise control in cer¬ 
tain, specifically designated subjects. 

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): An area sea¬ 
ward of the territorial seas up to 200 miles wide 
within which coastal states exercise exclusive 
jurisdiction over economic activities subject to 
a regime based on freedom of the high seas. 

Continental Shelf: The continental shelf of a 
coastal state comprises the seabed and subsoil 
extending beyond the territorial sea through¬ 
out the natural prolongation of the coastal 
state's land territory up to the outer edge of the 
continental margin or to a distance of200 nau¬ 
tical miles, or more in certain cases. 


11-43 












CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


While the future of deep seabed mining is hard to predict, any growth in the seabed 
mining industry will occur within the UNCLOS framework and the state or non-state 
actors undertaking the activity will have to act within that international legal regime. 
UNCLOS established the International Sea-Bed Authority (ISBA) to govern seabed 
mining. ISBA is charged to organize and oversee the exploitation of mineral resources 
of the deep seabed and to assure that both developed and developing states benefit from 
seabed mining. 100 While UNCLOS outlines the framework for the conduct of seabed 
mining and the system of profit-sharing between developed and developing nations, 
deep seabed mining has been stymied by the discovery of significant mineral stores on 
land, prohibitively expensive seabed mining technologies, and a weak demand for the 
minerals that can be harvested from the sea. 101 

Although the United States has not acceded to UNCLOS, all three administrations since 
1984 have accepted and pledged to act in accordance with the Convention. The United 
States did participate in the creation of the ISBA, but its provisional membership in that 
body expired in 1998. It is likely, however, that the United States will accede to UNCLOS 
within the next 20 years. 

B. DESTABILIZING EVENTS 

The types of events that undoubtedly will occur through 2020, and which will either 
cause or exacerbate instability, include the broad spectrum of warfare, from asymmetric 
through large-scale regional, catastrophic natural disasters, and humanitarian 
emergencies. In addition to being destabilizing, any of these types of events could have 
a profound impact on maritime security. That some or all of these types of events will 
occur over the next two decades is predictable; the what, where, when, and how is 
speculation. 

1. Political-Military Engagements 

While the likelihood of global or nuclear war is improbable through 2020, there will be 
a high incidence of smaller conflicts and the steady continuation of lower order military 
threats. The international environment of 2020 will “very likely be one where world 
economic competition and tensions will be high and where armed conflict remains a 
possibility.’’ 102 Competition over resources, territory, and regional dominance between 
nations and among peoples within and across nations will be prevalent, often erupting 
into conflict. Civil wars and violent clashes between ethnic and religious groups will 


100 National Intelligence Council. Law of the Sea: The End Game (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, March 
1996), 15, 19. 

101 See Chapter III, Section Ab( 1) for a discussion on Ocean Minerals. 

102 Charles W. Taylor, A World 2020 : A New Order of Nations (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992), I 1-12. 


11-44 








CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


occur as states established by imperial or colonial powers in the 19th and 20th centuries, 
but lacking a unifying sense of nationhood among their inhabitants, are challenged by 
other group identities. Irregular warfare, including terrorism, insurgency, ethnic conflict, 
guerilla warfare, low-intensity conflict, and inter/intra-tribal warfare, will challenge 
stability within countries—and occasionally within regions—across the globe. 103 Most 
of the antagonists of these conflicts will seek to target the political will of stronger 
adversaries via asymmetric means, rather than directly challenging their military might, 
and thereby may target both civilian and military sectors of society. 104 

Perhaps the most likely challenges to be faced by maritime forces through and beyond 
2020 will be found in a variety of asymmetric warfare options. Given that only a handful 
of countries have the capability to project naval power outside their own geographic 
region, and that the vast majority are unable to project power beyond their own territorial 
waters, it is highly unlikely that any foreign naval power will emerge by 2020 which 
will be capable of challenging U.S. maritime superiority on a global basis. Rather, the 
vast majority of future maritime challenges will originate from individual states and 
stateless organizations with naval capabilities ranging from the nonexistent to a limited 
ability to operate within their own territorial waters. In order to defeat their adversaries, 
such countries and organizations will only be able to achieve success against modern 
Western maritime forces through the use of asymmetric warfare. 105 

Most conventional military operations endorse the elementary goal of asymmetric 
warfare. However, asymmetric warfare connotes actions by the weaker power which 
are unexpected, unusual, or surprising from the viewpoint of the stronger adversary. 
Asymmetric warfare can also involve actions launched by an inferior power against a 
superior power which the latter has a difficult time countering for political reasons or 
force structure issues, or which pursue ends that constitute a different definition of victory 
for the inferior power than the stronger power. In many cases, asymmetric warfare will 
express itself in the form of tactical battlefield measures taken by a foreign country or 
stateless organization to win a limited set of political objectives during a confrontation 
with the United States. 106 


103 LITTON-TASC, Problem Identification and Definition Forecast 2020 (U) (Chantilly, VA: L1TTON-TASC, Inc., 1998), 19. 

104 Joint Warfare Analysis Department, The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Littoral Warfare Handbook 
for Surface Combat System Engineering , Classified, Vol. I, March 1997, Chapter 1. 

105 Draft, ‘Advanced Technology Integrated Warfare Architecture Study: Technological Impact on Asymmetric Warfare,” 
Classified (Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence, November 1998), 1. 

106 Michael Mendenhall, “Challenges in the Littoral: 2010,” Classified, ONI Brief, May 1998 and Curt Smith, “Asymmetric 
Warfare: Future Warfare in the Littorals?,” Classified (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, July 
1998), 1-5 and 8-13. 


11-45 













CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


Asymmetric warfare concepts vary widely, and many types of warfare could be used 
asymmetrically. According to the National Defense University’s Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, there are four broad asymmetric warfare options to combat foreseeable 
U.S. military superiority: 


• Acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long-range ballistic or cruise 
missiles. 


• Acquiring high-technology sensors, communications, and weapon systems. 

• Exploiting cyberweapons to disrupt military logistics systems or the U.S. national 
strategic infrastructure. 

• Engaging the U.S. in environments that degrade the U.S. ability to attack 
militarily significant targets. (For example, choosing to fight in urban areas, or 
purposely blurring the distinctions between actions considered crimes and those 
viewed as warfare)." 17 


In addition, small boat tactics, guerrilla warfare, terrorist activities, and the exploitation 
of media coverage of events are other possible asymmetric options. Regardless of the 
options employed, the asymmetric challenger, “unable or unwilling to confront U.S. 
military power directly, and in kind, will pursue asymmetrical advantages designed to 
negate the U.S. military’s comparative advantages.” 108 Accordingly, the challenger will 
subscribe to an overall strategy that links political and military objectives in a manner 
that thwarts any U.S. and allied hopes of a quick, surgical victory. The challenger may 
even try to inflict a level of damage on U.S. forces and facilities that will weaken U.S. 
resolve for a protracted war, avoiding a direct confrontation with superior U.S. military 
power and instead concentrating on inflicting unacceptably high levels of damage and 
casualties by exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities. 109 


Through 2020, the world's littorals will present the most challenging environment for 
operations by maritime forces. In coastal areas, both long- and short-ranged, land-based 
systems, as well as maritime forces ranging from those with open-ocean capabilities to 
those tied closely to the shore, can be brought to bear on U.S. maritime forces. Challenges 
in the littoral therefore include a greater variety and number of weapons and delivery 
means that can be brought to bear on naval forces than in any other maritime 


1,17 Hans A. Binnenddijk and David C. Gompert, eds.. Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging Power for Peace (Washington, 
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), 170-171. 

108 William Rosenau, Gay Kemper, and David Mussington, “Transnational Threats and U.S. National Security,” Low Intensity 
Conflict and Law Enforcement . 6 (1997) : 152. 

109 Draft, "Power Projection Integrated Warfare Architecture Study: Littoral/Expeditionary Warfare Challenges,” Classified 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence, November 1998). 1 and Jeffrey B. White, “A Different Kind of Threat: Some 
Thoughts on Irregular Warfare,” Classified, Studies in Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency, Vol. 39, No. 5, 1996: 5. 


11-46 











CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


environment. Moreover, with the continually increasing range and accuracy of offensive 
stand-off weapons, the distinction previously made between the mere projection of 
offensive naval power will become blurred. Defending their national territories and 
territorial waters against these new, long-range strike weapons will require countries to 
project power to distances where these weapons can be neutralized. Therefore, those 
few states with any capability to do so will seek to deny the United States the sea area 
necessary to conduct long-range strike operations, while the rest will seek at least to 
oppose those U.S. forces that must operate closer to shore. 110 

Future conventional maritime weaponry that could present challenges in the littoral 
include aircraft, antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), patrol combatants and larger naval 
surface combatants, submarines, mines, special operations forces, small craft, coastal 
artillery, ballistic missiles (including terminally guided missiles), and even weapons 
available to ground combat units operating along the shoreline. Other non-conventional 
weapons, including biological and chemical weapons, could also be encountered. Many 
military operations in times of tension short of war-during sanctions enforcement, non- 
combatant evacuations or shipping escort operations, for example-could take place very 
near the bases and routine operating areas of potentially hostile foreign forces, allowing 
them to attack with little warning at a time and place of their choosing, and in waters 
well known to them. 1 " 

Control of the littoral battlespace of the future will be won by those forces that best 
combine surveillance, strike, and support capabilities. In many countries, improvement 
in littoral surveillance capabilities will be driven by a need to patrol exclusive economic 
zones and enforce sovereignty in them. In a few cases, an additional imperative will 
exist to monitor and target hostile forces approaching or operating within stand-off 
weapon range of the country’s coast. Surveillance and targeting technology is becoming 
more complex and capable, with space surveillance systems expected gradually to assume 
a more important role in reconnaissance and target cueing." 2 

Whether during conflicts or in operations other than war, the world’s littorals will be the 
most stressing environment for U.S. maritime forces through 2020. The greatest variety 
of foreign capabilities come together in the littoral, and those capabilities will continue 
to grow; what are now new technologies largely limited to the industrialized world will 
become increasingly available for purchase and/or production by 2020. Many countries 


110 Draft, “Power Projection Integrated Warfare Architecture Study: Littoral/Expeditionary Warfare Challenges,” Classified 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence, November 1998) and Jeffrey B. White, “A Different Kind of Threat: Some 
Thoughts on Irregular Warfare,” Classified, Studies in Intelligence , Central Intelligence Agency, Vol. 39, No. 5, 1996:5. 

111 Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Threat to U.S. Navv and Marine Forces, 1997-2017 , Vol. 1, Classified (Washington, 
D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence, October 1997), 7. 

112 Michael Mendenhall, “Challenges in the Littoral: 2010,” Classified, ONI Brief, May 1998. 


11-47 










CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


will have examined the problems of countering U.S. naval operations near their shores 
and may have developed asymmetric strategies and tactics with which to attempt to 
deny a quick victory to the United States. Denying an asymmetric challenger the ability 
to drag out a war on his terms, perhaps in water near his bases and far from one's own, 
may pose the greatest littoral challenge of all in 2020." ' 

2. Natural Disasters 

Littorals frequently are subjected to 
natural disasters including, but not 
limited to, hurricanes, typhoons, 
cyclones, floods, and tsunamis. Using 
data on “notable” natural disasters 
that have occurred since 1950, it is 
possible to identify those regions that 
are highly vulnerable to natural 
disasters and those regions that incur 
the greatest number of deaths and 
collateral damage from natural 
disasters. 114 


Hurricanes (as they are called in the Atlantic, Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and eastern 
Pacific), typhoons (as they are known in the western Pacific), and cyclones (as they are 
called in the Indian Ocean) are all the same type of severe tropical storm. The United 
States, the Caribbean, and Central America are the regions most likely to be hit by 
hurricanes and major tropical storms. Of these regions, the Caribbean and Central America 
suffer the greatest amount of damage and human casualties. The Philippine Islands, 
Japan, and China are the three areas most affected by typhoons, with the Philippines 
incurring the highest rates of death and collateral damage. Finally, Bangladesh is the 
country that is subjected to the highest rate of death and damage from cyclones, severe 
rainstorms, and floods. Over the past 50 years, more than 540,000 Bangladeshis have 
died in nine major storms. 115 

Since 1950, the United States and Europe have had the largest number of notable floods; 
however, these floods have not caused the extent of damage and death seen in other 
parts of the world. For example, Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan, and South America 
have incurred significantly greater human and property losses from fewer floods. 



Figure 11-24. NOAA Satellite imagery of 
hurricane Erin in August 1995. 


113 ibid. 


114 The term “notable” is taken directly from The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1998 . the source of the historical data used 


in this section. 

115 Robert Famighetti, ed.. The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1998 (Mahwah, New 
1997), 268-270. 


Jersey: K-II1 Reference Corporation, 


11-48 










CHALLENGES TO MARITIME SECURITY 


Based on data from notable natural 
disasters since 1950, there have been 
an average of eight hurricanes, four 
typhoons, two cyclones, and fourteen 
floods each decade that have caused a 
significant loss of life and/or major 
property damage. As discussed in 
Chapter I, there are no significant 
changes expected in the global climate 
through 2020 and, although the 
number and or severity of major 
storms can vary widely from one year 
to the next, the data gives an indication 
of the number of storms possible over 
that timeframe. 



Figure 11-25. Hurricanes will continue to batter 
the U.S. coastline in the years ahead. 


A product of earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and underwater landslides, tsunamis cannot 
be predicted in terms of frequency or severity. However, the destructive force of a tsunami 
is such that even a relatively small one can cause great loss of life and damage if it 
strikes an inhabited coastline, particularly when little warning is available. Tsunamis 
occur with fair regularity, especially in the Pacific, and have affected U.S. territories 
including Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific Northwest. 


3. Other Emergencies 


In addition to the threats posed by potential natural disasters and possible political- 
military engagements, the marine environment may also experience man-made disasters, 
epidemics, or mass migrations. Through 2020, “accidents involving nuclear power 
generators, chemical production, toxic waste disposal, or sudden and intense pollution 
of the water supply all appear to be well within the realm of possibility.”" 6 In addition, 
the outbreak of contagious disease or a massive flow of migrants or refugees would 
threaten security in the littorals. The occurrence of any of these events would jeopardize 
a large number of people and would necessitate an immediate humanitarian response. 
Accordingly, governmental and non-governmental humanitarian relief organizations can 
expect to be called upon repeatedly to assist in organizing and distributing food, water 
and medical supplies, providing transportation and evacuation assistance, assessing the 
loss of life and the extent of casualties, and constructing temporary shelters and emergency 
infrastructure. 


11,1 Defense Intelligence Agency, Alternate Futures in International Security Affairs. 2015: A Summary Study of the "Transformed 
World. 2015^ Project (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1997). 4, 


11-49 















fc 








CHAPTER III 

THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


The maritime world of 20 years hence will be, for the most part, a much busier place. 
The forces and changes described in Chapter II not only will affect the types of activity 
occurring on the seas, but also will tend to increase the amount of maritime activity. The 
primary drivers of this increase in maritime activity will be the continued growth of the 
economic interdependence among states, the overall world population growth, the 
tremendous migration of people from developing states to developed states, and a 
projected significant increase in passenger carriers. 

The oceans are vital to the overall growth of the world economy and population, and to 
the continued economic integration of nations. The oceans are a primary source of 
food, energy, and transportation, all key requirements of human activity in an 
interconnected world. Development of the oceans’ natural resources and use of the oceans' 
highways for transport must increase to accommodate an ever-growing world. 

Two primary challenges face the maritime states from now until 2020. First is the need 
to manage the growth in human use of the oceans with the need to protect the marine 
environment. Second is the substantial increase in illegal activity that will accompany 
the tremendous growth in legal maritime activity. 

A. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 

1. Natural Resource Exploitation 

“The oceans are no longer viewed by the community of nations as a vast unregulated 
void or solely as a barrier to be crossed. Not only must America exert its influence to 
safeguard its economic and security interests, we must support efforts to protect the 
seas and defuse conflict that arise from competing demands for the sea’s resources. 

This can be achieved only through the development of a comprehensive agenda for the 
ocean in the 21 st century. 1 


John Dailey 


a. Living Marine Resources 

(1) Fishing Stocks. Worldwide demand for fish 2 will increase through 2020, stressing 
already fully fished and overexploited stocks, reinforcing the need for sound fisheries 


1 Draft. John Dailey, “Space and Oceans: Can They be Controlled?,” Strategic Assessment 1999 (Washington. D.C.: 
Institute for National Strategic Studies. National Defense University, 1999), 460. 

2 For purposes of this section. "Fish " or "Fishing" also connotes shellfish and crustaceans. 


III-l 









THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


management practices, and creating potential conflict among states competing for scarce 
fisheries resources. Marine fisheries production (the amount of fish caught, measured in 
tons) may increase to help meet the rising demand, but only through effective fisheries 
management. The United States faces both international and domestic challenges to 
ensure its fisheries remain sustainable. 

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) conservatively 
estimates that world demand for fish for human consumption will increase from 80 
million tons in 1995 to 110-120 million tons in 2010. 3 Fish are an important source of 
protein for much of the world’s population. All of the regions around the globe are 
expected to have an increased demand for fish in the future, especially Asia. Aquaculture, 
or fish farming, will help meet this rising demand, but marine fisheries will still be the 
primary source. 

This rise in world demand for fish will place increasing stress on fish stocks, many of 
which are already overexploited. Of the top 200 marine fish resources in the world, 
over 60 percent require urgent management of the fishery because they are overexploited 
or fully fished. In North America, for example, the once robust cod fishery off the 
northeast coast of Canada is under moratorium because of overexploitation, and in Europe 
many groundfish stocks have been exploited so intensely that they are considered outside 
safe biological limits. 4 


Despite current depletion of fisheries stocks, it is possible that stocks as a whole may 
recover and remain at sustainable levels by 2010 should effective fisheries management 
practices be enacted and enforced. Many states are already taking steps, and the 
international community as a whole has recognized the need for fisheries management, 
adopting measures such as the UN Agreement on Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish (Straddling Stocks Agreement). The 
significance of the Straddling Stocks Agreement is its recognition that current fishing 
levels cannot be sustained at current harvesting rates. Under the FAO’s optimistic 
scenario, where fisheries management is improved, marine fisheries production will 
meet heavy worldwide demand for fish in 2010. Under the pessimistic scenario, where 
fisheries management is ineffective, marine fisheries production drops below current 
levels, far below the expected demand in 2010. 5 

There are three key components to the future success of worldwide fisheries management. 
All of these components will have to be used to some extent over the next two decades 
throughout the world. 


3 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture . (Rome, 
Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1997), 24. 

4 ibid., 47, 65. 

5 ibid., 27. 


III-2 








THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


(a) Reduction offishing fleet size. Reducing fleet size by at least 30 percent is a first 
step required in protecting the world’s fish stocks. Various plans to do this exist, such as 
retiring vessels, buying back permits, and limiting entry into a fishery as others’ permits 
expire. The United States has just completed such an effort to reduce the size of the 
New England fleet. These efforts are less effective if capacity is simply transferred 
from one fishery to another, such as in places like Italy, China, and Taiwan, where 
conversion programs have allowed former high seas driftnetters to enter other fisheries. 



(c) Limiting access. Today, fisheries managers are 
using several methods for limiting access to 
fisheries. One option. Individual Transferable 
Quotas (ITQs), establish property rights to what had 
previously been a public asset. Total-allowable- 
catches are established and divided among several 
quotas. These quotas may be bought and sold as 
property. The advantage of ITQs over programs 
like “days at sea’’ limitations is that ITQs give 
fishermen a vested interest in protecting their 
resource since they are only allowed to fish up to 
their quotas. Under a “days at sea’’ program. 

Figure in-1. In order to protect fish fishermen are limited in how many days they can 

stocks, the size of the New England fish, but there are no restrictions on the amount of 

fishing fleet was recently reduced. fish they can catch during those days. Other 

programs for limiting access include closing specific 
areas to fishing (or to a particular fishery) and restricting access to an area to certain 
permitted vessels. These two programs are currently in place on Georges Bank in the 


(b) Reduction or elimination of subsidies. Several 
foreign governments subsidize fisheries at a 
worldwide cost of $10 billion annually, according 
to the United Nations. 6 These subsidies encourage 
overcapitalization and greater effort by fishermen, 
and they increase consumer demand. 7 Examples of 
subsidies include guaranteed low interest loans, 
subsidized commodity prices, and capital 
investment tax incentives. 


Gulf of Maine. 


6 Allison Aubrey, “Morning edition” (text), National Public Radio, transcript, 26 October 1998, accessed from IC ROSE on 
22 January 1998. 

7 Hans A. Binnennddijk and Patrick L. Clawson, eds.. Strategic Assessment 1997: Flashpoints and Force Structure (Wash¬ 
ington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), 223. 


III-3 


















THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


Full implementation of these measures worldwide will not be easy. These measures 
require the commitment of resources to compensate fishermen for their vessels and 
other capital removed from the business. They also require plans (and more resources) 
to help these displaced fishermen to earn a living in other sectors of the economy. 
Furthermore, in the face of escalating demand for fish, limiting access will require 
significant commitment to enforcing any restrictions on fishing. Enforcement will be 
required to ensure domestic fishermen are obeying restrictions and to protect fisheries 
from foreign exploitation. 

International cooperation will be critical to the success of fisheries management 
endeavors. Fisheries issues are complex, and involve competing interests even among 
friendly states. Nearly 40 percent of the world’s oceans are claimed as exclusive economic 
zones, and coastal states control almost 90 percent of the oceans' fish. One example of 
international cooperation is the ongoing multilateral conferences on establishing a 
mechanism for the conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks in the 
Central and Western Pacific. The ambitious aim of the 23 countries involved is to 
manage highly migratory stocks over a 20 million square mile area, using tools such as 
a comprehensive registry of fishing vessels, a vessel monitoring system, and at-sea 
boardings of vessels whose countries are signatories to the eventual agreement. 

Despite efforts at cooperation, however, international fishing disputes will be inevitable. 
Disagreements among coastal states and coastal state enforcement measures will likely 
lead to conflict, and even violence, as countries grapple with balancing the need for 
food with the need to sustain the resource. Conflicts already in evidence today will be 
more prevalent in 2020. 

Fishing is such an important part of many coastal country economies that it often reaches 
into the social fabric of society. If the depletion of fishing stocks continues, we may 
well reach a point where security concerns over fishing rights approach the level of the 
concerns presently being dealt with in regard to water rights in the Middle East. 8 

For the United States, fisheries management and enforcement will be a major concern 
through 2020, both internationally and domestically. The U.S. commercial fishing Feet 
contributed nearly $50 billion to the economy in 1995. 9 The United States has the 
largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the world, and it contains an estimated 20 
percent of the world’s fishery resources. Should the United States be successful in 
managing its fisheries, U.S. waters will become even more attractive to foreign fishermen 
than they are today. In FY98, the U.S. Coast Guard detected 218 encroachments of the 


8 Draft, John Dailey, “Space and Oceans: Can They be Controlled?," Strategic Assessment 1999 

(Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1999) 458 

9 ibid., 457. 


III-4 







THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


U.S. EEZ by foreign fishing vessels. That number will likely increase through the next 
20 years because of overfishing in other areas of the world. For example, many fisheries 
in Asian waters are overexploited, or even depleted, while demand there is expected to 
increase substantially. The FAO notes that the East Asian region will probably have a 
high dependence on distant water fishing in the next decade to satisfy demand. 10 
Bountiful U.S. Pacific waters would be a lucrative target for Asian fishermen. 

For U.S. fisheries to be attractive to foreign fishermen, however, there must first be 
effective fisheries management at home. Fish stocks in the United States will only be at 
sustainable levels in 2020 if adequate fisheries management tools are implemented and 
enforced. This will require short-term sacrifice (e.g., reducing the number of fishing 
vessels and limiting access to fisheries) in the fishing industry for long-term gain, and 
long-term devotion of resources by the government to fisheries management and 
enforcement programs. 

(2) Endangered Species. The number of endangered marine species in U.S. waters 
likely will not increase by 2020, assuming adequate fisheries management programs 
are in place. Marine management is looking more and more to preserving ecosystems 
rather than individual species, broadening the scope and improving the efficiency of 
marine protection measures. Changes in abundance and distribution of one species 
affect the distribution of other species as well, and single species approaches are no 
longer adequate for modem fisheries management. Of the 174 stocks of marine mammals 



Figure 111-2. Protecting marine mammals will remain a challenge 

through 2020. 


10 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (Rome, 
Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1997), 63. 


III-5 












THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


and sea turtles, 42 are on the endangered species list or considered depleted over a 
significant portion of their range." By 2020, the number of endangered or depleted 
species will not appreciably increase, and will likely decrease. 

Marine mammal populations within the U.S. exclusive economic zone are expected to 
remain at current levels or increase through 2020, dependent in large part on how well 
the United States succeeds in preserving ecosystems and managing fisheries (maintaining 
food sources, enforcing no-trawl zones in vicinity of stellar sea lion rookeries, etc.). 
Collisions with ships and entanglement with fishing gear will loom as an ever-present 
hazard for large mammals such as the right whale, whose number has dropped to nearly 
300. 

Given the high priority placed by the United States on protection of the marine 
environment, more marine preserves will likely be established through 2020. The priority 
of the National Marine Sanctuaries will continue to be the long-term protection of U.S. 
natural resources. More coastal areas (See Table III-1) are likely to be designated as 
National Marine Sanctuaries, largely due to increasing development of mineral, 
hydrocarbon, living marine and gravel resources. 


CANDIDATE 

OFFSHORE AREA 

REASON 

Alaska 

Protect living marine resources’ habitat 

California 

Pressure from Environmental & Recreational 
Groups 

Texas 

Protect areas from Gas & Oil Industry 

Louisiana 

Protect areas from Gas & Oil Industry 

Florida (East Coast) 

Pressure from Environmental & Recreational 
Groups 

Eastern/Mid-Atlantic States 

Pressure from Environmental & Recreational 
Groups 


Table 111-1. Candidate Areas for New National Marine Sanctuaries. 12 


11 National Marine and Fisheries Service, “Marine Mammal Stock Assessment Report,” accessed online, URLxhttp:// 
www.nmfs.gov/tmcintyr/mammals/sa_rep/sar.html>. 

12 Richard D. Kohout and others. Looking Out to 2020: Trends Relevant to the Coast Guard . (Alexandria, VA: Center 
for Naval Analyses, 1997), 153. 


III-6 
















THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


b. Exploitation of Non-living Marine Resources 

The rapidly growing and interdependent international community of 2020 increasingly 
will probe and exploit the oceans for minerals and energy to fuel its expanding economy. 
Increasing world demand, improving technology, and decreasing availability of some 
resources on shore will stimulate greater seafloor exploration and development. 
Furthermore, exploration, drilling, and mining operations will move farther offshore as 
new technology advances the ability to operate in deeper waters. Production from the 
ocean waters themselves, rich in mineral deposits and holding tremendous energy 
potential, may become commercially viable, at least in some regions. Consequently, 
intensive commercial operations on and under the sea, including along the U. S. coasts, 
will greatly increase by 2020, presenting new and greater challenges to both the protection 
of the ocean environment and the safety and security of the people operating in that 
environment. 

(1) Ocean Minerals. The marine mineral industry will be substantially more robust by 
2020. Currently, the industry is active in exploration offshore, but production is limited 
to a few commodities such as sand and diamonds. In the short term, prohibitive costs 
and environmental concerns will hinder significant industry expansion beyond 
exploration. However, technological advances derived from deepwater oil exploration 
and production and, in some cases, increasing mineral prices may make marine mining 
ventures in several minerals profitable. Dr. James Hein, an International Marine Minerals 
Society Executive Board member from the U.S. Geological Survey, believes ocean 
mining “could be a profitable commercial industry around the year 2020 to 2025, but 
new companies are starting to see huge profit potential, so it could be sooner.” 13 

Diamond mining off the South African coast offers a clue to the future of marine mineral 
mining. The South African offshore diamond mines operate in depths of 100 meters, 
and are continuously moving to deeper waters, according to Dr. Charles Morgan of the 
University of Hawaii’s Marine Minerals Technology Center. In fact, the marine mines 
have actually become more profitable than diamond mining on land. Diamond mining 
occurs off the Namibian coast as well, where it is a billion-dollar industry. 14 Technology 
developed in sophisticated marine diamond mining operations may be applied to mining 
for other minerals as well, decreasing development costs. 


13 Daron Jones, “Marine Minerals Mining: Entering a New Age of Feasibility?” UnderWater Magazine (Spring 1998): 
accessed online. 

14 ibid. 


III-7 










THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 



Figure 111-3. Sand along a New Jersey beach is replenished to 

combat coastal erosion. 


The most sought-after mineral commodity from the U.S. outer continental shelf during 
the next 20 years will continue to be sand and gravel. 15 Offshore sand and gravel is used 
primarily for beach restoration, coastal protection, and construction material. Through 
2020. the demand for offshore sand and gravel likely will increase as land supplies 
begin to diminish and storms continue to erode beaches. Moreover, recovery operations 
will move farther offshore to avoid damaging coastal areas. There are immense sand 
and gravel reserves on the outer continental shelf, with estimates of over 2 trillion cubic 
meters on the Atlantic shelf alone. 16 Already, six large sand-dredging projects are 
operating on the outer continental shelf along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts. 17 

In addition to sand and gravel, the oceans surrounding the United States contain a wide 
variety of mineral resources. These minerals are found on the continental shelf, in 
ocean basins, or dissolved in ocean waters. In the U.S. EEZ, potential mining prospects 
include: 


• Phosphate beds from North Carolina to northern Florida 

• Titanium-rich heavy mineral sands from New Jersey to Florida 

• Gold-bearing sand and gravel deposits off the Alaskan shore 

• Barite deposits off Southern California 


15 Marine Minerals Management Service, “Year of the Ocean: Ocean Energy and Minerals: Resources for the Future,” 
accessed online, URL: <http://www.mms.gov/ooc/yoto/oceanpaper/tabcontent.htm>. 

16 ibid. 

17 Michael J. Cruickshank, “Waterworld - a 21 st Century Reality?” paper prepared for the International Mining Invest- 
ment and Regulation Direction and Development of the Mining Industry Seminar, July 1996. 


III-8 












THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


• Manganese offshore along the Southern California and Georgia coasts 

• Cobalt and platinum-rich seabeds in the Hawaiian EEZ 

• Gold offshore near Nome, Alaska. 18 


While marine mineral mining in U.S. waters is not currently active, these minerals could 
be exploited if price levels rise to the point where offshore operations become profitable. 
This is a realistic possibility, since mineral prices fluctuate and often move cyclically, 
depending on demand. In fact, relatively rich deposits of gold were recovered in the 
waters off Nome, Alaska, from 1986 to 1990, but operations halted when the venture 
became unprofitable because of declining gold prices. 19 Should the price of particular 
minerals increase in the future, mining could resume in U.S. waters. 



Figure 111-4. Left: gas hydrate breaking free from the sea floor 
(photo by Charles Fisher). Right: irregular pieces of gas hy¬ 
drate recovered from sediments in the Sea of Okhotsk, east 
of Sakalin Island. 


(2) Methane Hydrates. While vast deposits of methane hydrates in the U.S. EEZ could 
provide a significant source of energy, commercial exploitation by 2020 is questionable 
for two reasons. First, a safe and economically profitable technique must be designed 
to extract the gas. Second, there are still vast deposits of liquid land- and ocean-based 
methane (natural gas) available for extraction, much of it using existing technology. 
Even so, Japan has begun drilling an exploratory well for methane hydrate extraction, 
and the U.S. Department of Energy is researching the feasibility of methane hydrate as 
an energy source. Should these research and development efforts bring technological 
breakthroughs, deepwater methane hydrate extraction could become a burgeoning 
business by 2020. 

Methane hydrate deposits are abundant in the U.S. EEZ, especially along the East Coast. 
There are immense amounts of methane hydrate, concentrated in frozen, ice-like gas 


18 Marine Minerals Management Service, “Year of the Ocean: Ocean Energy and Minerals: Resources for the Future,” 
accessed online, URL: <http://www.mms.gov/ooc/yoto/oceanpaper/tabcontent.htm>. 

19 ibid. 


III-9 















THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


hydrates within the top several hundred meters of sediment in deep water on the 
continental margins of the United States. 20 Geologists differ widely on the actual amount 
of methane hydrate available, but a conservative estimate is that the amount beneath the 
sea floor could double all the known fossil fuel resources worldwide, both exploited 
and untapped. 21 

Recovering methane gas from beneath the ocean floor presents several safety and 
environmental challenges. First, methane gas is very unstable and can be dangerous to 
work with. Second, melting the crystals could destabilize regions of the ocean floor, 
thus collapsing any drilling rig built there. 22 Finally, the natural venting of unbumed 
methane, a potent greenhouse gas, to the atmosphere may contribute to global warming. 23 
Still, with conventional oil and gas production moving into progressively deeper waters 
in the Gulf of Mexico, the exploitation infrastructure is now in place in those geographic 
areas where large deposits of methane hydrates are located. This will spur serious research 
into the viability of methane hydrate as an energy source, and by 2020 may lead to 
solutions to the safety and environmental challenges posed by methane hydrate production 
at sea. 

(3) Oil and Natural Gas Exploitation. Oil and natural gas exploitation within the U.S. 
EEZ will continue through 2020. This exploitation will be affected by two factors: 
continued government restriction and a push to deeper waters. A 1998 presidential 
directive under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which limits offshore oil and 
natural gas development to the Gulf Coast and pails of Alaska through 2012, will continue 
to stem industry growth in most of the U.S. EEZ. Oil and natural gas developments in 
water depths greater than 1,000 feet, otherwise referred to as “deepwater” activities, 
will become an increasingly important part of future production in the few areas where 
drilling is permitted. 

The U.S. Department of Energy forecasts indicate U.S. offshore oil production will 
increase through 2006 and then decline to current levels through 2020. 24 The projected 
initial increase is a result of deepwater activities and technological advances. By 2020, 
offshore production will be characterized by wells located in deeper waters and, as it is 
today, will be focused in the Gulf of Mexico. Overall U.S. oil production will decline at 
an average annual rate of 1.1 percent through 2020, 25 while the demand for petroleum 


20 ibid. 

21 “Gas crystals on the seabed could be fuel for the next century,” The Times . 8 September 1998, accessed online. 

22 David Graham, “Energy Source of Future May Lie Under the Sea in Methane Deposits,” The San Diego Union- 
Tribune . 3 May 1995, E-l. 

23 Jon Van, “New Energy Source Eyed Under Ocean,” Chicago Tribune . 21 February 1995, 3. 

24 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 1998: With Projections to 
2020 (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, December 1997), 66. 

25 ibid., 66. 


Ill-10 












THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


products in the United States is projected to grow by an average annual rate of 1.2 
percent. 26 The resulting gap between rising demand and declining production will be 
satisfied with an increase in foreign imports. 



Figure 111-5. Oil and natural gas platforms 
will grow significantly in the Gulf of 
Mexico by 2020. 


The U.S. use of natural gas will increase significantly 
within the next 20 years in order to meet an increased 
demand for electricity and to offset a decline in the use of 
nuclear power. Projections for natural gas production 
through 2020 indicate an average annual growth rate of 
1.5 percent. 27 Natural gas consumption, however, is 
expected to increase at a slightly higher rate, 1.6 percent 
per year. 23 Like the oil industry, the difference between 
domestic demand and supply will be met with increased 
foreign imports. Net natural gas imports are expected to 
grow from 12.4 percent of total gas consumption in 1996 
to 15.2 percent in 2020. 2g A majority of the imports will 
come from expanded pipeline growth between the United 
States and Canada. While most of the imports will come 
across land, some offshore imports are expected from 
locations such as Sable Island, Nova Scotia. 30 Liquid 
natural gas (LNG) will continue to be another source of 
energy, although less significant. 31 Even so, LNG 
shipments will remain a maritime safety concern. 32 


The greatest development in the oil and natural gas industries during the next 20 years 
will be the growth of deepwater activities in the Gulf of Mexico. The expectations are 
so high that the Minerals Management Service recently published a report entitled 
Deepwater in the Gulf of Mexico: America’s New Frontier . According to the report, 
“favorable economics, the development of three-dimensional and subsalt geophysical 
technologies, the announcement of several deepwater discoveries, the development of 
new deepwater drilling and development technologies, the passage of the Deep Water 
Royalty Relief Act, and the opportunity to lease new prospects have all contributed to 
the revitalization of exploration and development in the Gulf of Mexico. 33 


26 ibid., 4. 

27 ibid., 6. 

28 ibid., 4. 

29 ibid., 61. 

30 ibid., 61. 

31 ibid., 61. 

32 Refer to Chapter III, Section A2 for discussion on LNG shipping. 

33 Deborah Cranswick and James Regg, Deepwater in the Gulf of Mexico: America’s New Frontier (New Orleans, LA: 
Minerals Management Service, 1997), iii. 


Ill-11 











THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


Increased production in the Gulf of Mexico will be offset by reduced production in 
Alaska. Oil production in Alaska is expected to decline at an average annual rate of 4.3 
percent through 2020. The decrease in Alaska’s oil production will be driven by the 
continued decline in production from Prudhoe Bay, the largest producing field, which 
historically has produced over 60 percent of Alaskan oil. 34 

A moratorium on oil and gas development on the outer continental shelf will remain in 
effect at least through 2012, thereby limiting activity mainly to Alaska and the Gulf of 
Mexico. In June 1998, President Clinton issued a presidential directive under the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act, which extended the moratorium signed by President Bush 
to protect the coasts from the threat of oil spills. 35 The moratorium prohibits oil and gas 
drilling and leasing on most of the U.S. outer continental shelf with the exception of the 
Gulf of Mexico and portions of Alaska. President Clinton’s directive also added a 
permanent ban on oil and gas development in fragile marine sanctuaries. 


Another environmental concern is oil transfer operations. Fears of large oil spills along 
fragile coastal areas, combined with increased imports by large tankers may raise pressure 
to force oil transfer operations offshore. However, the high cost of offshore oil transfer 
facilities will limit future progress. Developments such as the Louisiana Offshore Oil 
Port (LOOP) have been only marginally successful. Despite the environmental benefits 
the LOOP offers by being so far from shore, it has not generated enough revenue to be 
profitable. 36 The port of Corpus Christi, Texas, attempted a similar venture on a slightly 
smaller scale, but after analysis revealed it would take 20 to 25 years to break even, the 
project was halted. Future prospects for offshore port development are, therefore, 
considered unlikely. 



Figure 111-6. Ocean energy conversion 
is a potential energy source for some 
U.S. islands, such as Hawaii. 


(4) Ocean Energy. Harnessing ocean energy 
for commercial applications in the next 20 
years likely will remain economically 
unfeasible for large-scale operations, but the 
potential for small-scale development does 
exist. Ocean energy does offer a significant 
source of energy supply, but unless other, 
currently cheaper sources of energy rapidly 
diminish, there is little incentive for any 
significant growth in the industry. 


34 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 1998: With Projections to 
2020 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, December 1997), 66. 

35 “Clinton extends offshore oil drilling ban to 2012,” Reuters . 6 December 1998, accessed online. 

36 Richard D. Kohout, and others. Looking Out to 2020: Trends Relevant to the Coast Guard (Alexandria,VA: Center for 
Naval Analyses, 1997), 120. 

37 ibid., 121. 


III-12 














THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC) is one energy conversion process with 
several applications. These include the following: 

• generating electricity 

• desalinating water 

• supporting deep-water mariculture 

• providing air-conditioning and refrigeration 

• aiding mineral extraction. 38 

According to the Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory in 
Golden, Colorado, the OTEC potential is enormous. “On an average day, 23 million 
square miles of tropical seas absorb an amount of solar radiation equal in heat content to 
about 250 billion barrels of oil. If less than one-tenth of one percent of this stored 
energy could be converted into electric power, it would supply more than 20 times the 
total amount of electricity consumed in the United States on any given day.” 39 



Figure 111-7. Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion is 
possible where surface and deepwater temperature 
differences exceed 20 degrees Celsius. 


OTEC is the process of converting solar radiation to electric power using the ocean’s 
natural thermal gradient to drive a power-producing cycle. “Warm seawater from the 
ocean’s surface and the cold deep water below are pumped through a surface and the 
cold deep water below are pumped through a heat exchanger that employs a working 


38 National Renewable Energy Laboratory, “Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion,” accessed online, 
URL: <http://www.nrel.gov/otec/design.html>. 

39 ibid. 


III-13 
















































THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


fluid, such as ammonia, propane, or freon, in a closed cycle. The warm water vaporizes 
the working fluid, which turns a turbine, thus producing energy." 40 In order for OTEC 
plants to work properly, the warm surface temperature must differ by about 20 degrees 
Celsius from the cold deep water. 41 Figure III-7 shows where the 20-degree difference 
can be found. In the United States, OTEC technology is focused on the Gulf of Mexico, 
Florida, and islands such as Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 42 OTEC facilities 
can be built on land, submerged on the continental shelf, or designed to float on the 
surface. 

OTEC plants could be competitive during the next 5-10 years in three particular markets. 
However, OTEC competitiveness is highly dependent on other energy source prices. 
Potential OTEC markets include the following: 

• Small, land-based plants producing electricity and desalinated water on Pacific 
islands. 

• A larger land-based plant in Hawaii producing electricity and fresh water. 

• Floating systems transmitting electricity to shore in the Caribbean, the Gulf of 
Mexico, and the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans. 43 

The other two types of energy conversion, tidal and wave power, involve the mechanical 
motion of the ocean. All of the systems developed to capture mechanical energy are 
designed to supply electricity. 44 Engineers in many countries have developed devices 
for generating electricity from tidal and wave power. Specially designed turbines mounted 
in dams or on moorings can capture the energy manifested in elevated sea levels or 
strong currents. 4 '’ These systems are ineffective, however, where tidal amplitudes are 
not high, currents are not strong, or wave conditions are inconsistent. 

c. Maritime Safety and Security Requirements 

The growth in marine natural resource exploitation, particularly in the deepwater 
environment, will bring about new marine safety and security challenges in the years 
ahead. The year 2020 will likely see more oil and natural gas platforms in deeper 
waters, more pipelines offshore, increased ocean-based mining and dredging operations, 
and the possibility of ocean energy conversion facilities. Building, maintaining, and 


40 Richard D. Kohout and others, Looking Out to 2020: Trends Relevant to the Coast Guard (Alexandria, VA: Center for 
Naval Analyses, 1997), 97. 

41 National Renewable Energy Laboratory, “Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion,” accessed online, 

URL: <http://www.nrel.gov/otec/design.html>. 

42 ibid. 

43 ibid. 

44 Marine Minerals Management Service, “Year of the Ocean: Ocean Energy and Minerals: Resources for the 
Future,” accessed online, URL: <http://www.mms.gov/ooc/yoto/oceanpaper/tabcontent.htm>. 

45 ibid., 5. 


Ill-14 







THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 



servicing these capital projects will greatly expand the amount of vessel traffic and 
human activity on the seas. While there will be strict regulation of these activities in 

U.S. waters, regulation alone will not guarantee the 
safety and security of life at sea nor the preservation 
of the environment. Substantial monitoring, 
enforcement, and response capabilities will be 
required. 

There will be significant growth in U.S. offshore 
oil and natural gas platforms and pipelines by 2020. 
According to the U.S. Department of Energy, the 
number of oil and natural gas wells, both at sea and 
on land, is expected to increase between 0.7 and 
2.2 percent per year, depending on oil price levels. 46 
The greatest growth of offshore platforms will occur 
on the outer continental shelf of the Gulf of Mexico 
where the innovative use of cost-saving technology 

Figure 111-8. New challenges will emerge over and expected continuation of recent huge finds have 

the next 20 years with the development of encouraged greater interest. 47 Increased oil and gas 
deepwater platforms. production in the Gulf will require more pipelines 

as well. Pipeline construction in the Gulf of Mexico is expected to grow substantially 
since much of its existing pipeline infrastructure is at or near capacity. 48 



46 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 1998: With Projections to 2020 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, December 1997), 60. 

47 ibid., 61. 

48 Deborah Cranswick and James Regg, Deepwater in the Gulf of Mexico: America’s New Frontier (New Orleans, LA: 

Minerals Management Service, 1997), 21. _ 


III-15 






























THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


The growth in deepwater oil and gas infrastructure and operations will have major 
implications for maritime safety and security. Deepwater wells may be significantly 
more remote, increasing emergency response time. The operations may be technically 
more sophisticated and produce at much higher rates, 49 increasing the scope of potential 
marine accidents, such as spills. Specific pipeline concerns include: 

• Greater environmental risks associated with longer pipelines 

• More complex oil-spill contingency plans required for larger pipelines? 0 

The growth of jobs in the deepwater commercial energy sector is another safety concern. 
More accidents at sea could occur as larger crews begin operating offshore. “Some 
analysts project that deepwater development in the Gulf of Mexico could create as many 
as 100,000 new jobs, with up to 70 percent of these sustained beyond 25 years.” 51 The 
response time in the event of an accident will increase as support structures and vessels 
begin operating farther from shore. The Minerals Management Service estimates that 
many of the new deepwater facilities will be beyond a 2-hour helicopter flight. 52 

In general, the safety and security concerns brought on by deepwater oil and gas 
exploitation can be applied to other marine industries as well. While the future for 
marine mineral mining, methane hydrate extraction, and ocean energy conversion is 
less certain, operations in any of these fields pose their own risks to the marine 
environment and place more lives at risk on the seas. 

New technologies and larger, more complex facilities associated with deepwater activities 
could also create conflict ashore. Deepwater resource development will place increased 
demands on coastal ports and communities for support facilities and services. 53 With 
an increasing number of entities seeking to exploit ocean resources, conflicts among 
users could arise. Currently, some communities are opposed to offshore development 
because of environmental and land-use concerns. Most likely, any deepwater 
development will be opposed by some environmental activist groups, who may protest 
ashore or at sea. 


49 ibid., 3. 

50 ibid., 21-22. 

51 Deborah Cranswick, “Effects of Deep Water Development in the Gulf of Mexico,” accessed online. 

52 Deborah Cranswick and James Regg, Deepwater in the Gulf of Mexico: America’s New Frontier (New Orleans, LA: 
Minerals Management Service, 1997), 15. 

53 Marine Minerals Management Service, “Year of the Ocean: Ocean Energy and Minerals: Resources for the Future,” 
accessed online, URL: <http://www.mms.gov/ooc/yoto/oceanpaper/tabcontent.htm>. 


Ill-16 








THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


ANTARCTICA: A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE 

The international competition for Antarctica, for all practical purposes, 
ended in 1959 with the Antarctic Treaty. Its associated procedures and 
measures have successfully governed the Antarctic activities of nations for 
nearly 39 years. The treaty froze existing territorial claims, forbade new 
ones, banned military operations, and outlawed placement of nuclear 
weapons and disposal of radioactive wastes in Antarctica. 

The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed a commitment to the Treaty system 
with the adoption of several improvements. Amendments in 1980 limited 
the exploitation of living marine resources and, in 1991, imposed a 50-year 
ban on mining. Antarctica will be protected further with the adoption of the 
Antarctic Environmental Protection Act of 1996 (ratified by the United States 
in 1997). 55 

As one of the most pristine and underdeveloped regions of the world, 
Antarctica’s natural resources may draw attention as resources are fully 
exploited in other areas. The anticipated increase in commercial activity in 
Antarctica will be most notably in tourism and, because of ambiguities in 
the Treaty amendments and the lack of enforcement presence, harvesting 
of living marine resources. The number of cruise ships visiting the Antarctic 
region will increase profoundly through 2020. 56 The sub-Antarctic seas 
have attracted the fishing industry as nations have closed off their EEZs. 
The fishing industry is practically non-regulated in this area, and overfishing 
has caused the near extinction of species such as the Patagonian toothfish 
(also known as Argentine Sea Bass). Another concern is the potential drilling 
for offshore oil deposits. The U.S. Geological Survey believes that oil will 
be the only mineral exploited in the next two to three decades, and then 
only if drilling technology suitable to the unique conditions of the Antarctic 
becomes available and market conditions make it economically attractive." 7 


54 John M. Collins, Military Geography: For Professionals and the Public (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University 
Press, 1998), 223. 

55 The act extends and improves the Antarctic Treaty’s effectiveness to protect the environment by reaffirming the status of 
Antarctica as an area reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. The act includes a ban on all activities related to mineral 
resources except for scientific studies, and implements environmental impact procedures for both government and private 
activities. The act will not be reviewed for another 50 years. 

56 Interview with Christopher C. Joyner, Professor at Georgetown University, interview with author, 26 January 1999. 

57 Frank G. Klotz, America on Ice: Antarctica Policy Issues (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990), 

90-91. 


III-17 

















THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 



AiltSttW 


Queen Maud 
Land / 


ANTARCTICA 


S.Pole 


W. Antarctica 


E. Antarctica 


Wiikesland 


Amundsen 


1 french 


1000 Miles 


Australian 


1000 1500 Kilometers 


Figure 111-10. Territorial Claims in Antarctica 58 


58 John M. Collins, Military Geography: For Professionals and the Public (Washington. D.C.: National Defense Univer¬ 
sity Press, 1998), 294. 


III-18 























































THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


2 . Legal Maritime Trade and Activities 

Whether transporting dry cargo, petroleum products, or people, ships will continue to 
provide a cost-effective mode of transportation well into the next century. The vast 
majority of all commodities moving by sea throughout the world will continue to consist 
of legal goods in lawful transit. Large container ships and high-speed ferries likely will 
have the most significant impact on maritime transportation in the foreseeable future. 
These developments along with several others will continue to pose maritime safety 
challenges for the United States. The challenges likely will intensify as seaborne trade 
triples by 2020. 59 

Significant trade growth is expected between the United States and Asia over the next 
20 years. “The Clinton Administration predicts that nearly 75 percent of the world trade 
expansion over the next two decades will come from emerging economies... The 
economies to watch are China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Brunei, Malaysia, 
Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and India.” 60 Brazil, India, and the Soviet successor 
states also will increase trade with the United States but not at the same level as Asia. 61 
Increased trade with these countries does not necessarily mean more ships, but rather 
larger ships carrying more cargo. Increased foreign trade also raises the potential for 
increases in smuggling of illegal goods hidden amongst legitimate cargo. 62 

a. Container Shipping 

The container shipping industry will undergo enormous 
growth through 2020, highlighted by larger ships 
carrying more cargo. Container ships are already 
growing in size, with the newest versions too large to 
enter most U.S. ports. These large container ships, 
sometimes referred to as mega-ships or super ships, are 
usually 4,500 TEU 63 or larger and require 43-47 feet of 
water. Industry experts believe about one-third of the 
world’s container ship fleet will be 4,500 TEU capacity 
and larger within 15 years. 64 The REGINA MAERSK, 
1,043 feet long with a 6,000-TEU cargo capacity and 
47.5-foot draft, is just one example of the mega-ships 



Figure 111-11. The Regina Maersk was the 
largest container ship to call at a North 
American port when it sailed into New York 
Harbor in July 1998. 


59 Charles Bookman, “U.S. Seaports: At the Crossroads of the Global Economy,” Issues in Science and Technology (Fall 
1996): 71 and U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard 2020 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard, 1998), 4. 

60 Richard D. Kohout and others. Looking Out to 2020: Trends Relevant to the Coast Guard (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Naval Analyses, 1997), 101. 

61 ibid., 102. 

62 Refer to Chapter III, Section A3 for details on illegal trade. 

63 TEU or 20-foot-equivalent unit refers to the cargo capacity of the ship. A typical 40-foot container is equal to two TEUs. 

64 Moody’s Inverstors Service, Moodv’s Port Ratings: Outlook, (New York, NY, June 1998), 5. 


Ill-19 

















THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


that will transit U.S. waters in the future. The push toward larger container ships is 
being driven by profit considerations; simply, more containers aboard a vessel decreases 
the cost per container. Mega-ships primarily will visit a few major load centers, which 
can handle the ship size and cargo volume. As a result, feeder ships transiting from the 
load centers to smaller ports will increase coastal trade. 65 An increase in coastal trade 
could mean more U.S.-flagged ships. 

With the move toward huge container ships calling on a few major load centers, another 
possible development in the container industry will be the “Fast Ship” working between 
the load centers and feeder ports. In the “Fast Ship” scenario, smaller, 1200-TEU 
container ships traveling at speeds of up to 40 knots rapidly move containers to the 
feeder ports. 66 The movement of these relatively large vessels at such high speeds 
could create safety concerns in the coastal shipping lanes. 

b. Bulk and Break-bulk Cargo 

While the growth in containerized cargo will have the greatest impact on future U.S. 
shipping trends, bulk and break-bulk cargo will remain extremely important through 
2020. Bulk cargo vessels carry large quantities of cargo, such as grain or iron ore, in 
large, uncompartmented cargo holds. Break-bulk cargo vessels carry their shipments in 
barrels, bags, pallets, or other units. Bulk and break-bulk cargoes make up half of all 
cargo (by volume) entering or leaving the United States, 67 and will continue to account 
for a large portion in 2020. Cargo freight rates for these vessels that operate in the 
Atlantic have remained relatively stable as demand for shipments between the United 
States and Europe has fluctuated normally. In the Pacific market, Asian economic 
difficulties and currency devaluations have greatly reduced the demand for cargo 
shipments from the United States to Asia, but the demand for shipments from Asia to 
the United States has actually increased. Generally, when one market slows down, 
excess vessels can be moved quickly into other markets. Thus the outlook for bulk and 
break-bulk cargo vessels should be stable for the foreseeable future. 68 Bulk and break- 
bulk cargo will remain critically important in U.S. maritime trade, but because no major 
changes in this field are expected, the demands on port infrastructure, vessel safety, and 
law enforcement efforts, from this sector of the market, will remain relatively stable. 


65 Refer to Chapter III, Section A2e for information on port infrastructure. 

66 United States Coast Guard, Commandant (G-MRP-1), Business Plan for Marine Safety and Environmental Protection 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard, 1997), 11, citing DRI/McGraw Hill, World Sea Trade Service and World Fleet 
Forecast Service 1996, and DRI/Mercer Management, World Sea Trade Outlook Conference, October 1996. 

67 Interview with Scott Poyer, Chief Economist at St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, interview with author, 
13 Jan 99. 

68 ibid. 

69 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 1998: With Projections to 2020 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, December 1997), 6. 


III-20 







THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


c. Tankers 


Tanker traffic in U.S. waters will increase substantially by 2020 as U.S. oil imports rise. 
Increasing energy demand in the United States and decreasing domestic petroleum 
production will drive oil imports from 46 percent of U.S. petroleum consumption in 
1996 to 66 percent in 2020. 69 The demand for increased oil imports will be met with 
more transits rather than growth in tanker size. 70 Domestically, Alaskan oil production 
will decrease, while oil drilling in the Gulf of Mexico will move farther offshore. These 
trends will bring accompanying changes in tanker movement patterns. By 2020, more 
foreign tankers will be entering U.S. waters, especially the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf 
will be the area of primary activity for two reasons. First, most of the U.S. oil refining 
capacity is in Gulf ports. Second, increased deepwater oil production in the Gulf likely 
will require tankers as well as pipelines to move oil ashore. On the West Coast, fewer 
U.S. tankers will be transiting from Alaska to refineries in Southern California, because 
of the drop in Alaskan oil production. However, there will be more foreign tankers 
bringing oil to West Coast refineries. 

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports into the United States will continue through 2020, 
but not at significant levels. Although LNG shipments will only represent a small portion 

of U.S. energy imports, the volatile characteristics associated 
with LNG will present a significant safety concern during vessel 
transits. Two U.S. ports (Everett, Massachusetts and Lake 
Charles, Louisiana) likely will continue to import LNG through 
2020. 71 LNG imports into Everett and Lake Charles are projected 
to increase, reaching a level of 0.36 trillion cubic feet in 2020, 
compared with 0.04 trillion cubic feet in 1996. 72 

d. Nuclear Waste 

The need to move and secure shipments of spent nuclear fuel 
and waste from reprocessing will increase. This trade is now 
predominately between the Far East and reprocessing facilities 
in Europe. Future concerns about an environmental catastrophe 
and security of the nuclear waste will lead to increased demands 
for storage in or transit through U.S. hands, particularly from 
the Russian Far East. 73 At the same time, increased numbers of 
plants will generate a growing surplus of spent fuels to be 
transported. 

70 United States Coast Guard, Commandant (G-MRP-1), Business Plan for Marine Safety and Environmental Protection 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard, 1997), 13. 

71 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 1998: With Projections to 2020 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, December 1997), 61. 

12 ibid., 61. 

73 Notes from Charles Dragonette, Office of Naval Intelligence, December 1998. 



Figure 111-12. Nuclear waste being 
loaded for shipment. 


III-21 







THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


e. Port Infrastructure 

U.S. ports will face intensifying pressure to expand to meet the growing volume of 
shipping and to combat the threat of foreign competition. The container industry, in 
particular, because of the increasing volume of cargo and the growing size of the ships 
themselves, will divide ports into two categories: load centers and feeder ports. “The 
relentless introduction of large container ships into U.S. trades is dividing the port industry 
into two camps: an elite tier of large ports with deep harbors and excellent inland 
infrastructure, and a second tier of feeder ports that cannot accommodate the new 
generation of vessels.” 74 

The ports that are able to expand and meet market demand will progress into load centers 
for the United States. Several factors, including harbor depth, efficiency in intermodal 
connections, labor productivity, and the size of the local market will influence a port’s 

• Harbor depth. In order to be a successful 
load center, a port’s waters likely will 
have to be at least 45 feet deep. 76 Mega¬ 
ships such as the REGINA MAERSK 
will require deep channels to access port 
facilities in order to offload their 
enormous amount of container cargo. 77 
Ports that cannot dredge because of legal 
and environmental restrictions will be 
forced into the feeder port category. 

• Intermodal efficiency. Load centers will 
require efficient terminals and inland 
infrastructure in order to move large 
volumes of cargo. Load centers will 
require superb railways, roadways, and 
inland waterways, and will need 
efficient, rapid means for moving high 
volumes of cargo from the dock to the 
secondary mode of transportation. 


ability to develop as a load center. 75 



Figure 111-13. Container ships will drive 
port development over the next 20 years. 


74 Bill Mongelluzzo, “How Big Ships Will Change Port System: Some Facilities Face Inevitable 
Demotion To Feeder Status,” Journal of Commerce . 29 September 1997, accessed on OSIS computer 
system. 

75 Moody’s Investors Service, Moody's Port Ratings: Outlook . (New York, NY, June 1998), 5. 

76 ibid., 6. 

77 Refer to Chapter III, Section A2 for more details on mega ship transits. 


III-22 










THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


• Labor productivity. Ports will attract more customers if they can service ships 
quickly and thereby reduce the associated labor costs. The reliability and 
productivity of the labor force in a port will influence how favorably a port is 
viewed by the shipping industry. 

• Local market. Large local markets stimulate intermodal connections, provide 
relatively fixed revenues, and reduce competition from other ports because of 
the proximity of the market to the port. 78 

Load centers will play an important maritime role as both mega-ships carrying 
large volumes of cargo and feeder ships conducting coastal trade travel the harbor 
waterways. Under pressure to develop into load centers, several ports are 

undertaking significant projects in order to meet 
future shipping needs. The success of these 
developments will become important in determining 
which ports evolve into load centers. 

The ports that do not evolve into load centers will 
become feeder ports. Feeder ports still will play an 
important role in maritime trade, even though they 
will not handle volumes of cargo nearly as large as 
those moved through the load centers. 79 Unlike the 
load centers, feeder ports will be less affected by 
global developments in the shipping industry. These 
ports will strive to diversify into bulk and break- 
bulk trades to avoid dependence on the container 
industry. However, lower profit margins in bulk and 
break-bulk, and competition from other 
transportation modes (railroads, pipelines and canals/ 
waterways), may prevent ship owners and operators 
from driving expensive capital development the way 
they can in the containerized sector. 

While U.S. ports will compete among themselves for positions as load centers, 
their greatest competition may very well come from foreign ports. Vancouver, 
Halifax, and Freeport (Bahamas) already compete with American ports for U.S.- 
bound container cargo, and by 2020 Mexican ports could challenge as well, if 
improvements planned for the Mexican transportation infrastructure are 
completed. Halifax, where the main channel is 60 feet deep, has captured ten 


78 Moody’s Inverstors Service, Moodv’s Port Ratings: Outlook , (New York, NY, June 1998), 6. 

79 Terry Brennan, “Eastern Ports’ Fate Hangs On Dredging: Deep Channels Needed For Big Vessels,’’ Journal of Com¬ 
merce. 22 June 1998, accessed on OSIS computer system. 



Figure 111-14. The port of Long Beach is 
currently one of the busiest cargo 
container ports in the United States. 


III-23 


















THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


percent of New York's Midwest-bound traffic annually over the last four years. 80 The 
deep harbor and intermodal infrastructure in Halifax make the port a strong competitor 
for eastern U.S. ports. The North American Free Trade Agreement further enhanced the 
competitiveness of Halifax and other non-U.S. North American ports, expanding their 
access to U.S. markets. While 98 percent by weight of all cargo leaving or entering the 
United States currently passes through U.S. ports, 81 the challenge from foreign ports, 
particularly in containerized cargo, could reduce that figure. 

f. Cruise Ships and Ferries 

Tremendous growth in the cruise line industry and the emergence of high-speed ferries 
will be the key developments in the maritime passenger transport business through 2020. 
Both developments will pose challenges to maritime transportation in the United States. 



Figure 111-15. Royal Caribbean’s cruise ship, Voyager of the Seas, 
is under construction in Finland. The vessel will displace 
142,000 tons and span the length of three football fields. 


The cruise line industry will exhibit strong growth throughout the next two decades. 
The average annual growth of the industry has been almost eight percent since 1980, 
and with the world fleet of 230 cruise ships operating at 90 percent capacity, 82 there are 
no signs of this growth slowing. North America is the largest market, and surveys 
indicate that 56 percent of Americans want to take cruises, while only 11 percent have 
done so. The number of cruise line passengers worldwide is projected to triple to 15 
million by 2020, according to one industry expert. 83 


80 Moody’s Inverstors Service, Moody’s Port Ratings: Outlook (New York, NY, June 1998), 12. 

81 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Promote Safe Navigation,” 10 July 1998, ac¬ 
cessed online, URL:<http://anchor.ncd.noaa.gov/psn/psn.htm>. 

82 Don Walsh. “Oceans,” Proceedings Vol. 125/2/1,152 (1999): 89. 

83 Notes from Andy Vladimir, author of Selling the Seas: An Inside Look at the Cruise Industry. 3 August 


1998. 


III-24 





















THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


The cruise line industry will respond to this increasing demand with new ships and new 
markets. The number of cruise ships will likely double before 2020; the industry already 
is building or has plans to build 44 ships. Many of these new ships will be larger as 
well, with behemoths such as the 142,000-ton VOYAGER OF THE SEAS coming on 
line within the next two years. 84 The president of Carnival Cruise Lines believes the 
overriding trend in the worldwide cruise industry will be the significant increase in 
global capacity as older ships are retired from the North American arena. 85 New cruise 
markets will emerge as these older vessels reposition to other areas. The Caribbean will 
remain the top destination of cruise ships, with approximately 60 percent of such traffic, 86 
but more routes will open to remote areas such as South Pacific islands, the Amazon, 
and Antarctica. 

The particular factors involving U.S. policy could have a profound impact on the cruise 
industry in the next 20 years. First, Cuba will become a very popular destination if the 
U.S. embargo is lifted. A 1992 study found that half a million cruise passengers would 
likely visit Cuba in the first two years after the lifting of the embargo, followed by E2 
million in the subsequent few years. 87 Second, if the Passenger Service Act—which 
requires U.S. crew members on cruise ships transiting from one U.S. port to another 
U.S. port—is amended, there could be more cruises to destinations like Hawaii since 
cruise lines will be able to increase profits by hiring foreign laborers at lower wages. 

Another maritime transportation industry expected to grow significantly by 2020 is the 
high-speed ferry business. In certain world markets, high-speed ferries are already 
competitive with other forms of transportation, particularly commuter airlines. High¬ 
speed passenger ferries already have begun to ply U.S. waters and will increase in number 
and speed over the next two decades. 



Figure 111-16. The Bay Ferries’ Cat can reach speeds in excess of 
50 knots making it the fastest car ferry in North America. 


84 Don Walsh, “Oceans,” Proceedings Vol. 125/2/1,152(1999): 89. The Voyager of the Seas will out-displace a fully loaded 
Nimitz class aircraft carrier by almost 50,000 tons. 

85 “Leaders' Roundtable: The Next Millennium.” Cruise Industry News Quarterly Vol.7 No.28 (1997). 

86 Notes from Andy Vladimir, author of Selling the Seas: An Inside Look at the Cruise Industry , 3 August 1998. 

87 Joan Sanchez, “Trends at US Cruise Ports,” World Cruise Industry Review (1996): 136. 


III-25 


















THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


SeaConn is one emerging high-speed ferry company and is illustrative of the future 
high-speed ferry industry. SeaConn is creating a super high-speed passenger ferry system 
that connects Long Island, Connecticut, and New York City. These ferries will be the 
fastest in the world, significantly reducing the commute to and from New York and 
between Long Island and Connecticut. The SeaConn system will operate seven vessels, 
each 214 feet long and capable of speeds in excess of 60 knots. 88 

Femes, such as those employed in the SeaConn system, will pose significant safety 
challenges as they encounter other maritime traffic. The potential for mishaps will 
grow as technology increases ferry speeds. Some experts are predicting high-speed 
ferries could reach speeds up to 80 or even 100 knots as they strive to compete with 
other forms of transportation. 89 The challenge will be to maintain adequate separation 
between these high-speed ferries and other vessels, thereby reducing the risk of human 
error. 90 

g. Underwater Cables 

The undersea cable industry is expected to grow considerably through 2020 as the fiber¬ 
optic cables industry strives to compete against satellite communications. Growth in 
undersea cable investments between 1997 and 1998 increased by 81 percent 
demonstrating a strong resurgence in the undersea cable market. 91 Several companies 
are involved in building extensive fiber optic networks to support the future cyber world. 
As a result of these vast cable networks, new infrastructure for cable repair and 
maintenance will be required for support. 



Figure 111-17. More cable ships will be required to 
sustain the growing fiber optic cable industry over 
the next 20 years. 


88 Doren Voeth, “New York flying boats,” International Cruise and Ferrv Review (1998): 109. 

89 Nigel Gee, “For higher speeds - the 100 knots ship?” International Cruise and Ferrv Review (1998!: 122-123. 

90 DNV Corporate Communications, “DNV experience strong growth in the high speed market,” 22 October 1996, accessed 
online. 

91 PRG Guide, “1998 Worldwide Summary of Fiberoptic Undersea Systems,” accessed online, 

URL: <http://www.prgguide.com/reports/fiber/rl 1 -31 w.htmlx 


III-26 








THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


Two projects under development help paint a picture of what the future will hold. “Project 
Oxygen is an ambitious initiative to lay 320,000 km of mainly undersea fiber optic 
cable, with 262 landing points in 175 countries and locations to produce a US $14 
billion 'Super-Internet.'” 42 The cable maintenance for Project Oxygen will ultimately 
be performed by 23 cable ships. 93 Global Crossing Ltd. is building a similar undersea 
cable network which will directly connect Asia, North America, Europe, Central America, 
and the Caribbean. 94 As the size and scope of the undersea cable industry expands 
rapidly, the infrastructure necessary to support cable repair and maintenance will increase 
accordingly. The recent and projected growth of the cable industry represents a significant 
resurgence, which could grow considerably during the next twenty years if initial 
networks prove successful. 

3. Illegal Maritime Trade and Activities 

A drawback of increasing maritime trade, and economic globalization in general, is that 
it will facilitate the expansion of transnational crime. Trafficking in drugs, arms, and 
people is already big business, with maritime means a key method of transport. These 
transnational crimes will not disappear by 2020, and may, in fact, increase. The corrupting 
influence of the organized crime groups controlling these activities will threaten the 
safety of peoples and the security of governments. The ability of these organized crime 
groups to form alliances and easily permeate international borders in 2020 will intensify 
their threat to the state. 

a. Drugs/Narcotics 

Control of the processing and sale of illicit drugs worldwide is a continuous challenge 
that has no short-term solutions. 95 The United States has wrestled with drug control 
since the 1930s when the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was first established. Since then, 
increasingly rigorous anti-drug programs have failed to keep the U.S. population from 
becoming the world’s greatest illicit drug consumer. 96 The U.S. General Accounting 
Office estimates that law enforcement, corrections, and public health costs of the illegal 
drug problem total $67 billion annually. 97 Despite U.S. and foreign efforts, to date, no 
solution to the Gordian knot of drug control has emerged. 


92 Peter H. Nelson, “Project OXYGEN,” accessed online, URL: <http://circle4.com/allblack/oxygen.html>. 

93 CTR Group Ltd., “Frequently Asked Questions About Project Oxygen,” accessed online, 

URL: <http://www.oxygen.org/project_oxygen_faq.htm>. 

94 Global Crossing Ltd., “Global Crossing,” accessed online, URL: <http://www.globalcrossing.bm/city2city.html>. 

95 Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Strategy, 1998: A Ten Year Plan (Washington, D.C: Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, 1998), 3. 

96 United Nations Drug Control Programme, World Drug Report (New York, NY: Oxford University, 1997), 328. 

97 Draft, Kim Thachuk,’ “Transnational Trends: New Threats?," Strategic Assessment 1999 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1999), 372. 


III-27 











THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


There is little evidence to suggest this complex problem will be solved by 2020. Given 
that there likely will be a future illicit drug market, there also will be sources of supply 
and transportation methods to deliver drugs to market; the maritime trafficking of illegal 
drugs is expected to remain a global threat. 

(1) The illicit drug market. Assessing the worldwide future demand for illicit drugs 
is difficult. While profit is the central motive in the decision to sell illegal drugs, motives 
for using drugs can vary greatly. Societal and cultural mores provide a starting point 
from which a nation’s children begin making decisions about the seemliness of drug 
use. Since attitudes formed early tend to stay with one throughout life, teen opinions 
and attitudes about drug use are an important predictor of what a future market may 
look like. 

In the United States, teen perceptions concerning drug use are mixed, but it is clear 
there is a teen drug problem. Almost one out of every ten teenagers and one in four 
twelfth graders use illegal drugs. 98 Although current levels are fairly low, there has 
recently been a significant increase in teen use of heroin. 99 ’ 100 While most teens view 
cocaine and heroin use as risky or dangerous, they nevertheless are experimenting with 
these drugs at an increasingly younger age. Despite current efforts, the total amount of 
hardcore cocaine users in the United States has remained relatively constant. 101 Hardcore 
users consume three quarters of the total cocaine consumed in the United States. 102 As 
for marijuana, teens perceive it as a less dangerous drug. 

While these facts do not lend themselves to any specific conclusions concerning the 
scope of the U.S. drug market in 2020, they do suggest that: 

• By 2020, there will be an illegal drug market comprising adults who 
habitually used drugs as teens in the late nineties. These adults will have 
greater access to drugs primarily due to an increase in disposable income 
from full-time jobs. 

• The number of chronic cocaine users will not significantly change. The 
number of chronic cocaine users has not significantly changed in seven years. 


98 Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Strategy. 1998: A Ten Year Plan (Washington, D.C.: 1998), 7. 

99 ibid. 

100 The rise in teen heroin use has been linked to the recent increase in availability of high-purity Colombian heroin. This 
high-purity heroin can be ingested by smoking or snorting, thus eliminating the need to inject the drug and greatly reducing 
former barriers to use. 

101 Office of National Drug Control Policy, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, Fall 1997), 41. 

102 Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Strategy, 1998: A Ten Year Plan (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, 1998), 6. 


III-28 










THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


Given that any program attempting to alter perceptions of drug use will 
require time to take effect, (reversing perceptions of tobacco use took 20 
years) the number of chronic users will not be significantly altered by 
2020. 

• Cocaine market demand will not significantly change. Given that chronic 
users account for three-quarters of the total cocaine market, the number 
of chronic users is unlikely to change significantly by 2020. 

• The global use of illicit drugs may increase if social mores change 
significantly. Such changes could develop as a result of improved 
methods of drug ingestion, revived attempts to legalize controlled drugs, 
greater concern over personal freedoms, the lax enforcement of current 
drug laws, or a general global acceptance of drug abuse as an 
uncontrollable issue. 

While the popularity of certain drugs waxes and wanes, the United States, in general, 
has a large appetite for illegal substances. This appetite sometimes manifests itself in 
attempts to legalize certain drugs, especially drugs not considered “dangerous.” 

Therefore, attempts to legalize marijuana have 
occurred regularly during the last 20 years, but 
there has been little effort to legalize other 
controlled drugs such as cocaine and heroin. 
Public perceptions of these drugs as “dangerous” 
will likely keep them confined to the U.S. 
Controlled Substances Schedule. In the unlikely 
event that marijuana is eventually legalized, 
enforcement officers will still need to be vigilant 
against traffickers importing other dangerous 
drugs. 

(2) Illicit drug sources. Worldwide illegal 
drug production is expected to continue to expand 
well into 2020. Illegal drug producers will be 
increasingly flexible in circumventing 
international enforcement efforts. They will be 
able to weather law enforcement attacks on 
specific drug production nodes and survive. This flexibility will be largely due to an 
increased use of technology to support highly mobile operations and to improve both 
operational security and production methods. Organized crime syndicates will provide 
effective business planning and will make use of their significant financial power to 
corrupt the authorities in a growing number of countries. The financial power of the 
cocaine industry in Latin America, for example, is staggering; cocaine is Latin America’s 



Figure 111-18. New drug producing countries 
will emerge in 2020. 


III-29 


















THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


second largest export, accounting for 8 percent of the GDP of Colombia, and 3-4 percent 
of that of Peru and Bolivia. 103 

It is not surprising that during the past decade, illicit drug production has spread to 
places where law enforcement poses the least threat. 104 By 2020 major drug producing 
nations such as Afghanistan (heroin), Colombia (cocaine, heroin), and Mexico (marijuana, 
heroin and synthetic drugs), will likely be competing with other countries to supply 
major U.S. and European markets. Countries most vulnerable to being overwhelmed 
by drug producers are those that have weak central governments, access to regional or 
global drug markets, and remote areas where illegal drugs can be cultivated without 
detection. These conditions exist in many Eurasian countries 
of the former Soviet-bloc, 105 ’ 106 as well as some developing 
African nations. 107 With the drug trade’s significant profit 
potential, several of these countries will likely fall into the ranks 
of those where drug production is already endemic. 108 

Future producers will use technology at least as efficiently as 
today’s narco-businessman. Tools such as portable computers, 
handheld satellite phones, and increasingly “miniaturized” 
equipment make highly mobile production facilities an easily 
attainable goal. Where mobility is not required, producers can 
use technology to reduce operating expenses. Large-scale 
cannabis growers use computer-controlled, warehouse-sized 
hydroponics hot houses to grow thousands of plants in optimum 
growth conditions. 109 With computers controlling water, plant 
food, light, and heat, fewer people are required, decreasing labor 
costs and improving operational security. Other improvements 
in the technical process have increased plant yields in both coca leaves and marijuana. 
In Colombia, chemical process improvements have yielded higher purity heroin than 
that of rival producers in Mexico. In the future, technology may allow producers to 
further increase plant yields, cheaply produce synthetic versions of organic drug 
components, or even mask indicators of drug use. 



Figure 111-19. Technology will improve 
drug production capabilities in 2020. 


103 Draft, Kim Thachuk, “Transnational Trends: New Threats?,” Strategic Assessment 1999 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1999), 372. 

104 United Nations Drug Control Programme, World Drug Report . New York, NY: Oxford Press, 1997), 9. 

105 Dr. Stephen E. Flynn, Beyond Sovereignty . Unpublished book manuscript (New London, CT: U.S. Coast Guard Academy, 
October 1998), 7. 

106 These countries include Kazakstan, Kyrgystan, Uzbekestan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikstan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. 

107 These countries include Kenya and Nigeria. 

108 Countries of Southeast and Southwest Asia and Colombia for heroin; Peru. Bolivia, and Colombia for cocaine; Colombia, 
Mexico, Jamaica, Canada, and the U.S. for marijuana, the U.S. and Mexico for methamphetamines and other synthetic drugs. 

109 National Drug Intelligence Center, The National Drug Intelligence Digest Special Report. Marijuana: Domestic Situation 
Report (Johnstown, VA: National Drug Intelligence Center, March 1998), 9. 


III-30 




















THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


While technology may significantly improve raw production capabilities, organized 
crime will provide many producers the business acumen, political leverage, and funds 
with which to effectively expand their enterprise. High-profit potential will continue to 
attract crime syndicates to the drug production business in 2020. 110 For producers, the 
diversification these partners bring could provide ready-made distribution networks, 
money laundering services, and even venture capital, which could be used to purchase 
and incorporate new technology. This union of complimentary criminal enterprises 
inextricably links the drug trade to a host of other crimes such as smuggling (drugs, 
weapons, people) gambling, prostitution, and corruption. 1 "’ 112 


(3) Illicit drug movement. Drug trafficking will 
continue to plague the global community well into 
2020. Future traffickers will increasingly rely on 
commercial transportation systems to move their 
products. 113 The relatively low cost of maritime bulk 
transshipment and good product security, as well as 
limited personal risk, will entice a number of future 
drug transporters away from traditional non¬ 
commercial maritime methods. Smugglers moving 
smaller loads by speedboat will have more capable 
platforms than vessels currently in use, and future 
amateur smugglers will be able to effectively use 
traditional smuggling techniques with some degree 
of success. 



Figure 111-20. More than 6 tons of cocaine were 
seized from the motor vessel Limerick in October 

1997. 


Commercial maritime trade overall is expected to 


triple by 2020. A global trend in trade deregulation is largely responsible for this jump 
in international cargo movement. With the soaring of container shipping, regional 
transportation systems are increasingly becoming intermodal. 114 International trading 
blocs are connecting their container moving systems (road, rail, and sea) together to 
allow for easy cargo passage through international boundaries. In addition to offering 
future drug transporters simplicity and convenience for shipping their product, the sheer 
volume of cargo being shipped via this method ensures no one specific shipment will be 
scrutinized too carefully. This method is certainly the most cost effective. 


1,0 United Nations Drug Control Programme, World Drug Report (New York, NY: Oxford Press, 1997), 133. 

111 United Nations Drug Control Programme, World Drug Report (New York, NY: Oxford Press, 1997), 329. 

112 Michael Klare and David Andersen, A Scourge of Guns: The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin 
America (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists/Arms Sales Monitoring Project, 1996), 4. 

113 See Chapter III, Section A2a - Legal Maritime Trade and Activities - Container Shipping. 

114 Ken Cottrill, “Intermodal Shipping Special Report: Bypassing Intermodar, Traffic World (14 September 1998): 35. 


III-31 















THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


For smugglers moving smaller loads, traditional speedboats or 
“go-fasts” 115 will likely continue to improve beyond today’s 
impressive standards. Current fast boats used for smuggling can 
carry a metric ton of drugs at speeds of 35 knots or more and are 
very difficult to detect. 116 Future boats may triple the speed and 
cargo capacity of current platforms, while virtually 
“disappearing” from law enforcement sensors through the use 
of a variety of low-observable technologies. Innovations such 
as super efficient engines or jet drives may significantly increase 
their operating range, and new computers may allow for the 
remote operation of high-speed delivery vehicles from an airplane 
or remote site. 

Notwithstanding future technological improvements in drug 
detection, the resolve of anti-drug forces and the varying levels 
of political will to combat drug trafficking, future smugglers 
likely will be able to engage in their trade using methods and 
equipment common today. Despite current law enforcement’s 
growing capability to counter smuggling, traffickers continue to reap enviable profits 
even with 25-30 percent load losses. This “cost” of doing business is one example of 
the typical smuggler’s flexibility using conventional methods. Traffickers will continue 
to exploit gaps in law enforcement capability as well as legal and political impediments 
to international enforcement efforts. 

(4) International resolve. Absent a dynamic change in international cooperation and 
domestic resolve to substantially reduce illegal drug availability, the impediments to 
tomorrow’s counterdrug forces will continue to be political, jurisdictional, and sovereignty 
issues which blunt effective drug control. 

Effective regional drug control plans hinge on international cooperation, and future 
plans will require extensive collaboration among regional partners. International 
commitment and governmental resolve will be critical to any plan which might require 
the softening of sovereignty claims, cooperation with historically hostile states, and the 
commitment of resources such as defense forces and national police. 



Figure 111-21. The capabilities of 
speedboats will likely improve the 
ability to transport drugs in 2020. 


115 Smugglers use “go-fasts" to directly deliver drugs from a source country to a customer in the arrival zone, as a high¬ 
speed ferry after receiving drugs from a mothership, or as the primary recipient of drugs dropped from aircraft. 

116 This description of go-fast characteristics is taken from U.S. Coast Guard post-event reporting of go-fast smuggling 
incidents from 1991-1998. This figure represents the average capabilities of vessels operating in the Caribbean and East¬ 
ern Pacific; individual characteristics vary widely. 


111-32 


i. > L ', - :-J » -I 










THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


This level of resolve, while difficult to achieve, will be necessary if the world’s nations 
are to deny illegal drug producers’ and traffickers’ exploitable niches. These niches 
extend beyond sovereignty concerns and constitutional interpretations, and are more 
complex than simply stopping drug boats. Drug producers rely on a business 
infrastructure to support their trade. Future enforcement efforts will need to exert greater 
pressure on key business nodes such as: 

• Crop production 

• Facility Security (insurgents, guerillas, and militias) 

• Communications and Operational Security 

• Transportation 

• Chemical reagents for processing 

• Cash Flow (money laundering/cash transportation). 

The removal of any piece of this critical infrastructure would cause a significant disruption 
in the production or transportation of illegal drugs. 

The simple removal of a drug production business node seems like an easy solution, but 
disruption even in one country is a difficult task. Even if this goal is achieved, the 
current global demand for illegal drugs is so massive that producers will remain intent 
on overcoming production obstacles with new methods or by moving production to 
another exploitable country. Although future drug control programs will need to develop 
and then emphasize demand reduction strategies, the interdiction of drugs at sea will 
remain a major tenet in reducing the available drug supply. 

b. Arms Proliferation 

Weapons will continue to be in high demand in 2020 throughout the world. Violence 
and open conflict resulting from ethnic or religious differences, nationalism, class 
struggle, criminal activity, or competition for resources will be constant threats, and 
may destabilize individual countries or entire regions. The various groups involved in 
these conflicts will often desire arms to help obtain their goals by force, if necessary, 
ensuring a thriving illicit arms trafficking business in 2020. 

A large part of the illicit anns market will consist of small arms and light weapons 
ranging from handguns to shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. Such weapons are 
easier to conceal and therefore easier to smuggle, and forces and groups armed with 
such weapons can cause damage and casualties disproportionate to their numbers. In 
some cases, irregulars can use such weapons to avoid defeat by — or even achieve 
victory against — the most modern and powerful military forces. In the recent past, for 
example the Chechens fought the Russian Army to a standstill, and Somali clans weath- 


III-33 









THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


ered an intervention by modern Western forces. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, the 
Mexican state of Chiapas, Colombia, Kosovo, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, and Zaire/ 
Congo are just a few of the places where conflicts involving irregular forces fielded by 
insurgents or tribal groups and armed primarily with light weapons have captured media 
attention since the early 1990s. 117 

According to the Federation of American Scientists, “there are more than thirty wars 
raging in countries around the world today. These wars are being fought primarily with 
light weapons and small arms...Few combatants involved produce any, let alone the 
bulk of these munitions. Most light arms being used in these conflicts are imported - 
either through legal international channels, or through the black market.” 118 



The demonstrated need for and effectiveness of small arms and light weapons will fuel 
a continued black market through and beyond 2020. Trafficked weapons will include 
both newly manufactured ones and older weapons drawn 
from arms caches maintained by stateless organizations or 
sold and transferred from the inventories of states. A portion 
of the arms traded on the black market inevitably will move 
by sea. In the United States, the greatest maritime challenge 
with respect to small arms and light weapons is and will 
remain their illegal exportation; overseas, the illicit arms 
market will operate worldwide. 


(1) The market for small arms/light weapons. The low 

cost of small arms and light weapons in comparison to 

heavy weaponry increasingly will attract new buyers. Figure 111-22. Small arms 

support criminals, terrorists, insurgents, 

and other groups. 

In South America, for example, the Revolutionary Armed 

Forces of Colombia (Spanish language abbreviation FARC) and the National Liberation 
Army (Spanish language abbreviation ELN) have been engaged in a bloody conflict 
with the Colombian government for decades. In Colombia, paramilitary and insurgent 
forces use small arms and light weapons to conduct political assassinations and 
intimidation. “Violence is that country’s leading cause of death. With a record 25,100 
violent deaths in 1992, Colombia’s murder rate is approximately nine times that of the 
United States.” 119 


In addition to its importance to insurgents, the illicit small arms market is closely linked 
with drug dealers and other criminal groups and is growing as these elements work 

117 Lora Lumpe, “Illicit Arms Market Sustains Global Conflicts,” Journal of the Federation of American Scientists (July/ 
August 1997): accessed online. 

118 Federation of American Scientists, “Monitoring the Diffusion of Light Weapons: A Campaign of the Arms Sales Moni¬ 
toring Project,” accessed online, URL: <http://www.fas.org/asmp/light_weapons/index.html>. 

119 Michael Klare and David Andersen, A Scourge of Guns: The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin 
America (Washington, D.C.: Arms Sales Monitoring Project, Federation of American Scientists), 5. 


III-34 














THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


together to move illicit substances throughout the world. The lucrative business of 
smuggling small arms and light weapons, often in close connection with drugs, will 
remain a significant driving force behind small arms smuggling in the years ahead. In 
some cases, profits from drug trafficking provide the funds that insurgents need to 
purchase weapons. 



In 1998, Russian organized crime groups reportedly exchanged weapons from their 
vast arsenal for Colombian drugs. Since the Russian crime syndicates can provide 

sophisticated weapons and new drug markets, alliances 
between Russian and South and Central American crime 


Figure 111-23. VS SSI Rifles. 


(2) Sources of small/light weapons. Both new and old small 
arms and light weapons will emanate from a variety of 
sources, including the United States. Anns caches from civil wars and military armories 
sold on the black market will contribute to the growing diffusion of small arms and light 
weapons in the years ahead. 


groups will remain likely. In Mexico, gun running is the 
third richest source of profit after drug trafficking and 
robbery/extortion. 120 The growing number of small arms, 
which are smuggled to support organized crime and 
narcotrafficking, will allow drug cartels to resist government 
crackdowns violently and ultimately enhance their ability 
to smuggle drugs into the United States. 121 


Small arms smuggled out of the United States will be among those available on the 
black market, and stopping that smuggling will present a significant challenge to U.S. 
law enforcement agencies. U.S. arms manufacturers produce approximately five to six 
million weapons each year. 122 Some of these weapons are smuggled into Mexico where 
an enormous small arms market exists. “Proximity, liberal gun sale laws, and inadequate 
law enforcement have made the U.S. Mexico’s leading source of black market arms — 
despite Mexico’s own strict gun control policy,” according to the Federation of American 
Scientists. 123 Weapons originating from the United States and illegally entering Central 
America via Mexico have fueled high crime rates in the region. The Inter-American 
Development Bank estimates that 120,000 people are murdered every year in Latin 
America, many by criminals, terrorists, and insurgents wielding U.S.- made firearms. 124 


120 Lora Lumpe, “The US Arms Both Sides of Mexico’s Drug War,” Covert Action Quarterly (Summer 1997): accessed 
online. 

121 Michael Klare and David Andersen, A Scourge of Guns: The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin 
America (Washington, D.C.: Arms Sales Monitoring Project, Federation of American Scientists), 9. 

122 Lora Lumpe, “The US Arms Both Sides of Mexico’s Drug War,” Covert Action Quarterly (Summer 1997): accessed 

online. 

123 ibid. 

124 U.S. Southern Command, “Arms Trafficking in the Caribbean,” accessed on Intelink. 


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THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


In addition to those newly manufactured in the United States and smuggled overseas, 
small arms and light weapons already in circulation will continue to sustain the black 
market. Many of the weapons in circulation in the late 1990s date back to Soviet and 
American arms transfers to Central America in the 1970s and 1980s. 125 In addition, 
U.S. weaponry abandoned in Vietnam in the early 1970s was smuggled to insurgent 
movements in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and other Central American states in the early 
1980s. The enormous number of small amis that supported the civil wars in Central and 
South America in the 1980s remain in circulation on the black market. In the wake of 
the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 15 Soviet successor states, faced with 
severe economic challenges, will become increasingly willing to auction off ex-Soviet 
military hardware to the highest bidders. 126 Ex-Soviet military equipment, therefore, 
will remain available, if not become more common, on the black market. 

(3) Small arms/light weapons smuggling. Smugglers will continue to transport illicit 
small arms and light weapons by sea through and beyond 2020. Despite occasional 
seizures of illegal weapon shipments, the full extent of maritime arms smuggling is 
unknown; identifying illicit arms shipments will become increasingly difficult as the 
volume of commercial seaborne trade triples by 2020. 

Maritime arms smuggling will remain attractive because it allows smugglers to move 
large amounts of weaponry among legitimate cargo and within the legitimate 
transportation infrastructure. In a complex 1989 case, the Colombian police seized 232 
Israeli-made Galil assault rifles after conducting a raid on one of the top leaders of the 
Medellin drug cartel. An investigation revealed the weapons were originally part of a 
larger arms shipment from Israel to the Caribbean nation of Antigua and Barbuda. The 
smuggling scheme involved Israelis, Antiguans, Panamanians, and Colombians who 
attempted to use legitimate covers to divert weapons to the Medellin drug cartel. The 
operation began in March 1989 when 500 assault rifles and ammunition left Haifa, 
Israel, aboard the motor vessel ELSE THUESEN bound for Central and South America 
via Antigua. While in Antigua, the container, presumably filled with weapons, was 
transferred to the motor vessel SEAPOINT which was supposedly bound for Panama. 
En route to Panama from Antigua, however, SEAPOINT, diverted to Santa Marta, 
Colombia, where the Medellin cartel took possession of the weapons. 127 


125 Michael Klare and David Andersen, A Scourge of Guns: The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin 
America (Washington, D.C.: Arms Sales Monitoring Project, Federation of American Scientists), 58. 

126 Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed, eds., Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (Cambridge, MA: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), 35. 

127 ibid., 62-65. 


m-36 











THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


Smugglers also will use the United States as a transshipment point for moving weapons 
hidden among legitimate cargo, as they have done in the past. In one case “two Lithuanian 
nationals were arrested after they allegedly tried to sell Russian shoulder-fired surface- 
to-air missiles for $330,000 to U.S. agents posing as [Colombian] drug dealers. They 
were to be shipped through Bulgaria, Puerto Rico, and Miami.” 128 Another case, the 
largest in U.S. history, caught significant attention when U.S. military weapons left 
over from the Vietnam War era were shipped through the Port of Long Beach, California, 
in two large, sealed containers. “Before the arms returned home, they were well-traveled, 
having gone from Ho Chi Minh City to Singapore to Bremerhaven, Germany, through 
the Panama Canal, and up to Long Beach.” 129 The containers were filled with thousands 
of grenade launchers and M2 carbine parts and were never inspected by U.S. Customs 
while in the Port of Long Beach because they were not destined for the United States. 
Moreover, the cargo was represented as “hand tools and strap hangers.” The containers 
were then placed on a truck and transported to the Mexican border where the arms were 
discovered by chance. 13 " Although it is unknown how often arms are smuggled through 
the United States, it is reasonable to suspect organized crime will continue to take 
advantage of trade deregulation and legitimate commercial infrastructure to move illicit 
arms to their final destination. 

Smugglers will attempt to transport weapons manufactured in the United States to Central 
and South America. A majority of these weapons first move into Mexico, primarily 
carried overland by human “mules” or by commercial air. 131 However, maritime 
smuggling represents another alternative for moving weapons from the United States to 
Central America. No substantial data exist on the number of weapons illegally exported 
from the United States via maritime means, but a report prepared by Mexico’s Attorney 
General’s Office, “cites flourishing gun/drug routes along the Pacific coast, the Gulf 
coast, and Central Baja and adds that a ‘significant’ amount of arms trafficking originates 
out of central Florida, crossing through the Caribbean and entering Mexico through the 
Yucatan Peninsula.” 132 In the future, maritime smuggling via these routes likely will 
expand if U.S.-Mexican border inspections intensify to stem the overland Bow of illicit 
weapons and substances. 


128 U.S. Southern Command, “Arms Trafficking in the Caribbean,’' accessed on Intelink. 

129 Lora Lumpe, “The U.S. Arms Both Sides of Mexico’s Drug War,’’ Covert Action Quarterly (Summer 1997): accessed 
online. 

130 ibid. 

131 “According to a U.S. Customs survey conducted at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), gunrunners often wrap 
the firearms in foil and then put them in their checked baggage. Smugglers also hide weapons in television sets or other 
electronic components and ship them either as air freight or as personal luggage. In 1989, U.S. Customs officers recovered 
463 firearms at LAX. It can probably be assumed that many more guns escaped detection there and at other U.S. airports.” 

132 Lora Lumpe, “The U.S. Arms Both Sides of Mexico’s Drug War,” Covert Action Quarterly (Summer 1997): accessed 

online. _ - 


III-37 












THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


In summary, the demand for small arms and light weapons will not diminish through at 
least 2020, and will continue to drive the black market and associated smuggling activities 
that transport them. While some of the weapons will move across land or by air, many 
will be transported via maritime means. These shipments will be difficult to detect, 
especially those shipped among legitimate cargo by the large smuggling operations that 
exploit the legitimate transportation infrastructure. Small arms will continue to be used 
by rogue states, insurgents, terrorists, and criminal organizations, any of which can 
threaten the ability of international organizations and national governments to maintain 
stability. Interdiction and prevention of illicit small arms and light weapons will continue 
to present a significant challenge to both U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies. 

c. Unlawful Migrant Entry Methods 

With emigration pressure from less developed countries 133 expected to rise over the 
next 20 years, 134 thousands of potential immigrants will be unable to gain legal admission 
to the United States because of quota-controls, travel costs, or other obstacles. For a 
variety of reasons, many of these migrants will attempt to enter the United States illegally, 
and, with more than 12,000 miles of U.S. coastline, many of these attempts will be by 
maritime means. While some migrants will make these attempts on their own or en 
masse, others will receive assistance from family, friends, or paid smugglers to avoid 
detection and capture by border control forces. 



Figure 111-24. U.S. Coast Guard forces escorting 
a Chinese migrant smuggling vessel. 


133 The term Less Developed Countries (LDCs) has replaced the term Third World and refers to the bottom group or 
countries in the hierarchy of developed countries (DCs), former USSR/Eastern Europe (USSR/EE) and less developed 
countries (LDC). These countries are generally characterized by low output levels, low standards of living and per capita 
GDP less than $5000 and often less than $1500. 

134 See Chapter II, Section A2. 


III-38 











THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


(1) Unassisted Methods. Unassisted illegal entries into the United States by maritime 
means will likely decrease by 2020. In the past, migrants trying to enter the United 
States unassisted have attempted to do so en masse, individually, and by stowing away. 
Each of these methods has met with varying degrees of success, but has been effective 
enough to ensure future migrants will continue its use. However, U.S. policies and 
interdiction efforts will limit the number of people who try these methods to reach the 
United States. 



(a) Mass Migration . The United States has weathered five 
maritime mass migrations in the last two decades, all from Cuba 
and Haiti. 135 In the Cuban “boatlifts,” thousands of Cubans used 
any boats or rafts they could obtain to sail toward the United 
States, or they jumped aboard U.S. vessels and sailed to Cuba to 
bring people back to the United States. In the Haitian cases, 
thousands of people crowded onto dilapidated wooden sailboats 
to leave Haiti for the United States. The overwhelming demands 
of such large groups of people strained U.S. societal infrastructure 
and government resources so severely that the U.S. government 
now routinely monitors events that may spark other mass 
movements. The policies and actions of the United States, such 
as routine Coast Guard patrols north of Haiti and within the Mona 
Passage, direct repatriation of migrants, and the May 1995 
Immigration Accords with Cuba have helped deter mass 
migrations. With these measures in place, the likelihood of future 
mass migrations has been reduced, though certainly not 
eliminated. 


Figure 111-25. Haitian mass migration 
during 1994. 


135 Camarioca, Cuba (1965) - 5000 people; Mariel, Cuba (1980) - 125,000 people; North Coast of Haiti (1991) - 25,000 
people; North Coast, Haiti (1994) - 25,000 people; and North Coast of Cuba, Havana to Caibarien - 38,000. 


III-39 
















THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


(b) Individual Attempts. Unassisted individual attempts to depart via raft, sailboat, or 
stolen vessels will decrease over the next 20 years as better detection methods and high 
failure rates make these methods less desirable than assisted methods. Currently, the 
greatest immigration threat from these methods comes from Cuba, Haiti, and the 
Dominican Republic. Migrants from these countries often use the islands of the Bahamas 
as a waypoint en route to the United States. 

(c) Stowaways. With an expected increase in maritime trade, stowaways will continue 
to frustrate shipping companies and immigration officers well into 2020. In the future, 
stowaways will continue to engage in dangerous clandestine boardings and transits on 
commercial vessels. In some cases, these attempts will prove deadly as it did for the 31 
Dominican migrants who died from asphyxiation after attempting to hide in a shipping 
container in August 1998. 136 In this case the migrants only endangered themselves, but 
some attempts endanger the ship and crew as well. In July 1998, the crew of an Italian 
ship located five Tunisian stowaways and locked them in a cabin to secure them for the 
authorities. The migrants then reportedly set a fire in an attempt to escape rather than 
face forced repatriation. Unable to break free, the five stowaways died in the cabin’s 
bathroom. 137 As these examples illustrate, some personal situations are so dire that 
migrants will assume great risk in order to escape their present circumstances. With the 
global economy creating ever-widening rifts between socioeconomic classes, future 
efforts by the world’s poor to escape will likely become more dramatic and entail 
increasing danger. Although stowaway movements will continue to account for only a 
small fraction of global illegal migrant movement, the inherent danger of this practice 
to the migrants, the ship, and its crew will continue to make this issue a concern for the 
United States. 

(2) Assisted Methods. While the total amount of future unassisted migrant movements 
is expected to decrease, assisted movements will likely increase. Alien smuggling in 
the future will grow increasingly complicated as organized crime expands its 
infrastructure to capture a share of the $10 billion dollar illicit human trafficking 
business. 138 As a result, a majority of migrants bound for the United States over the next 
20 years will likely do so via illegal methods. 


136 “Would-Be Illegals Reportedly Suffocate” (text), in Santa Domingo Ultima Hora (25 August 1998), online version, 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service . 26 August 1998, accessed online. 

137 “Investigation Begins into Migrant’s Death in Ship Blaze” (text), in Rome ANSA (28 July 1998), online version. Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service . 28 July 1998, accessed online. 

138 U.S. Southern Command, “Illegal Migration in the Caribbean,” accessed on Intelink. 


III-40 









THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


As discussed previously, smuggling operations will continue to threaten the United States 
and other developed nations. Alien smugglers, using common smuggling techniques 
adapted to their human cargo, are not likely to make significant changes to methods that 
have worked reliably for decades. For transportation, smugglers will continue to rely on 
decrepit bulk freighters and converted fishing vessels for long distance movement and 
smaller motorboats for shorter distances. 



Figure 111-26. Chinese migrant smuggling vessel. 


(a) Bulk Freighters. Smugglers use small freighters because they remain the cheapest 
means of moving large numbers of people long distances. Although in limited use for 
alien smuggling in the Caribbean, bulk freighters are the primary transportation for 
Chinese organized crime syndicates moving illegal Chinese to the United States. These 
vessels are unable to earn money by legitimate means, making them exploitable targets 
for organized crime groups who will easily obtain the crew and vessel’s services. 
Although these vessels’ poor condition and lack of life saving equipment make them 
hazardous to use, their relatively high availability, low cost, and nondescript 
characteristics will continue to be attractive to future smugglers. 

(b) Speedboats. Go-fasts and motorboats will continue to be used to move illegal 
migrants shorter distances. Bahamian-based smugglers use 20-30-foot vessels to move 
Cubans, Haitians, Indians, and Pakistanis, as well as migrants of other nationalities into 
the United States from Bimini (40 miles) or Grand Bahama (50 miles). This relatively 
short distance (2-4 hours) can be negotiated in a variety of craft and smugglers easily 
blend into the abundant traffic, of which there is a constant stream across the Florida 
Straits between MiamiAVest Palm Beach and the Bahamas. Similar techniques are used 
by Miami and Cuban-based smugglers moving Cuban migrants. Because of the longer 
distances involved and the need to evade both Cuban and U.S. border forces, these 
smugglers rely extensively on go-fasts. These larger (35-40 foot) offshore sport fishing 
boats and racing boats can move small family groups (four to six persons) at speeds of 
30 knots or more. The larger size of these vessels gives them improved sea-keeping 
ability on this longer trip (100-150 miles from the Cuban north coast to the Florida 
Keys). Little change in this type of smuggling methodology is expected in the future. 


III-41 










THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 



Figure 111-27. A Coast Guard boat crew moves in to look for bodies that might be 
trapped in a capsized boat. Fourteen people died in the December 1998 accident, 
which is one of the worst accidents involving suspected migrant smuggling. 

(c) Fishing Vessels. Some migrants use multiple smugglers for differing legs of the 
total transit to the United States. Cuban migrants have been known to pay fishermen to 
take them from Cuba to remote uninhabited Bahamian islands such as Cay Sal. Once 
there, relatives or another hired smuggler bring them to the United States or inhabited 
Bahamian Islands where they work or attempt to obtain false immigration documents. 

(d) Use of Third Countries and U.S. Territories. As mentioned earlier, third countries 
will continue to be major gateways for illegal migration to the United States. Smugglers 
will use indirect routes to stage near U.S. borders before finally moving migrants into 
the United States. Staging will allow smugglers the opportunity to observe law 
enforcement capabilities and judge weaknesses prior to the final landing. Smuggling 
into nearby countries such as Mexico and Canada will also likely increase as well as to 
U.S. territories such as Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. Interdicting 
illegal migrants at sea (whether they are assisted or unassisted) will continue to remain 
a serious challenge for the United States. Since 1980, about 290,000 illegal migrants 
have been interdicted at sea and with a rapidly expanding global population, this number 
is likely to increase. 139 The high cost of interdicting migrants at sea and repatriating 
them will continue to challenge U.S. forces. 140 While interdiction costs remain high, 
intercepting U.S.-bound illegal migrants before they reach the border saves the 
government much more. Since migrants interdicted at sea are afforded less legal recourse 
than those caught within the U.S. border, the government avoids the cost of providing 
basic human services and security as well as the expense of an extended appeals process. 


139 U.S. Coast Guard estimates circa 1998. 

140 The interdiction of the Chinese smuggling vessel CHIH YUNG in the summer of 1998, for example, cost the U.S. Coast 
Guard approximately 5.6 million dollars in resources. 


III-42 






THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


Such legal appeals can stretch for years, and migrants released on their own recognizance 
often slip away into the general population before the case becomes fully adjudicated. 
An important future challenge for the U.S. government will continue to be to stop illegal 
maritime migrants before they land. 

B. POLLUTION AND DEGRADATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 

Degradation of the marine environment, unquestionably, will remain a substantial concern 
in 2020. However, there will be a great disparity in the actual health of the seas from 
region to region around the world. Because of the high value developed countries will 
place on preserving as pristine a marine environment as possible, they will continue the 
trend toward more regulation and stricter standards in shipping and environmental 
protection, and will devote the resources necessary to obtain their goal. The result will 
be healthier marine environments near most developed states by 2020. Conversely, the 
developing states will not have the means, even if they have the will, to enact effective 
measures to protect the seas adjacent to their countries. Waters abutting most developing 
states will, therefore, be more polluted in 2020 than today. Several factors will contribute 
in varying degrees to the degradation of the marine environment. 

1. Coastal Population Growth 

Coastal population growth will play an important role in the degradation of the marine 
environment well through 2020. Human activity degrades the environment through 
nonpoint-source pollution and the physical alteration of habitats. (Nonpoint-source 
pollution refers to pollutants originating from non-distinct sources such as agricultural 
lands, roadways and other paved surfaces, soil erosion, septic tanks, and the air). 141 
Already, 66 percent of the world’s people live within 100 kilometers of the ocean, and 
because of migration from inland areas to the prosperous coasts, populations in coastal 
zones are increasing at a much faster rate than overall population. 142 For example, in the 
United States, 17 of the 20 fastest growing states are located along the coast, 143 and the 
coastal population is increasing by 3,600 people per day. 144 This continuous coastal 
growth poses a threat to the natural resources in the surrounding waters. While the 
United States is likely to expend the necessary resources to combat degradation of the 
marine environment resulting from coastal population growth, most countries will not 
have the means to do so. 


141 The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment, Our Ocean Future (Washington, D.C.: The 
H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment, 1998), 16. 

142 Gale Mead Hey, Population and Environment: Linkages: Oceans , accessed online, 

URL: <http://www.cnie.org/pop/oceanshort.htm>. 

143 The Heinz Center, “Coastal/Marine Systems,” accessed online, 

URL: <http://www.heinzctr.org/Programs/coastalmarine.htm>. 

144 Thomas J. Culliton, National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration 1998, “Population: Distribution, Density and Growth,” 
NOAA’s State of the Coast Report, accessed online., URL:<http://state_of_coast.noaa.gov/bulletins/html/popJ)l/pop.html> 


III-43 











THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


2. Nonpoint-source Pollution 

Nonpoint-source pollution from ashore will remain the largest threat to the health of the 
marine environment through 2020. Ninety percent of marine pollutants originate on 
land and eventually make their way to the rivers and bays connected to the ocean. 145 
“The oceans are the ultimate sinks for the by-products of human activities, receiving 
waters from cities, farms and industries via sewage outfalls, dumping from barges and 
ships, coastal runoff, river discharge and even atmospheric transport.” 146 Common forms 
of land-based pollution include fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, heavy metals, and 
sewage. These pollutants have a significant impact on the coastal regions. In the last 50 
years, two to tenfold increases in nutrient enrichment have occurred in coastal waters. 147 
Increased nutrient levels have led to eutrophication and growth of tiny toxic animals. 148 
For developing countries, these problems will worsen through 2020. The United States 
and many other developed states will have taken significant regulatory and enforcement 
action to reduce nonpoint-source pollution by 2020. In the future, at least in the developed 
world, human activities that severely degrade coastal areas will be stringently monitored 
to reduce pollution from land runoff. 



Figure 111-28. Nonpoint-source pollution 
will represent a significant threat in 2020. 


145 Gale Mead Hey, “Population and Environment Linkages: Oceans,” accessed online, URL:<http://www.cnie.org/pop/ 
oceanshort.htmx 

146 Environmental Software and Services GMBH, Australia, “Marine Pollution,” accessed online, 

URL: <http://www.ess.co.at/GAlA/FRAMEWORKS/PISS/Marine_pollution.html>. 

147 The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment, Our Ocean Future (Washington, D.C.: The 
H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment, 1998), 14. 

148 ibid. 


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THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


3. Maritime Accidents 

Maritime commercial activity will expand greatly during the next 20 years 149 resulting 
in larger amounts of petroleum and chemical products being transported by ship. 
However, the adoption and enforcement of stricter safety standards will ensure that 
both the number of devastating oil incidents and the volume of contaminants spilled 
will decrease substantially. This trend is already evident in the United States, according 
to U.S. Coast Guard statistics. “The amount of oil and chemicals shipped through U.S. 
waters has steadily increased over the past 15 years, from 259.9 million gallons in 1982, 
307.8 million gallons in 1990, and 333.1 million gallons in 1995. At the same time, 
however, the amount of gallons spilled per million gallons shipped has dropped 
dramatically, from 13.5 gallons, to 9.03 gallons, to 5.96 gallons.” 150 

Because of the central role the maritime shipping industry plays in creating 
interdependence among states, the actions of developed states to effect a safer shipping 
industry will contribute to safer shipping in developing countries as well. Efforts such 
as the U.S. Port State Control program will grow, reducing if not eliminating loopholes 
exploited by shipping companies to save money through the use of flag states with lax 
shipping regulations and little ability to enforce the standards they do have. Therefore, 
environmental damage caused by marine accidents should decrease worldwide over the 
next 20 years. 



Figure 111-29. Eighty thousand gallons of fuel oil were spilled 
in July 1995 when the vessels Alexia and Enif collided 70 
miles south of New Orleans. 


149 Refer to Chapter III, Section A2, for discussion on increase in maritime commercial activity. 

150 Richard D. Kohout and others, I .poking Out to 2020: Trends Relevant to the Coast Guard (Alexandria, VA: Center for 

Naval Analyses, 1997), 150, citing the U.S. Coast Guard. Marine Safety 1995 Performance,Report, 19._ 


III-45 












THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


4. Ocean Dumping 

Both the number of incidents and volume of waste dumped into the marine environment 
will decline substantially by 2020, another effect of stricter regulation of the shipping 
industry. Whether vessels wish to transport toxins, dump nuclear and/or industrial waste, 
or deballast tanks, doing so will remain explicitly prohibited without the possession of 
a permit. The likelihood of obtaining such permission, however, will simultaneously 
decrease as restrictions tighten to encompass ever more toxic chemicals. Consequently, 
the present declining trend in ocean dumping, in both volume and number of incidents, 
both internationally and within waters under U.S. jurisdiction, is likely to continue. 151 
Catching ocean dumping violators will remain an enforcement challenge, however, as 
great incentive will exist to try to avoid legal but expensive disposal options. 

5. Noise Pollution 

Acoustic pollution is an issue beginning to garner attention that potentially could affect 
future shipping regulations. Ocean noise is reportedly affecting marine mammals and 
their communications, 152 although no studies exist conclusively proving so. The subject 
is currently being studied, and should it be shown that noise from human activity harms 
marine mammals, ships will become the primary target for noise reduction since they 
account for over 99 percent of the acoustic energy humans put in the oceans. 152 In the 
frequency band used by many whales (20 to 300 Hz), the average ambient noise level 
has risen ten- to one hundred-fold compared to a century ago. 154 Environmental groups 
probably will exert pressure in the future to reduce acoustic pollution even if studies 
indicate, but do not prove, that noise is injurious to marine mammals. 

6. Invasive Species 

With maritime trade expected to triple by 2020, the threat of invasive species entering 
the United States through seaborne trade will increase significantly. Invasive species 
are those species intentionally or unintentionally introduced into an area outside of their 
natural ranges. The maritime environment is involved in two ways: as a victim and as a 
means of transport. Invasive species affect marine, estuarine, freshwater, and terrestrial 
ecosystems throughout the world and have strong economic and environmental 
consequences. According to the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, nearly every 
part of the U.S. faces at least one highly damaging invasive species. 

151 Richard D. Kohout and others. Looking Out to 2020: Trends Relevant to the Coast Guard . (Alexandria, VA: Center for 
Naval Analyses, 1997), 140. 

152 Interview with Dr. James Luyten, Senior Associate Director and Director of Research, Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institution, interview with author, October 1998 and Richard Pittenger, Associate Director for Marine Operations, Woods 
Hole Oceanographic Institution, interview with author, October 1998 and Steve Nadis, “A Noisy Silent Spring,” Currents 
Vol. 33, No. I (Summer 1998): 9. 

153 Steve Nadis, “A Noisy Silent Spring,” Currents Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 1998): 9. 

154 ibid. 


III-46 









THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


a. Marine Environment 

Worldwide, ballast water discharge from ships appears to be the major vector of aquatic 
invasive species. The volume of ballast water discharged in U.S. waters in 1991, for 
example, was estimated to be 57 million metric tons or 2 million gallons per hour. 
Ballast water, commonly originating from estuarine systems, often contains a diverse 
assemblage of microorganisms, plants, and animals. This problem has not been contained 
to one single area (See Table III-2). Although not all invasive species are damaging, 
some have been responsible for paralytic shellfish poisoning, declining commercial and 
sport fisheries, and possible cholera outbreaks. An example of the range and cost of 
damage from invasive species can be derived by examining the effects of the introduction 
of the zebra mussel into U.S. waters. These effects range from clogged municipal and 
industrial water intake pipes to the decline and perhaps extinction of native mussel 
populations. 1- ''' It has been estimated that the minimum cost to industries and 
municipalities to repair zebra mussel damage from 1993 - 2003 will be more than three 
billion dollars. 156 


GEOGRAPHIC AREA 

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF 
INVASIVE SPECIES 

San Francisco Bay 

200 

Hudson River Estuary 

120 

Great Lakes 

137 

Chesapeake Bay 

Unk 


Table 111-2. Number of Invasive Species in Selected Parts of United 
States. 157 


To combat such invasive species. Congress passed the National Invasive Species Act of 
1996, mandating the implementation of regulations that require all vessels entering U.S. 
waters to exchange ballast water (flushing of ballast tanks) outside the U.S. EEZ. This 
should reduce the introduction of invasive species into the United States, but will require 
cooperation by the maritime industry and strict enforcement to ensure compliance. Until 
better methods of detection and prevention are developed, invasive species will remain 
a significant concern well into the future. 


155 Chesapeake Bay Commission, The Introduction of Nonindigenous Species to the Chesapeake Bay via Ballast Water , 
Ballast Water Working Group, January 1995, iii. 

156 ibid., 1. 

157 . . 


III-47 














THE FUTURE OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES 


b. Terrestrial Environment 

Invasive species can create tremendous damage in the terrestrial environment as well as 
the marine environment. For example, insects introduced into the United States through 
maritime trade will pose a serious threat to U.S. forests and agriculture and could cause 
billions of dollars in damage over the next two decades. 

Invasive insects such as the Asian long-horned beetle, various exotic Bark beetles, and 
the Asian gypsy moth usually enter North American ports in untreated wooden packaging, 
ship’s ballast, agricultural stock, or containers aboard ships arriving from Europe or the 
Far East. Not only are they extremely difficult to detect, but they also often arrive on the 
North American continent in other countries, compounding the difficulty in keeping 
them out of the United States. According to one study, “the Canadian Maritime Provinces 
and Newfoundland have yielded more records of invasive species of insects than any 
other region of North America. The port city of Halifax, Nova Scotia, is especially 
noteworthy for its rich immigrant fauna.” 158 After infiltrating North American ports, 
these insects then make their way to the United States. 

Once established, the insects can cause significant damage to U.S. agriculture. The 
Asian long-horned beetle is the newest insect creating concern in the United States. 
With no natural enemies in the United States and a stubborn immunity to tree-friendly 
pesticides, the bug may inflict $138 billion in damage if it spreads to forests, according 
to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 

Over the next 20 years, invasive insects will become increasingly difficult to detect as 
shipping volume increases and trade opens with developing countries. As a result, the 
potential for foreign insects to infiltrate U.S. agriculture through maritime 
transportation will increase. 



Figure 111-30. The Asian long-horned 
beetle is the newest invasive 
species. 


158 E. Richard Hoebeke and A. G. Wheeler, Jr., “Meligethes Viridescens (F.) (Coleopters: Nitidulidae) in Maine, Nova 
Scotia, and Prince Edward Island: Diagnosis Distribution, and Bionomics of a Palearctic Species New to North America,” 
Proc. Entomol. Soc. Wash.b (April 1996): 221. 

159 “Asian beetle threatens U.S. forests,” Reuters. 25 October 1998, accessed online. 


III-48 











APPENDIX A 


FUTURE TRENDS IN COMMERCIAL 
SPACE-BASED REMOTE SENSING 


This appendix provides information expanding on that discussed in Chapter III, Ocean 
monitoring. Topics covered include: Electro-optical imagery, synthetic aperture radar 
imagery, synergy of different imagery systems, SMALLSAT development and 
hyperspectral imagery. 


A-l 





APPENDIX A 


ELECTRO-OPTICAL TRENDS 

Commercial electro-optical imagery is moving rapidly from 10 M resolution (1994 
standard) to 1-m resolution (1999 standard) as shown in this image of simulated 
space-based data. This acceleration is a fundamental characteristic of commercial 
space-based remote sensing. Driven by market demand, the performance of these 
systems will improve rapidly and dramatically. 



Courtesy of Orbimage 

Figure A-1. Image of U.S. Capitol (viewed from directly overhead). 


A-2 






APPENDIX A 


CURRENT ELECTRO-OPTICAL CAPABILITY 


With the launch of its IRS-1C satellite in 1995, India vastly improved the available 
commercial resolution to 5-m from the 10-m data offered by the French SPOT sys¬ 
tem. 



Courtesy of EOSAT Corporation 


Figure A-2. Naval Air Station, North Island, San Diego, California. 

IRS-1 C 

5.8-m Resolution 


A-3 














APPENDIX A 


SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR TRENDS 







AIRSAR-13 M RES 


ZHAO QING, CHINA 

* . 1 ■ - . -. 

GLOBESAR-30 M RES 


M 




mm 


Figure A-3. 


Courtesy of Lockheed-Martin 


The evolution of space-based synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is towards improving 
resolutions and multi-mode beam forming capabilities. These air-borne SAR images 
approximate the progress in improved resolutions which space-based, civil, non-US 
SARs have accomplished in about a decade. The next improvement in resolution 
will occur with the launch of Canada’s RADARSAT-2 shortly after 2000 which will 
provide data of 3-m resolution. However, it is currently technologically feasible to 
build civil SARs which could provide 1-m resolution. If these systems were U.S. 
owned, they would face political constraints to selling 1-m data. However, other 
countries would be constrained only by the marketability of such data. 

















APPENDIX A 


SHIP TRAFFIC MONITORING WITH SYNTHETIC 

APERTURE RADAR 

S AR data has progressed during the 1990s from 30-m data provided by the European 
Space Agency's Earth Resources Satellites (ERS series) to 7.5-m data which was 
introduced by Canada’s RADARS AT in 1995. Future systems will provide data of 
at least 3 m. The following image, provided by Radarsat International, demonstrates 
RADARSAT's capability for monitoring ship traffic, a capability that previously 
had been the domain of military satellites only. 



Courtesy of RADARSAT 


Figure A-4. RADARSAT image of Singapore Harbor 
at 7.5-m resolution. The reflectance patterns clearly 
identify these vessels as commercial ships. 


A-5 












APPENDIX A 


OPEN WATER DETECTION CAPABILITY WITH SYNTHETIC 

APERTURE RADAR 


In 1998, RADARSAT’s maritime versatility was demonstrated successfully in two 
exercises. The first, sponsored by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
addressed the ability of a commercial SAR to detect wakes of “Go-Fast Boats.” 
These vessels are the primary means of maritime shipment of cocaine into the 
United States from the Caribbean and can be detected in the SAR data by the 
distinguishing feature of the long narrow wakes which they produce. The second, 
during MARCOT 98 (a NATO exercise held off the eastern coast of Canada), 
demonstrated several different data maritime utilities of RADARS AT data, including 
the transmission of time-sensitive location and other products back to the 
participants. The images below depict the success of using commercial SAR to 
detect “Go-Fast Boats.” 



Courtesy of RADARSAT 

Figure A-5. RADARSAT image Dec 1997. Standard 25-m 
resolution captures long narrow wakes produced by target. 












APPENDIX A 


TRENDS IN SYNERGY OF IMAGERY 



Courtesy of Space Imaging in joint project with HJW 

Figure A-6. 


A-7 












APPENDIX A 


TRENDS IN SYNERGY OF IMAGERY (Cont.) 

These simulated space images of Cupertino, CA demonstrate the synergistic effect 
of combining various types of data. In this case, 0.82-m panchromatic data was 
combined with 4-m MSI data to produce an image that retained the sharpness of the 
panchromatic data but added material identifications supplied by the MSI data, thus 
increasing the accuracy of scene/target characterization. 





APPENDIX A 


TRENDS IN SMALLSAT CONSTELLATIONS 



Courtesy of Satellite Tool Kit 

Figure A-7. 

Advanced lightweight designs, SMALLSAT and LIGHTSAR, will allow 
constellations of remote sensing satellites to be deployed. Such constellations will 
provide timely multi-sensor near-global coverage. 


A-9 












/ 


APPENDIX A 


Trends in Hyperspectral imagery 



Figure A-8. 

Hyperspectral imagery has revolutionalized imagery analysis by expanding the spectral 
area of collection as well as vastly sharpening the spectral resolution by dividing up the 
spectrum into several hundred bands instead of 3-7 bands. Instead of a literal image, 
such as a photo, these sensors will provide a spectrogram of the object’s components. 
These spectral refinements will lead to spectral fingerprints. 



Figure A-9. 


A-10 














APPENDIX B 


PROJECTED SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE/ELECTRONIC 
WARFARE AND INFORMATION WARFARE THREAT TO US 

COAST GUARD 2010 (U) 


This information is classified and if needed, is available from Coast Guard Intel¬ 
ligence Coordination Center, Production & Dissemination Branch. 


US Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC-13) 
National Maritime Intelligence Center 
4251 Suitland Rd 


Washington, DC 20395-5765 
(301)669-2226 
1-800-842-0821 ext 2226 
DSN 659-2226 


B-l 












APPENDIX C 


UNCERTAINTIES IN MODELING 
CLIMATE CHANGE 

Scientists studying climate change generally agree that there are still 
uncertainties in general circulation model (GCM) results. These are due 
to: 

1. High Resolution Required for Accurate Findings. Running a higher 
resolution global model that includes several layers of the atmosphere 
and ocean, as well as the complex fluxes at the air-sea interface exceeds 
current computational capabilities. As computer power increases, efforts 
are being made to improve the resolution of GCMs. 

2. Assumptions and Approximations. Certain physical processes 
affecting global climate are extremely complex, and cannot be explicitly 
calculated within a GCM either due to limitations on computational 
resources or lack of complete understanding of the physics behind the 
process. Nevertheless, the effects of these processes must be accounted 
for within the model. This is accomplished by making simplified 
assumptions and approximations about certain processes so that they 
can be easily included in the model. The model output can be very 
sensitive to which assumptions and approximations are made, with small 
changes in the approximations having a potentially large impact on model 
results. 

A good example of this problem occurs in cloud formation analysis. 
The explicit calculation of the formation, growth, and dissipation of 
clouds within the model requires a spatial resolution on the order of a 
kilometer or less and a temporal resolution of minutes. Both are 
impractical in a GCM which normally has a spatial resolution measured 
in degrees of longitude and latitude, and a temporal resolution on the 
order of hours. Thus, the effects of clouds must be parameterized through 
numerous simplifying assumptions, each of which is likely to add some 
error to the model output. 

The approximation of cloud formation and dissipation is a major source 
of uncertainty in climate models. Clouds increase the reflectivity of the 
earth’s surface, and thus provide a cooling effect. They also decrease 
radiation cooling, producing a warming effect. Cloud height and 
thickness determine which effect will predominate. Parameterization of 
this one factor could make a significant difference in modeled results. 


C-l 





APPENDIX C 


Another example is an incomplete understanding of how polar ice-sheets 
will be affected, which in turn will affect sea level changes. This also 
impacts albedo 1 , as ice and snow are strongly reflective and water and 
soil absorb heat, resulting in dramatic changes in the distribution of heating 
and accelerated warming of the poles. 

3. Regional Effects and Distribution of Climate Change. While there 
is agreement that the global climate will continue to change, exactly where 
and how are not known. At this time, models cannot predict which 
continents will suffer or benefit from climate change. 


' Albedo refers to the fraction of light or electromagnetic radiation that is reflected by a surface or body. 


C-2 







APPENDIX D 


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APPENDIX D 


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Lumpe, Lora. “The US Arms Both Sides of Mexico's Drug War." Covert Action Quarterly . Summer 
1997. Accessed online. 

Marine Minerals Management Service. “1998 Year of the Ocean: Ocean Energy and Minerals: 
Resources for the Future.” Paper used as background information for workshops coordinated by the 
H. John Heinz Center for Science, Economics and the Environment. 1998. Accessed online. 

“Maritime Container Industry Assessment: Trends and Forecasts.” Unpublished draft report. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Customs Office of Intelligence and Communication. 31 October 1998. 

“Marine Pollution.” Environmental Software and Services GMBH. Australia Accessed online. 
URL: <http://www.ess.co.at/GAIA/FREAMEWORKS/PISS/Marine_pollution.html>. 

Mathers, Dwight T. ITOs: Are They Enforceable? . University of Rhode Island: Marine Affairs 
Seminar (MAF 651), December 1997. 

Maul. George A., ed. Climatic Change in the Intra-Americas Sea. New York: Edward Arnold, 1993. 

McRae, Hamish. The World in 2020 . Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1994. 

Menefee, Samuel P Trends in Maritime Violence . Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 1996. 

Mongelluzzo, Bill. “How Big Ships Will Change Port System: Some Facilities Face Inevitable 
Demotion To Feeder Status.” Journal of Commerce . 29 September 1997. Accessed on IC ROSE. 

“Monitoring the Diffusion of Light Weapons: A Campaign of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project.” 
Federation of American Scientists. Accessed online in December 1998. 

URL: <http//www.fas.org/asmp/light_weapons/index.html>. 


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APPENDIX D 


Moody's Port Ratings: Outlook . Moody's Investor’s Service. New York. NY: June 1998. 

Morris. Michael A. Caribbean Maritime Security . New York. NY: St. Martin's Press, 1994. 

Nadis, Steve. "A Noisy Silent Spring.” Currents . Woods Hole. MA: Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institution. Summer 1998: 8-10. 

Nair, V.K. Brig. VSM (ret.) War in the Gulf: Lessons for Third World Nations . New Delhi. India: 
Lancer International. 1991. 

Naisbitt, John and Patricia, Aburdene. Megatrends 2000 . New York. NY: William Morrow & Co., 
1990. 

National Drug Intelligence Digest Special Report. Marijuana: Domestic Situation Report . Johnstown, 
PA: National Drug Intelligence Center, March 1998. 

National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2010 . Classified. Washington, D.C.: National 
Intelligence Council, 1997. 

National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate on Information Operations. Classified. 
(NIE-97-9). July 1997. 

National Marine and Fisheries Service. Marine Mammal Stock Assessment Report. Accessed online. 
URL: <http://www.nmfs.gov/tmcintyr/mammals/sa_rep/sar.html>. 

National Security Agency. Unified Cryptologic Technology Forecast: A View Towards 2010 . 
Classified. 1998. 

Nichiporuk, Brian. “The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors.” Brief presented at RAND, 
Washington, D.C., 3 February 1999. 

Office of National Drug Control Policy. What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs . Washington, 
D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, Fall 1997. 

Office of Naval Intelligence. Brief: “Commercial Imagery Trends.” Washington, D.C.: Office of 
Naval Intelligence, 1996. 

Office of Naval Intelligence. Worldwide Threat to U.S. Navy and Marine Forces. 1997-2017 , Vol. 1, 
Classified. Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence. October 1997. 

“Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion.” National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Accessed online. 
URL: <http://www.nrel.gov/otec/design.html> 

TVpnrtmpnt of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997 . Pub 10535. April 1998. 

Pickard. George L. and William J. Emery. Descriptive Physical Oceanography . Oxford. UK: Pergamon 
Press Ltd., 1990. 

Prater, Herman. Global Marine Environment . Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 
1993. 


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APPENDIX D 


Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63. "Protecting America's Critical Infrastructures." 22 May 
1998. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. Accessed online. 

URL: <http://www.ciao.gov/63factsheet.html>. 

"Promote Safe Navigation.” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 10 July 1998. 
Accessed online. URL: <http://anchor.ncd.noaa.gov/psn/psn.htm>. 

RADARS AT International. Brief: "Ship Detection and Monitoring Using RADARS AT." 1996. 

Report of the Independent World Commission on the Oceans. The Ocean. Our Future . New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998. 

Richardson. W. John and others. Marine Mammals and Noise . New York: Academic Press, 1995. 

Robock, Alan. Global Warming: State of the Science . Testimony before the House Committee on 
Science Subcommittee on Energy and Environment. October 1997. 

Rosenau, William. Gay Kemper, and David Mussington. “Transnational Threats and U.S. 

National Security,” in Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement . Vol 6, 1997: 144-161. 

Sanchez, Joan. “Trends at US Cruise Ports.” World Cruise Industry Review . 1996: 135-138. 

Sissenwine. Michael P. and Steven L. Swartz. Shifting Currents in Fisheries Policy . Silver 
Spring, MD: International Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Marine Fisheries Service. 
Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy, 16-19. Summer 1996. 

Taylor. Charles W. A World 2020: A New Order of Nations . Carlisle. PA: U.S. Army War 
College. 1992. 

Thachuk, Kimberley. “International Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking.” Paper presented at 
the Transnational Issues Conference. 14-15 October 1998. Washington. D.C.: National Defense 
University, 1998. 

The John H. Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment. Our Ocean Future . 
Washington. D.C.: The John H. Heinz Center for Science, Economics and the Environment, 1998. 

Tilford, Earl H., ed. World View: The 1998 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies 
Institute . Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College. 1998. 

Tisdell, Clem and James M. Broadus. “Policy Issues Related to the Establishment and Management 
of Marine Reserves.” Coastal Management . Vol 17. 1989. 

United Nations 1998 Revision of the World Population Estimates and Projections. Population Division: 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "Revision of the World Population Estimates and 
Projections.” Accessed online. URL: <http://www.popin.org/pop/1998/>. 

United Nations International Drug Control Programme. World Drug Report . New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997. 




















APPENDIX D 


U.S. Census Bureau. International Data Base. “Countries Ranked by Population: 2020." Accessed 
online. URL: <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbrank.pl> and <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ 
ipc/idbsum>. 

U.S. Census Bureau. U.S. Exports/Imports History: Historical Summary 1992-1997 . CD-ROM. 
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, 1998. 

U.S. Coast Guard. Coast Guard 2020 . Washington. D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard. 1998. 

U.S. Coast Guard. Business Plan for Marine Safety and Environmental Protection . Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard. October 1996. 

U.S. Coast Guard. Theater Intelligence Assessment. Third Quarter - FY 1999. Alameda, CA: 
Commander. Pacific Area Intelligence. 1999 

U.S. Coast Guard. Theater Intelligence Assessment. Third Quarter - FY 1999. Portsmouth, VA: 
Commander, Atlantic Area. 1999. 

U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Office of Integrated Analysis and 
Forecasting. Annual Energy Outlook 1998: With Projections to 2020 . Washington, D.C.: Department 
of Energy, 1997. 

U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Office of Integrated Analysis 
and Forecasting. International Energy Outlook 1998: With Projections Through 2020 . Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Energy, 1998. 

Van. Jon. “New Energy Source Eyed Under Ocean.” Chicago Tribune . 21 February, 1995. 

Viola. Marc A. “Verification of Commercial Satellite Imagery.” Unpublished research paper. Accessed 
on Intelink, 30 September 1998. 

Voeth. Doren. “New York flying boats.” International Cruise and Ferry Review . 1998:109-110. 

White, Jeffrey B. “A Different Kind of Threat: Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare,” Classified. 
Studies in Intelligence . Central Intelligence Agency, Vol. 39. No. 5, 1996. 

Wigley. Thomas M. L., The Kyoto Protocol: C02, CH4 and climate implications. Geophysical 
Research Letters. 25,2285-2288. 1998. 

Zebra Mussel: A Threat on the Move . 1993-1994 Report from the Mid-Atlantic Sea Grant Network. 
University of Delaware Sea Grant College Program and The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, 1995. 

“1998 Worldwide Summary of Fiberoptic Undersea Systems.” PRG Guide. Accessed online. URL: 
<http://circle4.com/allblack/oxygen.html>. 

1997 Worldwide Maritime Threat Assessment . Washington, D.C.: Coast Guard Intelligence 
Coordination Center. January 1998. 


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APPENDIX D 


This report expresses the collective views of several subject matter experts. It does not necessarily 
imply that all subject experts subscribe to the details and analysis of the report. 

Subject Matter Experts 

Michael A. Alfultis, Ph.D., CDR. USCG Academy. Associate Professor of Marine Science. 

Jim Andrews, LT, International Ice Patrol. 

Roger Amato, Department of the Interior. Minerals Management Service, Office of International 
Activities and Marine Minerals. 

John Arquilla, RAND, co-editor of In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age . 
Dave Balton. Department of State. Office of Marine Conservation. Director. 

Charles Bookman, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Strategic Assessment Branch. 
Edward Bos, World Bank, Demographics Analyst. 

Patrick L. Clawson, co-author of The Andean Cocaine Industry . 

Michael Cruickshank, Ph.D., Marine Minerals Technology Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, Director. 
Jennifer E. Dick O'Donnell. USCG Research and Development Center. 

William P. Dillon. U.S. Geological Survey. Geologist. 

Stephen E. Flynn. Ph.D., CDR. USCG Academy, Associate Professor of International Relations. 

James George. Strategic Maritime Analyst, former Adjunct Fellow with the Hudson Institute. 

Terry Gilbreath, CDR. USCG Headquarters, Chief, Strategic Planning and Analysis Division. 
Marine Safety and Environmental Protection. 

Joseph S. Gispert Jr., QMC, Air Force Space Command, Coast Guard Liaison. 

Edward Gonzalez. RAND, author of Cuba's Dismal-post Castro Futures . 

Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith. Ph.D., Florida International University, Associate Professor, author of 
Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege. 

G. Thomas Gunther, CAPT, USCG Research and Development Center, Commanding Officer. 
Allen Hammond. World Resources Institute, author of Which World?: Scenarios for the 21 st Century 
Greg Hitchen, LCDR, National Marine Fisheries Service, USCG Liaison Officer. 


Richard Hoebeke. Cornell University, Assistant curator. Department of Entomology. 













APPENDIX D 


Christopher C. Joyner. Ph.D.. Georgetown University, Department of Government. 

Jim Kendell. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. Office of Integrated 
Analysis and Forecasting. 

Michael Klare, co-author of A Scourge of Guns . 

Rensselaear W. Lee III, co-author of The Andean Cocaine Industry . 

Margaret Leinen, Ph.D., University of Rhode Island, Dean, Graduate School of Oceanography. 
Allen Leonard. LCDR. USCG Navigation Center. 

Robert Livezey, Ph.D., National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service. 

Doug Lovelace, Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College, contributing author to The 
World View Strategic Assessment 1997 and The World View Strategic Assessment 1998 . 

James Luyten, Ph.D.. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Senior Associate Director and Director 
of Research. 

Laurence P. Madin. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. 

Ram Mahanand. Bureau of Alcohol. Tobacco, and Firearms, Intelligence Division. 

Erik Meindl, NOAA, National Data Buoy Center. 

Jack McCready, USCG Research and Development Center, Technology Division. 

Don Murphy, International Ice Patrol. 

Brian Nichiporuk, RAND, Associate Political Scientist and Defense Analyst. 

Kevin O'Connell. RAND. Director of Intelligence Programs, Washington. D.C. 

Norman G. Paulhus, Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration. 

Richard N. Paolino, Ph.D., USCG Research and Development Center. Physics Section. 

Richard F. Pittenger. RADM. USN (ret). Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Associate Director 
for Marine Operations. 

Scott Poyer, St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, Chief Economist. 

Peter Reuter, Ph.D., University of Maryland, School of Public Affairs. 

J. Ashley Roach, CAPT, USN (ret.). Department of State, Legal Advisor. 

Peter A. Rona, Ph.D., Rutgers University, Institute of Marine and Coastal Sciences. 


D-l 1 










APPENDIX D 


David Ronfeldt, RAND, co-editor of In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information 
Age. 


Doug Scally, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. National Data Buoy Center. 

Donald Schulz. U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Associate Professor, author of 
the forthcoming National Security Strategy for the 21st Century . 

Jeffrey Shumaker. Department of Transportation. Senior Terrorism Analyst. 

Dan Terlizzi, University of Maryland Sea Grant College Program. 

Earl Tilford, Jr., U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, editor of The World View 
Strategic Assessment , years 1997 and 1998. 

Greg Treverton, RAND. 

Georges Vernez. RAND. Director, Center for Research on Immigration Policy. 

Andy Vladimir, author of Selling the Seas: An Inside Look at the Cruise Industry . 

Dave Waymiller, Colorado State University. 

Brian G. Whitehouse, Ph.D.. Alliance for Marine Remote Sensing Association, Executive Director. 

Keith Whiteman, LCDR. USCG Headquarters, Strategic Planning and Analysis Division. Marine 
Safety and Environmental Protection. 

George M. Woodwell, Ph.D., The Woods Hole Research Center, Director and Founder. 


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